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in which one of the sectors uses a renewable resource as a factor of production. The 
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Chapter 1: 
Trade and the Environment: 
An Economic Literature Survey 
 
 
The trade and environment literature started in the early 1970’s as a response to 
the first environmental protection policy enacted in OECD countries. The concern was 
that this policy together with trade would force regulated industries to migrate to 
unregulated regions. During the 1980’s environmental issues in general became less 
important amidst the world recession at the beginning of the decade. However, with the 
beginning of the next decade environment and trade issues took the headlines for the first 
time. Two passionate intellectual camps took positions: the anti-globalization group 
fiercely started to oppose further trade integration worried that globalization in general 
will translate in progressive lowering of environmental and labor standards. In the 
opposite side free-traders argued that integration (including trade) is the only policy that 
guarantees growth, which is unavoidably accompanied by improvements in income, labor 
and environmental standards. In the middle, or perhaps, isolated from the hot headed 
debate a rich economic literature bloomed, providing arguments for both camps, 
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understanding the linkages, and providing the settings under which trade can be 
beneficial for the environment, as well as welfare.  
This survey aims to collect in a comprehensive and orderly fashion the economic 
thought developed the last decade. This study is founded on early surveys done at the 
beginning of the nineties that helped this trade and environment literature boom (Dean 
(1992), Beghin et al. (1994), Xing and Kolstad (1996)), and hopes to help and guide a 
new and better generation of economic research on this subject of great consequence. 
This exploration over the trade and environment literature will first take us over 
the theoretical literature. We will see how many second best results have been 
formalized, the effects of removing trade (price) distortions in the presence of a second 
distortion (the environmental externality). These results have been explored for different 
types of environmental externalities: when the environment is factor of production, when 
production damages the environment, when consumption depletes the environment, and 
when there are spillover transboundary environmental externalities. Additionally, we will 
see why when these two externalities are present environmental and trade policy are 
linked. Finally, we see how competition for policies can actually revert many policy 
effects that are thought to be unambiguous.  
In the second section we revise the empirical literature. In this section we review 
how economists have measured the trade and environment links. We see different roads 
to measure environmental externalities and the effects of trade when these are present. 
Direct and indirect channels through which trade can affect the environment are 
identified and estimated. Some important questions regarding trade policy, political 
economy forces and environmental effects are estimated in this literature. Do differences 
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in environmental policy determine patterns of trade, industry location, and DFI flows? 
Does corruption matter? 
Finally, we take a brief break to learn about the main criticism that this literature 
has received. Some argue that not all the environmentally degrading effects of trade are 
being considered by mainstream economics. The intention in reviewing this critique is to 
investigate areas that may be improved in future research. 
I.- The Theory1 
1. Environmental Regulations, Distortions and the Patterns of Trade 
As OECD countries began to impose environmental regulations in the early 1970’s, one 
of the first concerns of economists, when thinking about environment and trade, was that 
these controls could impose burdens too heavy that would alter patterns of trade, and 
ultimately make industries migrate to unregulated regions. Pethig (1976) using a two-
sector Ricardian model with emissions and labor as inputs shows that a country will 
specialize in the production of the environmental-intensive good if their environmental 
regulations are less restrictive than the other country. Siebert (1977) expanded the 
analysis in a single factor model, but with non-linear technology. He shows that 
environmental policy improves the environment, but at the cost of reducing the output of 
the environmental intensive good, and further, reducing the standard gains from trade. If 
the environmental regulation becomes too restrictive, eventually it could revert the 
comparative advantage of a country in the pollution intensive good. These results are 
confirmed in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework by McGuire (1982). The author adds to the 
                                                 
1 Many of the seminal papers discussed in this section have been recently compiled by Dean (2002). 
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standard trade model one factor of production in one sector, the environment, which is 
subject to a quantitative restriction. As modeled, the restriction acts as negative technical 
change in the good that uses the environment, redistributing income between the standard 
factors of production, to the factor used intensively in the non-environmental good. If the 
restriction is large enough, it can revert a comparative advantage the country may enjoy 
in the good that uses the environment. Furthermore, if capital and labor are freely mobile 
across countries, the country that imposes the restriction on the environment has its 
factors emigrate until it only produces the non-environment good, at the limit of the cone 
of diversification.  
Lack of regulations, can also determine the patterns of trade. If a country has a 
property rights problem in the access to the environment, there will be an over-
exploitation of the environment that would give the country an apparent comparative 
advantage in the environment-intensive good (we describe this literature in detail in the 
next section). 
Thus, environmental regulations can change the patterns of trade, altering the 
direction of Ricardian (technological) comparative advantage, and even standard 
comparative advantages based on relative factor abundance: at the margin it can drive 
industries out of international markets.  
Copeland and Taylor (1994), show that environmental considerations can drive 
industries out of countries even when environmental policies are the same2. The authors 
construct a model with a continuum of goods indexed by their emissions intensity, with 
                                                 
2 In their model both countries use the same policy as they tax emissions at their marginal damage level. 
However, since the richer country imposes a different (higher) tax, the authors call this different 
environment policies. 
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pollution affecting welfare as a bad, and an efficient government taxing emissions at their 
marginal damage level. Since the marginal damage, increases with income, i.e. 
environmental quality is a normal good, when countries trade the richer country 
specializes in cleaner goods (reducing pollution vis-à-vis autarky), while the poorer 
country specializes in the dirtier goods (augmenting pollution). Overall pollution 
increases for the same reasons there are standard gains from trade, the specialization 
expands output3. In Copeland and Taylor (1995a) the authors expand the analysis to the 
case of consumer generated pollution, showing that with the advent of trade, pollution 
decreases in the rich country and increases in the poor country, confirming in a broader 
sense that the dirty industry migrates from the richer to the poorer country.  
Furthermore, differences in the environment’s ability to replenish itself or to 
absorb pollution can also determine patterns of trade. Countries with “larger” 
environment, or with resources with a faster capacity to replenish themselves, enjoy a 
competitive advantage in the production of pollution intensive goods. Siebert (1977), for 
example, formalizes this result by showing that the country with an environment with 
higher assimilative capacity imposes a lower emissions tax which gives it a comparative 
advantage in the pollution intensive good. Leger (1995) extends this idea in a model with 
regional distribution of industries. He presents a Heckscher-Ohlin model with regional 
differences in the environmental assimilative capacity, showing that countries will export 
the good produced in the region with the higher environmental assimilative capacity 
(although which industry locates in that region is determined by history/chance). 
                                                 
3 More specifically, the authors show pollution increase because pollution increasing composition effects 
dominate the scale (pollution increasing) and technique (pollution decreasing) effects. These effects are 
explained in the next section. 
 6
2. Renewable Resources and Property Rights Failure 
When the environment is viewed as a factor of production, there is a potential for over-
exploiting it due to property rights problem. For example, assume the relevant 
environment was a lake with fish in it. When property rights (private or common) are 
correctly enforced, in the economic decision of harvesting fish agents must consider the 
costs of extraction plus the cost imposed on the stock of fish by altering its ability to 
regenerate. In a property rights regime of open access, only the current costs of 
harvesting are considered which translates into an over-harvesting of the resource. In this 
case there is a dynamic externality as only current costs are internalized in the economic 
decision of fishing, while the cost over the future availability of the resource is ignored. 
In a static scenario, a similar analysis is valid. Imagine every agent makes the decision to 
extract from the environment, taking other agents extraction decisions as given. In (Nash) 
equilibrium the amount harvested depends on the amount of agents, and with a 
sufficiently large amount of agents, each extracts until revenues equal average costs, 
instead of marginal costs which would be optimal; i.e. there is over extraction of the 
resource. Note that the property rights failure is not a problem of lacking a private 
property rights regime. It is possible for a community to manage a common resource 
optimally and fail to do so when a private property regime is imposed4.  
There is a rather fertile literature that examines trade in a general equilibrium 
framework, when the environment is a factor of production subject to property rights 
failure. In this literature it has become customary to call the South the country/region 
with the externality in its access to the environmental resource, while the North is the 
                                                 
4 López (1998) provides an example of this. 
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region that optimally manages its resources. Obviously, these categories want to stress 
the fact that less developed nations, usually located in the South suffer from property 
rights failure. 
2.1. North-South Trade Models 
One of the earlier North-South trade models is presented by Chichilnisky (1994), which 
is an extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Two final goods are produced with one 
factor, capital, in fixed supply, while the other factor is an intermediate good, an 
environmental good that is extracted from the environment5. The country without a 
complete property rights regime “South”, extracts more from the environment than is 
optimal, for any given price of the environmental good in comparison to the North. In 
autarky the final good that uses the environmental intermediate good more intensively, is 
cheaper in the South. Therefore the South has the standard endowment Heckscher-Ohlin 
type comparative advantage in that good and exports it. But the comparative advantage is 
not a real comparative advantage, it is only apparent, given by the externality in the 
access to the environment. Due to this environmental distortion the South loses with 
trade, and exacerbates the environmental problem by over-harvesting the environment 
even more, while the North, externality free gets the standard gains from trade. She also 
shows that if the environmental good is produced by subsistence farmers-harvesters, 
reducing the price of the environmental intermediate good (for example with an export 
tax) may lead to more over-extraction as farmers try to maintain subsistence levels of 
income. 
                                                 
5 In Chichilnisky (1993) the environment is modeled as a renewable, but all the main results hold.  
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Brander and Taylor (1997b) expand the North-South model by allowing the 
environment to be a renewable resource6. They assume linear technologies; two goods, 
one using labor exclusively, and the other labor and the environment as production 
inputs. As before, the South over-extracts the environmental input, but does not always 
expand output with additional efforts committed to harvesting the environment. 
Renewable resources have a regeneration capacity that is a function the stock. The most 
common growth function for this type of resources is an inverted-U shaped function like, 
for example, logistic growth. This means that the resource grows slowly when the stock 
is too large due to congestion, or when the stock is too low and the growth is hindered by 
a reduced population; and grows at the highest rate when the stock is around half of its 
maximum or carrying capacity. This means in the context of the trade model, that when 
the stock is high (equivalently, the price of the resource good is low) additional efforts 
would increase output of the good that uses the renewable resource. However, after a 
certain threshold, steady state output of the resource good falls in the South as it employs 
more labor in this sector (which happens when the price of resource good is high and the 
stock in the South is low). Thus, the authors show, that Chichilnisky’s result (South loses 
with trade while the North gains) is changed, when the price of the resource is high and 
the resource in the South is depleted. In this latter case, the North is more productive in 
the good that uses the environment, exports it, and both countries gain with trade. 
Note that in these North-South trade models the North that is externality free 
always gains with trade. The South does not have a real comparative advantage in the 
good that uses the environment (more intensively), and if it exploits it loses with trade. 
                                                 
6 Brander and Taylor (1997a) presents the same model under the assumption of small open economy taking 
international prices as given. 
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When the North exports the environment good, trade is efficient, in the sense that it 
follows real comparative advantages, and is thus beneficial for both countries. 
2.2 South-South Trade Models 
When both trading partners have an environmental externality, the possibilities expand: 
trade can be beneficial for both partners, to only one, or even reduce welfare vis-à-vis 
autarky for both countries.  
Brander and Taylor (1997) present a model where both countries have an open 
access externality, but have different endowments of production factors: labor and natural 
resources. This endowment differences will motivate trade. Here the country with more 
natural resources (higher natural growth rate of the resources) relative to labor, exports 
the resource good as expected. The country that exports the resource good loses with 
trade, while the other country gains. Thus if in an after-trade equilibrium the resource 
exporting country imposes an export tax, it will gain from it, and make the importing 
country lose. Furthermore, if the resource importing country imposes an import tariff, it 
will always benefit the resource exporting country, and may cause the importer to lose or 
gain from trade (i.e. the tariff may be Pareto improving). 
Karp, Sacheeti, and Zhao (2001) present a South-South model where trade is 
motivated not by differences in endowment of productive factors, but by varying levels of 
the environmental externality, and environmental stock level. The authors build on the 
work of Chichilnisky (1994). They assume fixed proportions technology for the final 
goods, and they assume that one good is a subsistence good, consumed only to a 
maximum level. Additionally a Cobb-Douglas technology is assumed for the production 
of the intermediate environmental good, and they model the property rights externality in 
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a way that it can vary from extreme open access to more moderate property rights 
problem. First, they show that, in autarky, when the stock of the resource is more 
abundant the level of the environmental externality (property rights problem) does not 
affect the steady state level of the resource, but it does when the resource is very 
depleted. On the other hand, when the countries trade, the level of the externality will 
always have an effect on extraction levels, regardless of the initial abundance or scarcity 
of the resource.  
The authors do not limit their analysis to steady states; so many possible trade 
outcomes are possible. We can delimit them into two groups efficient trade patterns 
(when trade is originated by real comparative advantage, and not generated by the 
property rights externality), and inefficient ones. Under inefficient patterns the country 
with a higher degree of environmental externality always loses from trade, but also can 
“pull down” the other and also make it a loser from trade. If the patterns of trade are 
efficient, then both countries can win or at the least one is indifferent and the other gains 
from trade. The results of the model can be conveniently organized according to the 
regeneration capacity of the renewable resource. When the environment has low growth 
(i.e. it is fragile) long run free trade and autarky levels are identical. For levels a bit 
higher of growth rate, both countries lose from trade. For still higher environmental 
growth levels, there exist initial conditions (initial stock levels) that can make both 
countries gain from trade. For even higher environmental growth rates (resilient 
environment) the country with the greater environmental externality always loses under 
free trade, while the other always gains (as in North-South trade models).  
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2.3. Treating the Environmental Externality as Endogenous  
The next step in North-South trade models is to treat the environmental externality, the 
lack of environmental policy or property rights as endogenous. The first determinant of 
the existence or lack of environmental policy is of course income: the wealthy North has 
property rights, while the less wealthy South does not. Copeland and Taylor (2004) 
attempt to answer the question: What are the other determinants for the absence of 
property rights in renewable resource extraction?   
The authors assume that there is always a property rights regime (government 
assigns extraction permits), but agents can cheat, so there exists a different de facto 
property rights regime determined by the amount of cheating. They show when trade 
occurs, and the price of the good that uses the renewable resource intensively is raised, 
countries may or may not improve the de facto property rights regime. In the losing 
spectrum there are countries that regardless of how high the price of the resource is raised 
will never improve their de facto open access regime. These countries are characterized 
by a large number of agents that can extract the resource, agents with a short life span, a 
government with limited ability to punish cheaters, and a renewable resource with a low 
intrinsic growth rate. At the opposite side, countries with strong governments, a very 
reproductive environment, and few but long lived agents, can change from open access to 
perfect property rights regime for high enough international price.  There are some 
countries in the middle, that can improve their property regime, but never achieve perfect 
property rights regime. Thus when the South opens to trade and enjoys higher price of the 
resource using good, the latter two types of countries earn unambiguously with trade, 
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both from the standards gains from trade as well as from the dynamics gains accrued 
from the improved property rights regime (i.e. extraction rents).   
2.4. Multiple Equilibria 
One of the reasons so many different welfare outcomes occur in the Karp, Sacheti, and 
Zhao (2001) model, is that their assumption of fixed proportions technology, and a 
subsistence good with maximum consumption level, translates into multiple possible 
equilibria in the renewable resource, both under autarky, and under trade. The possibility 
for multiple equilibria is more than a theoretical curiosity; it presents the possibility for 
trade to cause severe environmental depletion or even collapse.  
Copeland and Taylor (1997) present a case were trade induces multiple equilibria, 
while under autarky this possibility does not exist. In their model a small open economy 
produces two goods, one of them a polluting good. A benevolent government taxes 
emissions optimally, in a static sense. However, pollution also affects natural capital 
which is used as a factor of production in the non-polluting sector. The government 
internalizes the effect of pollution in welfare, but not the long-run effect of pollution on 
natural capital (a renewable resource): as in standard renewable resources model there is 
a property rights externality. In autarky the economy will have its natural capital move 
towards a unique steady state. When it opens to trade two different outcomes are 
possible. First, if the externality is weak, (which in this model corresponds to low 
productivity of natural capital, the one affected by the long-run externality), then opening 
to trade would produce the standard North-South models results. If it exports the 
polluting good, the economy has short terms gains, and over time the reduction of natural 
capital may completely offset these gains. If the country exports the non-polluting good it 
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will have short and long-run gains. However, if the externality is strong, as defined by a 
high productivity of the non-polluting industry, for the same autarky price, the same 
steady state becomes unstable. Outside that unstable equilibrium there are two different 
stable equilibriums: the country either finishes in a low equilibrium with very low natural 
capital; or the opposite, it specializes in the non-polluting good. The welfare effects are 
exactly opposing, big long-run losses in the former case, and important long-run gains in 
the latter.  
In Karp, Sacheti, and Zhao (2001), multiple equilibria is a result of the assumed 
technology together with low reproductive ability of the natural resource. In Copeland 
and Taylor (1997) multiple equilibria is a result of a large dynamic externality and trade, 
which for a small open economy de-links allocation of factors of production, output and 
relative prices. This type of results provides arguments for those who oppose trade, 
viewing it as an agent of environmental destruction, or can even provide economic 
explanations for known environmental breakdowns, like the one believed to have 
occurred in Easter Island, for example. 
3. Trade and Transboundary Pollution  
Transboundary pollution is understood by economists as a public bad. Public goods get 
undersupplied because economic agents can not preclude their use by other agents. Thus, 
to avoid free riders public goods get supplied in a smaller quantity than what is socially 
optimal. Equivalently, the public bad pollution gets over supplied when its transnational 
effects are not internalized. Put in a different way, the public good: transnational 
environmental quality gets undersupplied (less than optimal abatement effort) because 
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not all of the benefits can be excluded by the ones who carry the burden of the cleaning 
effort. 
In the presence of transboundary pollution, free trade is not optimal. If country A 
grants free trade (zero tariffs) to country B, then, since country B does not suffer from the 
transboundary effects, it will have the incentives to pollute more than what is optimal, 
both from a global perspective, as well as from the point of view of country A. This result 
was formalized early by Markusen (1975a), who presents the optimal tariff structure for 
the country suffering from transboundary eyesore pollution (that pollution that affects 
welfare, but does not affect the country’s production possibility set). Two caveats are 
highlighted by the author: the outcome is not Pareto optimum, which would involve 
cooperative solutions; and the author assumes that the other country does not retaliate 
with tariffs of its own. In Markusen (1975b) the author explores other second best 
instruments to deal with transboundary pollution, like consumption and production taxes.  
If countries internalize through policy the domestic effects of pollution, but not 
the transboundary effects, then trade is likely to benefit the country that specializes in the 
dirty industries, while it reduces the welfare of the country that specializes in the clean 
goods. If countries are equivalent in every respect but initial endowment of income, this 
means surprisingly, that the rich country loses with trade, while the poor country gains. 
This result is formalized in Copeland and Taylor (1995), with a model that is an 
extension of Copeland and Taylor (1994). There is a continuum of goods produced with 
Cobb-Douglas technology using emissions and labor, and indexed between 0 and 1 
according to their emission intensity. Consumers are affected by local pollution but also 
by a share of world pollution. Firms must pay for their emissions purchasing pollution 
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permits priced at the local marginal damage, so that they internalize the damage caused 
by pollution within their boundaries (governments choose a permit price that maximizes 
welfare taken other countries’ emissions as given), but the problem of global 
transboundary pollution lingers as a global public bad. Countries differ only in their 
endowment of labor which is understood as effective labor (raw labor times human 
capital), so that the rich nation is better endowed with labor. In autarky all countries 
generate the same amount of pollution regardless the amount of human capital: countries 
with higher human capital increase the demand for pollution permits, but the ensuing 
higher income reduces the pollution consumers are willing to accept raising taxes and 
moving the production towards cleaner goods (all are perfect substitutes). When countries 
open to trade the poor pollutes more, the North pollutes less, and world emissions remain 
unchanged (unless there is no factor price equalization in which case global pollution 
increases, note that this would occur if the world distribution of income was highly 
skewed). The South improves welfare from increased revenues from pollution permits, 
while the North is made worse off with trade: less permit revenues and more 
transboundary pollution (this is consistent with the fact there is no local environmental 
externality). A final important result is that it takes just two player in this set of n global 
polluters for an agreement of emissions reduction to be welfare improving (i.e. only a 
unilateral emission reduction is welfare reducing). Of course the rest of the n-2 players 
(free riders) would always benefit from such an agreement.  
Cross country differences in pollution damages generates comparative 
advantages. If one industry pollutes and affects the productivity of another clean industry, 
then the country that suffers less damage from pollution has a comparative advantage in 
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the clean industry. This concept is formalized by both Benarroch and Thille (2001) and 
Unteroberdoerster (2001). Benarroch and Thille (2001) present a simple Ricardian model 
of trade, with pollution that differentiates both local effects as well as transboundary 
effect. There are two sectors, a dirty one (i.e. manufactures) that pollutes and affects the 
productivity of the clean sector (i.e. agriculture). Due to the pollution externality, the 
production possibility set is convex. Due to transboundary pollution, the relative price of 
goods does not always reflect the real comparative advantage. Thus there is a possibility 
for trade to cause the wrong or inefficient allocation of resources and direction of trade. 
In this case there is a possibility for both countries to lose with trade. When there is an 
efficient allocation of resources that reflect real comparative advantages, the country that 
remains specialized in the externality free, polluting good, wins with trade, while the 
other country may win if it specializes in the good that is non-polluting but affected by 
the externality. In other words the country that exports the clean good can win if it can 
earn large standard gains from trade, which in a Ricardian model requires specialization, 
to overcome the losses from the transboundary pollution. Thus there is a possibility for 
trade to be welfare improving for both countries, even though there is an externality. 
Unteroberdoerster (2001) develops a very similar Ricardian model, with a dirty 
industry affecting a clean industry, and differentiating local from foreign pollution. The 
main results are the same than that of Benarroch and Thille (2001), but he explores 
further the determinants for trade being welfare improving for both countries or welfare 
reducing for both trading partners. He shows that when demand for the polluting good is 
high, the country that exports the clean good can not specialize and thus loses with trade7. 
                                                 
7 Comparable results are presented in Chapter 3. 
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Also, if the pollution damage is strong both countries lose with trade. On the other hand, 
when the demand for the cleaner good is large, both countries may win with trade.  
Intuition would suggest that in the presence of transboundary pollution, if one 
country reduces emissions, that would provide incentives to the other country to expand 
output and emissions. Gürtzgen and Rauscher (2000) show that this is not always the 
case. The authors adapt a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of intra-industry trade with 
monopolistic competition and endogenous number firms to include transboundary 
pollution. They show that when country tightens environmental policy, the number of 
firms in the trading partner can actually reduce if fixed costs are large and/or the 
monopolists’ mark-up factor is low, i.e. demand is elastic.  
Obviously one of the important challenges for the future is to design policy, 
ideally in a cooperative framework to deal with transboundary pollution. As green-house 
gases emissions increase, eventually countries will have to deal with the global “tragedy 
of the commons”. Cooperative solutions have not proven to be very successful, as the 
Kyoto protocol commitments are not being upheld by some countries like the US. In 
Europe, there is a new transnational authority, the Community’s government that can 
tackle the international externality. Some European economists have thus studied 
incentive proof policy that could deal with transboundary pollution. Harmonization of 
environmental policy does not produce efficient outcomes; because it is more efficient to 
make more emission reductions where it is cheaper (see for example Eyckmans (1999)). 
On the other hand, equalizing environmental standards has the merit of being easier to 
impose and supervise. Also, under asymmetrical information between polluters and 
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policy makers the best policy could be harmonization of environmental policy (Bigano 
(1999)). 
We can sum up the main findings in this literature by noting that trade in the 
presence of transboundary pollution is similar to South-South trade. Since both countries 
suffer from an externality trade can be welfare reducing for both countries. At the same 
time there is the possibility that trade improves the well-being of both countries, but in 
general that result requires either small transboundary effects or big standard gains from 
trade or both.  
4. The Trade and Environment Policy Linkages 
Given that bad environmental policy (i.e. existence of environmental externality) and 
barriers to trade represent two different distortions, initially economist suggested to deal 
with both problems separately (see for example Beghin et al. (1994)). Although first best 
treatment of these problems require that they be tackled with separate instruments it is 
necessary to deal with them jointly. As Copeland (1994) notes, it is well known since the 
1970’s that in the presence of many distortions an arbitrary reduction in any given 
distortion may reduce or increase welfare, because of second best problems. 
4.1. Linkages at the National Level 
Both Copeland (1994) and Beghin et al. (1997) study trade policy for small economies 
(that take prices as given) in the presence of environmental externalities (sub-optimal 
pollution regulation) using dual function: restricted revenue functions and expenditure 
function. Beghin et al. (1997) additionally explore other policy instruments like 
consumption taxes. Both find that one can not generalize results about trade policy in the 
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presence of both distortions. For example assume a country eliminates tariffs. That policy 
changes the composition of output, thus depending on whether the dirtier industries 
(more polluting) expand or contract the environment will improve or deteriorate. 
Although there will be standard gains from trade, the losses caused by a more polluted 
environment could over-compensate these gains for a net welfare loss. Thus additional 
assumptions are necessary to make welfare generalizations. For example, if all industries 
that are subject to trade protection (positive tariffs) are pollution intensive then a small 
equiproportionate reduction in tariffs will improve welfare. Also, if all industries that are 
subject to trade protection are pollution intensive then a small reduction in emission taxes 
in this sector is welfare improving. The intuition for the latter generalization is that the 
emissions taxes reduce the production of pollution-intensive sector which is indirectly 
subsidized by tariffs. The emission taxes reduction decreases the deadweight loss of the 
implicit production subsidy. The reader may refer to Copeland (1994) and Beghin et al. 
(1997) for additional generalizations. 
Two conclusions can be highlighted from the previous two examples. First, 
environmental policy and trade policy are (imperfect) substitutes. Given that dealing with 
both distortions with one instrument is second best, only small changes in the policy 
instruments are welfare improving. Both papers highlight that small coordinated 
movements in both instruments toward first best are always welfare improving. The first 
best policy is to get rid of the trade distortion with zero tariffs (small country case) and to 
use emission taxes equal to marginal damage. 
Zhao (2000) generates the same conclusions but modeling the environmental 
distortion as an open access externality and using iso-welfare curves which is a nice 
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graphical tool that captures the necessity of coordinating policy in one easy to understand 
image. What the iso-welfare curve shows is that coordinated reform toward first-best is 
always welfare improving. Also, it shows that large reductions in any one distortion, 
while keeping the other constant, is welfare decreasing. The message is that if a country 
suffers from large environmental distortions (for example no pollution regulation) and 
completely eliminates tariffs and opens to trade, most likely it will reduce well being 
rather than improving it.   
Thus, at the national level the benevolent policy maker must link both 
environmental and trade policy. 
4.2. Linkages at the International Level (Strategic Trade Policy) 
Let us begin by noting that in practice there are international linkages between trade and 
the environment. There are several trade agreements that contain environmental 
provisions, like NAFTA, European Union. There are also some environmental 
agreements that contain trade sanctions like the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, or the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES) that bans trade of certain endangered species and by-products like ivory 
and furs. Some authors in the policy world consider that these linkages are necessary to 
create credible threats necessary to make international law that deals with global 
environmental problems, and possibly as a tool of a future World Environment 
Organization (WEO), (see for example, Runge (1994)). On the other hand, the WTO has 
been consistent in not accepting differences in environmental damage of a product’s 
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production process as a ground for trade exceptions8. For the international organism, a 
product x is product x if it was produced with very clean or very dirty technology.  
Many incompatibilities and challenges linger in the plane of international law. 
However, theory suggests that trade agreements should be linked to environmental 
agreements because environmental regulations may be used as an instrument to hide 
subsidies and gain international market shares. The GATT and later the WTO in their 
effort to facilitate trade have banned the use of non-tariff trade barriers and export 
subsidies. As we have indicated before, environmental policy can be used as an imperfect 
substitute of subsidies, and thus can be used to hide export subsidies. 
The concept of strategic environmental policy has been formalized by Ulph 
(1992), Barrett (1994), Rauscher (1994), and Copeland (2000). Strategic environmental 
policy refers to the use of environmental policy to help domestic oligopolistic 
competitors gain market shares. These models are based in Spencer and Brander (1983) 
and Brander and Spencer (1985) that show how by subsidizing these firms directly or 
supplying R&D subsidies to their sector, the firms can be turned from Cournot-Nash 
competitors to Stackelberg leaders. Rents are shifted from foreign firms to domestic firms 
increasing welfare. With strategic environmental policy instead of offering a direct 
subsidy (not allowed by a trade treaty like GATT), firms are granted emissions taxes 
which are below the environmental damage as a hidden subsidy (this has been called 
“environmental dumping”). Since there is a negative welfare effect from excess pollution 
                                                 
8 See for example the high profile Tuna-Dolphin case between the US and Mexico (Rugman (1994) and 
Sampson (2000)). Following the Marine Mammals Protection Act (MMPA- 1972) the US embargoed 
imports of tuna from Mexico because they had as by-catch more than 1.25 times the dolphins’ by-catch of 
US fisheries. Mexico disputed this ban in the WTO (1991). The WTO found that the US measure was not 
valid because the ban was based on the process not the product, which violates the equal treatment of 
products provision of the GATT. The US did not abide by the ruling. 
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firms are not granted enough emission allowance for them to become Stackelberg 
leaders, but they are still allowed to expand output to levels above the Cournot player 
capturing additional rents at the expense of other competitors, and most importantly, the 
local environment. 
However, if one considers the general equilibrium effects it is not clear that 
always the policy to apply to expand the output of the oligopolist sector is to weaken their 
environmental standards. Rauscher (1994) shows that by weakening the environmental 
policy of a sector, it makes the good produced by in it cheaper, and that reduces the 
marginal returns of the factor employed there, forcing them to migrate to the other sector. 
This latter effect could overcome the direct effect of expanding output because of cheaper 
production. Similarly, Duval and Hamilton (2002) show that with asymmetric partners, 
the best strategic behavior may be to reduce environmental taxes to shift the tax burden to 
the trading partner.   
Copeland (2000) expands the discussion by showing in a two country scenario, 
that if the other country also subsidizes their oligopolist with strategic environmental 
policy, then they may end up in a new lose-lose Nash equilibrium. Countries lose, 
because as both expand output their monopoly rents are shrunk, and they further lose 
because of environmental deterioration: a classic prisoner’s dilemma case. In the 
presence of strategic environmental policy free trade may be welfare reducing. Tanguay 
(2001) shows that in the absence of the trade tariff instrument, countries will play the 
strategic game with only one instrument, the environmental tax. In their efforts to grab 
monopoly rents, governments will end up choosing lower environmental taxes, and 
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consequently pollution increases and welfare declines as compared to a restricted trade 
scenario: the prisoners’ dilemma again. 
Although, they have not been formalized in the literature, one can think of more 
scenarios where environmental policy can be used as strategic trade policy. For example, 
if an industry has economies of scale, it might be beneficial to subsidize it to drive 
competitors out of the market.  
The policy implications of strategic environmental policy are straightforward. If 
countries commit to trade policy establishing tariffs and subsidies levels, they must also 
commit to environmental policy. This trade and environmental policy linkage is 
necessary to avoid countries gaining unfair market power, or even worse, end in a case of 
trade wars, where not only trade gains are lost, but furthermore, the environment is 
depleted.   
This issue of “environmental dumping” is extremely tricky. What constitutes 
environmental dumping is not that countries have different environmental policy, but that 
they impose an environmental policy that is more lax than what is optimal for that 
country. Differences in environmental policy are expected to be observed, for the same 
reasons that there are comparative advantages: countries have different endowments of 
resources including the environment. For example it is natural to expect for a poorer 
country to have weaker environmental policy, because at its income level it is efficient 
for the country to trade off more pollution for additional income. Also, the ability of 
countries to absorb the environmental damage of output varies. For example the marginal 
damage of additional pollution is much higher in cities that are enclosed like Los 
Angeles, Santiago, and Mexico City, than in cities with good ventilation like New York. 
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Furthermore, measuring if the environmental policy is too low is at best, very difficult. It 
must be shown that for given preferences, income level and the environment’s ability to 
regenerate, the policy is too lax, i.e. taxes emissions below their marginal damage. At the 
current state of the art, we do not know how to value the environment accurately 
(although non-market techniques can provide lower bounds); nor do we know the real 
extent of the damage of pollutants to the environment, beyond their effect to human 
health. 
There is some empirical support for linking trade and environmental agreements. 
Abrego et al. (1997) construct a Computed General Equilibrium (here forth CGE) model 
and allow for a repeated game to occur to determine trade and environmental policy. 
They study the effects of this policy on welfare, under different bargaining strategies: 
non-cooperative, bargaining over trade (Nash equilibrium), bargaining over trade and the 
environment (Nash equilibrium). In the model the South owns all of the environmental 
resources and it uses it to produce both the traded and non-traded good. The North does 
not use the environment as an input, but has a valuation for it. Results indicate both 
regions gain from expanding the trade bargaining set to include environment. However, 
compared to bargaining with cash side payments, linking trade and environmental policy 
through negotiation provides significantly inferior developing country (South) outcomes. 
Thus, in presence of non-use valuation of the environment by the North, a trade and 
environment policy-linked negotiation may be better than an environment-only 
negotiation, but negotiating compensation to developing countries for environmental 
restraint would be better. 
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5. Political Economy and Policy 
Usually, the gains from trade are not equally distributed among factors of productions, as 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem highlights in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. This 
redistribution of income brought about by trade also changes the political economy 
equilibrium, which may under certain circumstances improve environmental regulations 
and ultimately the environment. Furthermore, if the effects of environmental damage 
affect different groups of society with varying intensity (or some groups do not care 
about the damage), then there are incentives for these groups to compete and lobby for 
the policies that are more beneficial to them. These political economy linkages between 
trade and the environment are receiving an increasing amount of attention from 
economists. 
Consider the case that pollution is originated by consumption, and only a group, 
“the greens” care about pollution (or are affected by it). Further, assume that home 
production is protected by a tariff. Hillman and Urpsrung (1992) show that in this case 
“the greens” would lobby for higher tariffs, because that would reduce consumption if as 
assumed foreign and local goods are less than perfect substitutes. The authors argue, that 
the more probable end result is that “the greens” displace the producers of the good in the 
lobby effort for higher tariffs, i.e. they free-ride the “green’s” lobbying. These results 
change dramatically if pollution is assumed to be caused by production. In this case, the 
greens want free trade to displace contaminating production as much as possible to the 
other country. However, the trading partner’s greens behave similarly, and the result is a 
prisoners’ dilemma Nash equilibrium for the greens with both countries choosing free 
trade and maximizing pollution. However, if there are spillovers (transboundary 
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pollution), the greens in both countries would lobby for protection, or if they can lobby 
for environmental policy, the greens would lobby for less stringent environmental policy 
(i.e. lower pollution tax), see Conconi (2003).  
Although, the efficient policy to control pollution is an environmental tax 
equivalent to the social marginal damage, Hoekman and Leidy (1994) argue that for 
political economy reasons this is not the more likely instrument used. The authors argue 
that quantitative restrictions are many times preferred because they are easier to enforce, 
and may appear as the more secure way of achieving emission reductions. The large 
deadweight losses that accompany inefficient policy may be reduced by the government 
by providing increased trade protection to the polluting and import competing sector. 
Thus the authors argue that inefficient environmental policies may be chosen for political 
reasons at the expense of free trade.  
Fredriksson (1997) and Fredriksson (1999) explore the political economy 
competition for emission taxes when pollution is a by-product of production, and groups 
of society are affected differently by pollution. In this setup, greens of course want tight 
environmental policy to reduce pollution that decreases its welfare, while industrialists 
want lenient environmental policy that would allow them to increase output and increase 
rents. Additionally there is a government that maximizes a combination of social welfare 
and rents from lobby contributions (in a similar setup to Grossman and Helpman (1996)). 
In Fredriksson (1997) the author shows, that if all of society were a member of either 
lobby group then the pollution tax would not deviate from the social optimum. However, 
if this is not the case, than the higher the weight the Government gives to contributions 
relative to social welfare, then the further apart from its optimal level the pollution tax 
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will be. That is as far as unambiguous relationships go. The political economy 
considerations bring counteracting forces into the comparative static of trade. For 
example assume that the environmental lobby group grows. It would be expected for the 
pollution tax to increase because (i) the disutility from pollution grows among the greens, 
and (ii) social welfare is more heavily affected by pollution. However there is a 
counteracting political economy effect (iii) a greater share of the tax revenues are rebated 
to the greens, which would want this group to prefer a higher tax. In Fredriksson (1999) 
the author explores the change in the pollution tax given a change in the trade policy. 
Note that, the pollution tax competition happens given the trade policy. Again, the effect 
of trade reform (reducing tariffs) has ambiguous effects over the pollution tax. Assume 
the production of the protected and polluting sector decreases after tariffs are reduced (as 
expected); then one side, the environmentalists lobby effort for a higher pollution tax is 
reduced because production falls ceteris paribus. On the other hand, the industrialists also 
reduce their lobby effort for a lower pollution tax as the tax affects less produced units. 
There is a final effect on rebated tax revenues; if the tax elasticity of revenues increases 
there is political economy effect pulling for a higher pollution tax. 
Bommer and Schulze (1999), provide an example of how trade opening may 
cause tighter environmental policy to re-establish a political economy equilibrium after 
one sector receives all the gains from trade. The author develops a model with two 
sectors each with a fixed factor, and competing for labor. One sector, the export sector, 
additionally uses the environment for production, which is subject to a quota restriction 
as an environmental policy. There are four sectors lobbying for an environmental policy 
(quota) given the trade policy, the export sector and labor, that want lower environmental 
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standards, and the import competing sector and the environmentalist that want tighter 
environmental policy. The government chooses the environmental policy, given the trade 
policy, maximizing a welfare function that weighs the welfare level of all four lobby 
groups. As a consequence of opening to trade there are windfall gains for the export 
sector and labor, and losses for the other groups. In order to re-establish a political 
maximizing equilibrium, the government trades off some of these gains to the harmed 
sector by tightening environmental controls. Note however, that these results would be 
completely reverted if the sector that used the environment was the import competing 
sector, in that case as a result of opening to trade environmental policy would be relaxed 
to re-establish the political maximizing equilibrium. 
Aidt (1998), with a very similar framework to that used by Fredriksson (1997) 
explore the more general case were lobby groups bid for both a pollution tax and a 
production subsidy (which can be understood as a protective tariff in an open economy). 
This exercise highlights the importance of targeting externalities with the right 
instrument. When there is political competition for both instruments simultaneously, only 
the pollution tax addresses the environmental externality, while the production 
tax/subsidy plays exclusively the role of distributing income. Of course, for the same 
political economy reasons the chosen pollution tax is different from the optimal 
Pigouvian rate. Schleich (1999) studies a very similar model, with a government 
choosing simultaneously trade and pollution policy, but instead of pollution affecting 
only the environmentalists, like in Aidt (1998) and Fredriksson (1997), all agents suffer 
disutility from pollution. In this case, the optimal pollution tax is also a deviation of the 
Pigouvian tax, but now the optimal trade policy is no price distortions with zero 
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tariff/subsidy, even though lobby groups are competing for protection. All the income 
redistribution in this case is provided by the sector specific pollution tax. On the other 
hand, if pollution was caused by consumption, rather than production, then both the trade 
tariff/subsidy and the pollution tax are different from zero. 
Damania (2001) expands the Fredrikksson (1997) setup and allows the possibility 
for polluters to invest in more efficient abatement technologies. He shows that under 
plausible assumptions of abatement technology, when the costs of more efficient 
technologies are high, polluters invest less in abatement and redirect resources to more 
contributions to obtain lower pollution taxes. The intuition of this result lies in the fact 
that when the least efficient (abatement wise) have greater marginal benefits from a lower 
pollution tax. Additionally, lower investment in abatement technology acts as a credible 
threat for the government that profits are going to come down and so will political 
contributions. A government that values these hand-outs will lower the environmental 
tax. 
Another linkage that could be beneficial for the environment is provided by the 
median voter, which is rational to believe in most countries is not a manufacturer or 
capital owner, but rather a consumer. As such, he receives only the externality of 
pollution, but not the direct rents from manufacturing goods. In a closed economy the 
median voter is willing to trade some weaker environmental policy for cheaper goods, but 
under free trade he would prefer zero pollution, because it would not affect price at he 
can buy the same imported goods (small country assumption). This idea is formalized by 
Yu (2000), in his model environmental regulations are tighter under free trade, but 
pollution is not brought to zero, because the government does not maximize its chances 
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of being re-elected (follow the median voter’s policy), but has an objective function that 
maximizes chances of being re-elected and contributions from lobbies (including the 
manufacturing/polluting sector). 
6. Trade, the Environment and Growth 
This literature is mostly concerned with the feasibility of growth when one of the assets is 
limited my nature, i.e. has a maximum carrying capacity. Thus if the economy produces 
two goods, one that uses the environment, and another one that does not, is growth still 
possible? Trade is not the main concern; however, trade makes growth feasible. López, 
Anríquez and Gulati (2001), show with an endogenous growth model that growth 
requires structural change, that is, as productivity grows labor must migrate to the non 
resource using sector in order for growth to be feasible. The authors make the small open 
country assumption, thus trade allows the growing country to free ride on the rest of the 
world, by allowing the growing consumption demand for the resource good to be filled 
by the rest of the world. This main result is confirmed by McAusland (2005) who 
assumes exogenous productivity growth in both the resource and non-resource sector. 
She shows that growth is not possible in the closed economy, however it is possible in the 
trading economy, as long as the country does not specialize in the resource good. She 
highlights that in the growing economy, labor employed in the resource sector must be 
shrinking over time.  
 Eliasson and Turnovsky (2005) present a more ad-hoc model, because they 
assume that productivity only grows in the non resource sector, and that the resource 
good is basically exchange coin for foreign consumption good. Under these assumptions 
the more labor in the non-resource good (without productivity growth) the lower the 
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growth rate of the economy. The authors show that under these assumptions, there is a 
fixed optimal allocation of labor, so as the non-resource sector growth there is a relative 
contraction of the resource sector.  
7. Other Trade and Environmental Linkages 
We now review other mechanisms presented in the economic literature by which trade 
can affect the environment. 
7.1. The Terms of Trade Argument 
Some authors have shown that very restrictive environmental policy may be pursued to 
restrict the output of an exported good that uses the environment and gain terms of trade 
benefits, assuming the country is big and can exert market power. 
Alpay (2000) presents a simple Ricardian model with three goods produced, in a 
two country setting. Two are normal goods that can be traded, and another is 
environmental quality. Welfare depends on the goods that can be traded and the 
environmental quality, both: the one produced at home as well as the one produced 
abroad. Thus, the environmental good is a public good, that as is standard without 
cooperative behavior gets under-supplied. When countries trade, they may end supplying 
more of the environmental good than under autarky. This happens because there is a 
terms of trade incentive. By producing more environmental good one country reduces the 
supply of the good in which it is specialized, improving its terms of trade; also this effect 
is augmented by strategic behavior as the other country behaves just like the other. Thus 
free trade through this term of trade effect can improve environmental quality, and under 
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certain parameter restrictions, it can supply more environmental quality than in a 
cooperative game.  
The balance in Alpay (2000) model is skewed towards environmental 
improvement, because the Ricardian model forces specialization in the traded goods, and 
all the terms of trade effect is channeled through the reallocation of resources from the 
traded sector to environmental investment. Rauscher (1994), shows the same result in a 
standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework where the factors of production are capital and 
emissions. In a Heckscher-Ohlin setting, if a country wants to improve its terms of trade 
it has to increase the relative price of the good that uses intensively the factor with which 
it is relatively well endowed (i.e. the good it exports). Thus a country well endowed with 
environmental resources should use a restrictive policy in the use of the environment, the 
opposite of environmental dumping. Note however, that the country relatively well 
endowed with capital should apply environmental dumping. 
The terms of trade argument may apply in certain types of trade. What is 
important for it to be a relevant issue is that one country or a small group of countries 
own a big share of the world supply, in order to affect the world price. For example, 
OPEC country behave accordingly in their supply of oil (a non renewable natural 
resource), and one may conjecture it was the policy pursued by South American countries 
in early 20th century when they enjoyed the monopoly of natural rubber. 
7.2. Debt, Resource Management, and Trade. 
Rauscher (1989) points to another trade and environment link that is especially important 
for small open countries that are exporters of renewable resource intensive goods. He 
shows that the level of public debt that a country manages determines the speed at which 
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renewable resources are depleted. The target steady state level of natural resources that 
the country would like to preserve is independent of the level of debt, as it depends on 
terms of trade, preferences and technology. However, during the transition phase when 
the stock of natural resources is being harvested; the level of debt determines the speed 
and effort spent in extracting renewable resources. The author shows that during 
transition if debt increases, so does the rate of extraction of renewable resources. That is, 
if public debt increases it is worthwhile for the country to reduce the debt faster, shifting 
extraction of the exportable resource from the future to the present. Obviously debt relief 
would have positive environmental effects, as extraction can be shifted from the present 
to the future.  
 
II.- Empirical Analysis 
1. Patterns of Trade and Industry Location 
From the literature described above, the researcher expects to observe with the greater 
factor mobility and growth of trade among nations a constant migration of 
pollution/environment-intensive industries from the developed world to developing 
countries. Developing countries are poorer; because of income and political economy 
considerations have weaker environmental regulations; and in general, as a consequence 
of being in earlier stages of development have more abundance of environmental 
resources. For all these reasons, a growing share of the dirtier goods should be produced 
in the developing world. This phenomenon has been called: the “dirty industry 
migration” or “industry flight”; “displacement” of industry, when it is the tightening of 
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the controls in developed countries that causes it; or “pollution haven” when it is the lack 
of regulations in the developing world that attracts the industries. Although there is broad 
theoretical support for this industry migration, the empirical evidence is rather mixed. 
During the 1970’s and 1980’s some research was conducted among these lines, 
we briefly mention the most important results of this work, while focusing in the work 
published in the last decade9. Early studies found that the environmental abatement costs 
relatively to total cost were rather low. Walter (1973) estimates that environmental 
control costs relative to total costs of export goods were 1.75% (using 1968-1970 data). 
Robinson (1988) supplies some support for the industry migration hypothesis showing 
that in the US, between 1973 and 1982, pollution content of imported goods rose faster 
than the pollution content of the exported goods. In other words, during the period there 
was a shift in US trade towards importing relatively more pollution intensive goods. 
Tobey (1990) uses a Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model and a cross section of the most 
polluting industries (those whose abatement costs are higher than 1.85% of total 
production costs) from a pool of 64 standard industrial and agricultural sectors, covering 
23 countries. Different regression analysis tests suggest that environmental control is not 
a valid variable in explaining the patterns of trade. 
Lucas et al. (1992) present evidence of polluting industry relocation, but they do 
not link the phenomenon to trade. The authors first calculate emissions per industry by 
linking Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA here forth) Toxic Release Inventory 
(1987) data to industrial census (1987) data, to calculate total toxic emission per dollar of 
                                                 
9 The 1970’s and 1980’s research is more completely covered in earlier literature surveys, Dean (1992) and 
Xing and Kolstad (1996). Less comprehensive in this area, but also a good previous literature survey is 
Beghin et al. (1994). 
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output for different industries in the US. Then they assume that these pollution intensities 
remain constant through time (1960-88) and across countries (56 countries) to prepare a 
panel data set of toxic pollution per country and through time. Next, the authors review 
the effect of trade liberalization on toxic emissions. They conclude that although 
developing nations as a whole had greater toxic intensity growth during the 70’s and 80’s 
this trend was more pronounced in fast growing closed economies (i.e. trade would not 
have caused the toxic industry flight). Birdsall and Wheeler (1992) use Lucas et al. 
(1992) data for an empirical study of pollution intensive industries in Latin America. The 
authors regress the growth of toxic intensity of output on income growth, measures of 
openness to trade, and other control variables. They reach similar conclusions to that of 
Lucas et al. (1992): slow and closed economies exhibit faster toxic intensity pollution 
growth, while open and fast growing economies show lower toxic emission growth. 
Low and Yeats (1992) explore the hypothesis of dirty industry migration by 
examining world trade data from 1967-68 and comparing it to 1987-88. They create a 
revealed comparative advantage index per industry: ratio of the country’s share of export 
in one industry (i.e. country’s export in that industry over the world total exports of that 
industry) to the country’s share of total exports (i.e. country’s total exports over world’s 
overall exports). If the index is greater than 1, it is assumed that the country has a 
revealed comparative advantage in that industry. The authors study the evolution of the 
index for the five dirtiest industries according to the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory: iron 
and steel, nonferrous metals, refined petroleum, metal manufactures, paper and articles. 
The main conclusions are that: (i) the amount of countries with revealed comparative 
advantages in dirty industries has been growing; (ii) dirty industries account for a 
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growing share of exports in some developing countries; while at the same time (iii) the 
share of dirty industries in total exports has been declining over time. Thus, the authors 
provide support for the hypothesis that dirty industries have been migrating, but they do 
not link it either to tougher environmental standards in developed countries 
(displacement) or opening to trade. 
Grossman and Krueger (1993) repeat a similar exercise to that performed by 
Tobey (1990): check the effect of environmental regulation on trade flows, in their case 
import penetration by industry. Grossman and Krueger use data on US imports from 
Mexico, and confirm Tobey (1990) results, that environmental policy has no effect over 
the trade flows.  
Mani and Wheeler (1999) present evidence for the displacement theory, that is, 
tougher environmental standards in richer countries have forced polluting industries to 
relocate in developing nations with weaker regulations. The evidence comes from 
showing that in OECD countries the polluting to non-polluting output ratio has been 
falling, at the same time that the import to export ratio of polluting industries has been 
growing in the 1960-1995 span. The industries identified as most polluting are the top 5 
of the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory. The support for the displacement theory is closed 
with evidence that the polluting to non-polluting output ratio has been growing in general 
in Latin America and in Asia (excluding Japan), and the import to export ratio of 
polluting industries has been falling in these same regions. However, the authors do not 
do a good job in convincing the reader that it is environmental regulations that cause this 
regional relocation of industries, since as they recognize different factors could explain 
the phenomenon: (i) income growth and the low income elasticity of demand of pollution 
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intensive industries; (ii) the rise in the prices of energy and land (polluting industries are 
intensive in these inputs); (iii) tougher environmental standards (mostly since 1970s). 
Wheeler (2001) supplies evidence that apparently contradicts the dirty industry 
migration hypothesis. The author shows that the countries that receive the greatest share 
of the world’s overall foreign direct investment (FDI): Brazil, Mexico and China, have 
actually shown a reduction in the levels of urban air pollution (particulate matter). 
The fact that different regression analysis shows that abatement costs, or 
environmental controls do not explain trade flows (Tobey (1990), Grossmann and 
Krueger (1993)) has puzzled researchers. A possible explanation is that higher abatement 
costs are not necessarily associated with reductions in output due to general equilibrium 
forces could be off-setting the intuitive result. Eskeland and Harrison (2002) show that 
when abatement costs rise, there is a substitution in production towards other factors, i.e. 
capital, if these factors are less polluting, they could reduce marginal costs, more than the 
rise in marginal costs produced by the hike in abatement costs; an unlikely but possible 
scenario. The authors, study foreign investment from US to Mexico and Venezuela, and 
French Investment to Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire discovering that these flows are not 
explained by the abatement costs these industries face in their homelands. The authors are 
not surprised by the result, because as they argue previously larger abatement costs ought 
not to be unambiguously related to higher marginal costs. 
Another possibility, for the ambiguous result of environmental policy explaining 
trade flows is provided by Levinson and Taylor (2001) and Ederington and Minier 
(2001), who argue that the economic theory we have reviewed above suggests that 
environmental policy is really endogenous. The strategic trade argument suggests that 
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environmental policy can be used as a trade instrument to protect industries. Additionally, 
the political economy literature suggests that environmental policy may be used to 
redistribute income among groups in society. For these reasons, previous work that 
treated environmental policy as exogenous was getting biased results, and could explain 
the apparent ambiguity. Levinson and Taylor (2001) examine US imports (1974-1986) 
from Canada and Mexico and show that when environmental policy is treated as 
exogenous it does not explain imports. However, when they treat abatement costs as 
endogenous the ambiguity disappears; industries with the biggest increase in abatement 
costs import more. Ederington and Minier (2001) carry out a similar exercise using 
imports from a cross section of all US manufacturing industries (1978-1992). The authors 
find that environmental regulations have a significant but very minor effect on trade 
flows. They find more specifically that environmental regulations (measured as share of 
abatement costs of total costs) increases imports, but the elasticity is very low 0.53. 
However, when they treat the environmental regulation as an endogenous variable, and 
estimate a system of two equations with an efficient method (imports and environmental 
regulations) they find that the effect of environmental regulations on trade flows is much 
larger; they estimate an elasticity of 35. Additionally, the authors find evidence that 
environmental policy is being used as an indirect instrument for protecting industries, as 
import penetration has a significant (negative) effect over environmental policy. 
A different method to test the effect of environmental policy on industry location 
is to estimate the marginal effect of environmental policy in the observed location choice 
for industrial plants. Levinson (1996) applies a conditional logit model to explain 
observed plant location of US firms in the 48 contiguous states controlling for the other 
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factors that affect plant location like market size, infrastructure, wages, energy cost, etc. 
He uses different environmental stringency variables, with mixed result. However, both 
the FREE (Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment) index of environmental 
law stringency and the industry’s abatement costs, jointly and separately are significant 
(and negative) in explaining industry location choices. List and Co (2000) use the same 
method to explain plant location of foreign firms, that is, US inbound FDI. Their results 
are unambiguous as all the measures of environmental regulation used explain negatively 
foreign plant location decisions. That is, states with lower abatement costs, and states 
which spend less effort in regulating polluters have a higher probability of receiving new 
foreign plants. 
We can summarize the evidence supplied by this empirical literature by 
recognizing that originally the evidence seemed mixed, but the later research seems to 
converge to accepting the hypothesis of industry migration. On one hand, there seems to 
be a well documented relative growth of pollution-intensive industries in developing 
countries. On the other, newer studies point to growth in the pollution content of imports 
of developed countries from developing nations (see Kahn 2003 and Muradian, et. al 
(2002)). Furthermore, as others have argued (see Cole et. al (2001)), the apparent lack of 
relationship between industry location and environmental regulations may be due to 
countervailing forces, factor endowment versus pollution haven. For example the 
chemical industry is very polluting, but requires ample supply of human capital; a 
developing nation may provide economies by allowing dirtier technologies, but be less 
endowed of the skilled labor production factor.  
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At the beginning of the decade the mixed evidence for the industry migration 
hypothesis was justified by low abatement costs relative to other factors affecting 
industry location such as tax breaks, price of inputs, proximity to markets, political 
stability, etc. It was also argued that the growth of pollution in developing countries 
(Lucas et al. (1992)) could be justified by the development path rather than differences in 
environmental policy. However, the latest empirical research that more comprehensively 
collects the results from the theoretical literature and treats environmental policy as 
endogenous is showing that environmental policy does affect industry location and the 
patterns of trade. 
2. Evaluating the Development, Trade, and Environment Linkages 
A very useful tool in understanding the mechanisms by which trade affects the 
environment is decomposing the economic consequences of trade in scale, composition, 
and technique effects. This decomposition first suggested by Grossman and Krueger 
(1993), has been widely adopted by economists10.  
The scale effects refer to the changes in pollution emissions caused by output 
expansion assuming the nature of economic activity remains unchanged. That is, a 
change in pollution is purely caused by the scale effect when all sectors of the economy 
expand in equal proportions and the technique to produce output remains unchanged. 
However this is an unlikely outcome after an economy opens to trade. Trade will cause 
sectors that enjoy comparative advantages to expand, while others contract, as factors are 
reallocated with the change in relative prices that the opening to trade encompasses. This 
                                                 
10 Grossman and Krueger credit Task Force on the Environment and the Internal Market (1990) for 
proposing a similar decomposition.  
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change in pollution caused by this modification of the structure of output is called the 
composition effect. Finally, the opening to trade and foreign investment is likely to 
change the technique used to produce output, changing the environmental damage by unit 
of output.  
Many channels can explain this change in production techniques. For example, 
trade could bring the adoption of cleaner foreign technology. However, the main channel 
is through the growth in income. Although the empirical literature that examines it is not 
free of controversy, there is an overwhelming consensus that trade causes growth. Given 
that it is assumed that environmental quality is a normal good, as income grows after 
opening to trade, better environmental quality is demanded. Consequently, stricter 
environmental standards are imposed, which translate into the use of cleaner techniques 
or the investment in abatement efforts. 
The scale effect is unambiguously environmentally degrading, the composition 
effect could either harm or improve the environment depending on the country’s 
comparative advantages, and the technique effect has a positive effect on the 
environment. Thus, a priori one can not provide a definite answer for the question: Is 
trade good for the environment? For example, if the composition effects make a country 
leave the production of dirty industries and specialize in cleaner sectors, trade is then 
likely to be good11. In any case, globally the composition effect brought abroad by trade 
should be neutral as what one country does not produce should be produced in another 
place. Furthermore, if the technique effect becomes stronger with development (as 
income grows) eventually countries would observe environmental improvement. 
                                                 
11 Bandara and Coxhead (1999) provide an example (with a Computed General Equilibrium model for Sri 
Lanka) where trade is good to the environment because positive composition effects dominate. 
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Grossman and Krueger (1993) supply evidence with a cross country study that emissions 
of both sulfur dioxide (SO2) and dark matter (smoke) grow with income until a certain 
threshold, above which emissions begin to diminish. Thus, emissions plotted with respect 
to income follow an inverted-U shape further labeled in the literature as an 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (here forth EKC)12.  
Certain technological conditions and preference structures must be assumed to 
observe EKCs. López (1994) shows that the environmental Kuznets curve result relies 
both on a high degree of technical substitution elasticity between dirty and clean inputs, 
and on the preferences side, a high relative risk aversion (curvature of welfare with 
respect to income). Also, welfare must be non-homothetic with respect to the 
environment and consumption goods. Alternatively, if the environmental improvement is 
thought of as the result of investment in abatement technologies, then that technology 
must show increasing returns to scale in order to observe a EKC, as Andreoni and 
Levinson (1998) show. Chavas (2004) using endogenous discounting shows that the EKC 
hypothesis is implicitly assuming the existence of alternative capital goods (engines of 
growth) that are less harmful to the environment. It is important to refer to these technical 
requirements, because they may not describe all industries or economies.  
Grossman and Krueger’s finding of an EKC has inspired a vast literature trying to 
confirm or reject the findings for different samples (countries and periods), pollutants, 
and measures of environmental quality. It is not within the scope of this survey to cover 
                                                 
12 The original Kuznets Curve describes the relationship of income inequality with respect to income. 
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comprehensively this literature, but we can refer to the main findings13. Most studies find 
that the EKC seems to exits for sulfur dioxide (SO2), as Grossman and Krueger (1993) 
show. This finding, however, has been lately rejected as the product of time trend rather 
than income (Stern and Common (2001)). The evidence is mixed with respect to 
particulate matter. Grossman and Krueger (1993) reject the EKC for particulate matter, 
but Wheeler (2001) provides evidence of EKC for particulate matter in developing 
countries. The evidence for CO2 is also mixed, see for example Galeotti and Lanza 
(1999). EKC do not seem to exist for industrial water pollution (Hettige et. al (1999)) or 
for deforestation (Koop and Tole (1999)). Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
EKCs do no exist (or we have not observed the turning point) for pollutants like trash per 
person, ozone, and other. 
In summary, there does not seem to be a predetermined road to environmental 
improvement where trade or development could lead to. Trade brings about changes in 
the economy that could be either harmful or beneficial to the environment. If comparative 
advantages are mostly determined by differences in environmental regulations, trade is 
likely to be harmful for the environment. EKC may exist for some pollutants, especially 
those that have important harmful effects at the local level, like NO2 related to acid rain, 
but its existence is not so clear for emissions with global effects, like CO2, a green house 
gas. 
                                                 
13 See Nordstrom and Vaughan (1999), Levinson (2002), and Stern (2001) for a more complete coverage 
and summary of the empirical literature that has studied EKCs for different pollutants and environmental 
quality measurements. 
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3. Empirical Evaluation of the Effects of Trade on the Environment and Welfare 
3.1. CGE Estimations 
Many of the empirical assessment of trade effects on the environment and welfare have 
been carried out with the use of CGE models. These models vary in their degree of 
generality, their realism, and how well calibrated they are. Their results should be taken 
with caution, as they are only an approximation, and especially when they try to measure 
the effects of large changes in the variables of the models like prices. General equilibrium 
holds relations at the margin, so large changes of variables may cause substitutions that 
are not necessarily captured either by the model or the assumed functional forms. In 
general, CGE simulations confirm theory discussed above (as they should); for example, 
trade does not necessarily improve welfare or the environment when the environmental 
externality is not addressed; also, trade may provide welfare gains in the presence of the 
externality if large positive composition effects dominate. We now review this research 
starting from the most general estimations to the country case studies.  
Cole et al. (1998) and Cole et al. (2000) provide the most general results of the 
effects of trade on the environment, calculating the effects of the GATT Uruguay Round 
on five air pollutants (nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, suspended 
particulate matter and carbon dioxide), and the monetary costs associated with this 
emissions changes. Of course such global results are very rough estimates and require 
brave assumptions. They first combine estimations on composition changes associated to 
the trade agreement (borrowed from the literature) with separate estimations on pollution 
intensity by industrial sector (Lucas et al. 1992), to calculate the composition effects of 
emissions. Then they use the estimated income effects (borrowed from the literature) and 
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econometrically estimate environmental Kuznets curves (assumed to exist for all 
pollutants) to compute what they call the combined technique and scale effect. Then they 
use estimates in the literature of the cost of pollution in health, labor, etc., to calculate the 
monetary costs of the pollution changes. They observe that all regions (9) are predicted to 
increase their nitrogen dioxide emissions, while sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide and 
suspended particulate matter are predicted to increase in the developing world and fall in 
the developed world. There are overall costs associated to the trade agreement, especially 
in the case of nations that grow faster, that is when there are strong scale effects. 
Perroni and Wigle (1994) also provide some general estimations of the effects of 
trade on the environment. The authors prepare a CGE model that incorporates 
environmental effects. There are three regions that trade goods. Production is affected by 
emissions, both produced at the local level, and also at the global level, i.e. transboundary 
pollution. The authors assume that governments charge an effluent tax for emissions, and 
that firms can pay to abate emissions. The authors also assume that the emission revenues 
are transferred not to the affected parties, but to the consumers where the emissions are 
generated (an efficient but unrealistic possibility). The model is calibrated with very low 
abatement costs, as estimated in the literature (Walter (1973)). The results are standard in 
this CGE models. Without payment for emissions (without solving the environmental 
externality) trade worsens the environment quality. The authors are very happy to show 
that the damage is very low. However this damage depends on the environmental damage 
function that is assumed; no such function has been estimated in the literature. Also 
without emission payments welfare improves with trade as environmental quality is not 
valued in the welfare function. When the environmental externality is internalized 
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through emission payments, there can be both environmental quality improvements and 
welfare gains with free trade. 
There are many different CGEs that study the environmental and trade effects of 
policy in specific countries. We begin with one of the earlier such studies, Beghin et al. 
(1995), who apply a CGE model developed at the OECD and later also applied to Chile 
in Beghin et al. (2002). In this first paper the author use a dynamic and recursive CGE 
model for the Mexican economy including 9 sectors with different pollution intensities 
for 13 types of pollutants. The authors show that a unilateral trade opening would cause 
in the Mexican economy a composition change toward cleaner sectors, but the scale 
effect would dominate toward an overall more polluting end-result. Emissions taxes 
increase abatement, but cause overall income losses that vary by the type of emission 
targeted, but always with a negative income (output) effect. Linking emissions taxes with 
trade opening can result in both income gains and pollution reduction, the amount of the 
gains and the reduction of pollution varies with the type of emissions targeted. Very 
similar results are shown for Chile in Beghin et al. (2002), which actually has better 
welfare analysis because emissions are valued by their health impacts. Unilateral trade 
reform in Chile induces considerable worsening of the environment mainly caused by the 
cheaper access to imported energy sources. On the other hand trade agreements with 
NAFTA or the MERCOSUR have more benign environmental effects. Again, unilateral 
reform together with taxes on emissions (especially small particulate matter) can bring 
overall welfare gains.   
There are different studies for Indonesia in the literature. Lee and Roland-Holst 
(1997), develop a CGE model that studies the trade pattern of Indonesia with special 
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attention to the bilateral trade with Japan. The authors first examine the patterns of trade 
between Japan and Indonesia, noting that Indonesia exports to Japan the more pollution 
intensive goods. Then they develop a three region (Japan, Indonesia and World) trade 
CGE model that includes emissions. The results indicate that unilateral trade 
liberalization by Indonesia would increase the ratio of emission levels to real output for 
almost all major pollution categories, which results actually in welfare losses. However, 
when tariff removal is combined with a cost-effective tax policy (that internalizes the 
environmental effects), the twin objectives of welfare enhancement and environmental 
quality improvement appears to be feasible. A more optimistic scenario is presented by 
Strutt and Anderson (2000) using a dynamic CGE. These authors, using a different model 
show that unilateral trade reform would actually improve air and water pollution over the 
horizon of 2 decades, and would slightly increase the degradation of renewable resources, 
even in the absence of policy directed to correct the environmental externality. 
Dessus and Bussolo (1998) study the case of Costa Rica, also using a CGE. The 
authors find that environmental taxes alone, produce a small reduction in growth but 
sharply reduce emissions. On the other hand, unilateral trade reform, with across the 
board tariff reductions, promotes growth but also promotes specialization in dirty 
industries which translates into strong environmental damage. Like in the studies 
mentioned above, unilateral trade reform with the proper effluent taxes allows for growth 
and emission abatement. 
Bandara and Coxhead (1999) develop a CGE model to study the effects of trade 
reform in the Sri-Lankan economy. The authors discover that unilateral opening to trade 
produces a win-win scenario for the country. That is, trade reform produces income gains 
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as well as environmental improvements. This rather unconventional result is explained by 
the dominance of positive composition effects. Unilateral trade reform in Sri-Lanka 
would increase the demand for land for tea production. Being tea a much less erosive 
crop, causes trade to be environmentally improving.  
3.2. Regression Analysis 
A completely different approach to measure the effects of trade on the environment is 
offered by Antweiler et al. (2001). Instead of using CGE measurements, the authors use 
world trade data to separately estimate composition, scale, and technique effects of trade 
on the environment, using regression analysis. The authors first develop the micro-
foundations for pollution emissions decomposing the scale, composition and technique 
effects. They use this theoretical equation to estimate the determinants of Sulfur Dioxide 
(SO2) emissions. The data comes from the Global Environment Monitoring System 
(GEMS) spanning from 1971-1996 and covering 44 countries, mostly developed. They 
conclude that trade has a positive impact on the environment as they show that a 1% 
growth in the scale of output causes 0.3% increase in pollution concentrations, while at 
the same time income drives concentrations down by 1.4% via the technique effect. To 
the surprise of the authors they show that trade in itself is overall pollution reducing, 
when theory suggests that the overall effect should be zero, that is the aggregate 
composition effect should be zero. However, the results of these authors should be 
moderated, they do not show that trade is good for the environment as they pretend, but 
only show that trade reduces SO2 emissions. From EKC studies we already knew that 
SO2 emissions always seem to follow the EKC pattern. Also, the fact that trade reduces 
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the emissions of one pollutant does not mean that it improves the environment, that result 
would require at least the same reduction pattern for a larger set of pollutants. 
Frankel and Rose (2002) extend the analysis by treating environmental quality as 
endogenous together with income. They estimate a system of two equations treating per 
capita income and environmental damage as endogenous, using data from a cross-section 
of countries, unfortunately limited by the availability of data for the environmental 
damage indicators used: SO2, NO2 and particulate matter. In spite of the concern of 
selection bias, the authors provide results consistent with Antweiler et al. (2001), opening 
to trade appears to improve the environment as measured by SO2, the result on NO2 
pollution is inconclusive, and there is no statistical relation between opening to trade and 
air particulate matter pollution. 
Dean (2000) follows a similar methodology to show that trade reform (opening) 
has been beneficial to the environment (water pollution) in China. The author develops a 
2 by 2 trade model where pollution, a factor of production, is endogenized with an 
implicit demand for environmental quality (tolerance of pollution), which as theory 
indicates depends on income, price of goods and environmental policy. Based on the 
model the author estimates a system of two equations where water pollution growth and 
income growth are treated as endogenous, using province level data from China (1987-
1995). The specification allows the identification of both composition and technique 
effects. The estimations suggests that trade liberalization has a direct negative effect over 
the environment via the composition effect. However, trade reform causes growth in 
income, which then causes a reduction in water pollution (technique effect) greater than 
the increase originally caused by the composition effect. Thus, trade appears to be good 
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for the environment (reduces water pollution). One should be careful on generalizing 
these appealing results from China, because in China water pollution is taxed (which is 
why there is data on pollution), which reduces and potentially eliminates the 
environmental distortion.  
3.3. Renewable Resources and Property Rights Failure 
North-South trade models stress the over usage of natural resources, and the possibility of 
trade being welfare reducing under these circumstances. Unfortunately very few studies 
have attempted to measure the existence of this type of environmental externality, and the 
effects of trade under this externality. López (1998), and López (2000) provide empirical 
estimations of this environmental externality by joining observed economic behavior 
from household surveys and environmental (biomass) depletion from satellite data in 
poor tropical countries. López (1997), estimates a production function for farms in Ghana 
(1988-1989), with biomass as a factor of production. He uses the estimated function to 
test the hypothesis that land is being cleared (after fallow periods) at socially optimal 
levels, and rejects it for assumed discount rates lower than 50%. He shows both, that 
biomass is an important factor of production (estimated factor share of 15-19%) and that 
biomass is overexploited, which reduces productivity of land and consequently farm 
income. Using, the parameters estimated, and others borrowed from the literature the 
author estimates the effect over national income of both reducing export taxes on 
agricultural goods, and across the board trade liberalization. Not surprisingly, reducing 
export taxes would diminish national income, as increasing the local price of agricultural 
goods would augment the pressure over biomass, reducing even further the productivity 
of farms. More surprising is the result that across the board trade reform would also 
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reduce national income, that is, standard gains from removing price distortions, are less 
than the losses associated to the magnification of the environmental externality. 
 In López (1998), and López (2000), a similar exercise is carried out for Côte 
d’Ivoire (1985-1987). The author first estimates a revenue function for farms, where 
again biomass is a factor of production. The author shows that biomass is an important 
factor in production, with an implicit factor share estimated of 17%. Additionally, for 
reasonable social discount rates lower than 60%, the revenue estimation suggests that 
land is being over used, by clearing more forests and reducing fallow periods. Obviously 
this behavior results in sub-optimal productivity of land and lower rural revenues. In 
López (1998), the author argues that trade reform that improves the relative price of non-
tree crops over tree crops, would increase land usage, magnifying the environmental 
externality, and potentially reducing national income. This issue is studied further in a 
general equilibrium framework in López (2000), where the author shows that complete 
removal of trade distortions increases real income up to 9% in the long run when land 
usage is in a new equilibrium. 
4. The Political Economy of Environmental Policy 
As Dean (2000), Levinson and Taylor (2000), Ederington and Minier (2001) argued, 
environmental policy can not be treated as exogenous. Furthermore, Fredriksson (1997) 
shows that environmental policy will deviate from the optimal depending on how the 
Government values social welfare vis-à-vis lobby groups’ contributions. Damania, 
Fredriksson and List (2000) argue that this relative valuation of lobby contributions may 
be understood as corruption. Using a similar framework to Fredriksson (1999) the authors 
show that trade opening reduces the pollution tax if corruption is low, and the opposite 
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happens when corruption is high. The authors test this hypothesis estimating an equation 
for environmental policy (lead content on gas) for a time series pooled cross section of 
countries using different trade openness measures, a government honesty index, and other 
country characteristics as controls. The authors find evidence that their hypothesis is 
correct. First, government honesty tightens environmental policy, with a significant 
coefficient in all specifications. Furthermore, the cross product of the government 
honesty index and openness is always significant, and indicates that the effect of trade 
openness on the pollution tax depends on the degree of corruption of the government. 
Increased corruption amplifies the more stringent environmental policy effect brought by 
opening trade.  
 
III.- The Ecological Economists’ Critique 
From the fringe of mainstream economics, ecological economists have constructed a 
body of strong criticism to the way most economists have studied trade and environment 
issues. Some arguments are better founded than other, but is a productive exercise to 
review them, because it highlights the strengths and weaknesses of traditional economic 
analysis of the trade and environment debate. 
One of the most important criticisms coming from the ecological economics camp 
has been called the race to the bottom hypothesis14. They argue that mainstream 
economists focus just on trade, ignoring the fact that there is factor movement in the 
globalized world we live in. If factors are allowed to move freely across borders, then 
                                                 
14 A good summary of the ecological economics view of trade and the environment is given by Muradian 
and Martínez-Alier (2001). 
 53
traditional comparative advantages based on relative abundance of factors of production 
does not motivate trade, but instead absolute advantages do. Countries in an effort to gain 
absolute advantage will be forced to lower environmental standards, and labor standards 
as well, in a race to the bottom towards the lowest common denominator (see Daly 
(1993), Daly (1997)). Poor countries desperate for investments and jobs will lower their 
standards, while developed countries will be forced to lower theirs too in an effort to stop 
the exodus of capital, as the world falls in a vicious cycle of lowered wages and 
destroyed environment. 
A well thought response to this hypothesis is given by Wheeler (2001). The 
author rejects the “race to the bottom” hypothesis, and its policy implication: equalizing 
international environmental standards and the possible use of trade as a coercive 
instrument. He first shows that in developing countries that captured most of the world’s 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in recent years (Brazil, Mexico, and China), pollution 
(particulate matter) has been decreasing over time; the opposite result to what the “race to 
the bottom” hypothesis predicts. The “race to the bottom” hypothesis is flawed, according 
to Wheeler, because: (i) pollution control is not a critical cost factor for most firm; (ii) 
even low income communities penalize toxic polluters, and even in the absence of 
regulation; (iii) rising income strengthens environmental regulation; (iv) local businesses 
sometime control pollution because abatement reduces costs; and (v) large multinational 
firms generally adhere to OECD environmental standards in their developing-country 
operations. We can add that although there is a more integrated worldwide economy, we 
are far from observing perfect factor mobility.  
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Nonetheless, there is certain theoretical support for the race to the bottom 
argument. Rauscher (1995) shows that when countries compete for industry location by 
offering tax rates for the environmental damage, the tax rate chosen varies from the 
cooperative tax rate. When the environmental damage is low, countries offer a lower rate 
than what would be optimal if countries chose the tax rate cooperatively and shared the 
benefits and costs of industry location. Furthermore, if there are large transboundary 
effects of pollution then countries may end up offering zero tax (or even a subsidy if 
possible) to attract industry location. These results follow Markusen et al. (1995) study 
for environmental policy competition within regions of a country: when disutility from 
pollution is low, regions compete undercutting each other’s tax level; and when pollution 
disutility is high the polluting industry is driven off the market with high taxes. 
Ecological economists also argue that economists assume very easily the dogma 
of two causal relationships: first, trade causes growth, and second, growth causes better 
environmental protection (and eventually improvement). There is widespread consensus 
that trade causes growth, however this is not undisputable. Standard gains from trade are 
static, but there is theoretical support for trade causing growth: economies of scale, 
monopolistic competition, diffusion of technology and learning by doing, etc. In the end 
if trade causes growth is an empirical issue, and the literature that has examined this 
question has not been exempt of controversy. There is overwhelming support for a 
positive empirical correlation between openness to trade and growth, but the causality 
arrow can not be shown to be unambiguously there. The second correlation is suggested 
by theory: if we value the environment positively, as we grow richer we are willing to 
make higher trade offs between income and the environment. However, the point at 
 55
which environmental improvements become observable is very important on itself and 
seems to be ignored.  
This latter argument appears to be the best founded criticism against traditional 
economic analysis. In economic analysis ecological considerations are ignored. 
Ecosystems are characterized by a complex web of inter-relationships some linear, some 
non-linear, some discontinuous, some not apparent, etc. Limiting the analysis of the 
effects of trade on the environment to EKCs can be extremely misleading. For example, a 
complete ecosystem may be destroyed by acid rain (and in turn destroying the 
sustainability of growth) in a certain region, before the economic threshold of reducing 
SO2 emissions is achieved. This is possible because the point of irreversible damage for a 
particular ecosystem may be reached before the economic turning point for 
environmental improvement. Abatement is not always the solution. The abatement cost to 
recover extinguished species is infinite. How do we even value the genetic information 
contained in disappeared species? Thus, the fact that eventually, through income growth, 
there is demand for environmental improvement nothing guarantees that the supply will 
be there. Furthermore, it is efficient to trade off some environmental damage for income; 
however, agents and governments may be dealing with this trade off with severe under-
valuing of the environmental damage due to ignorance. 
 
IV.- Conclusion 
Although the literature that studies trade and environment has grown productively during 
the last decade, there are still many gaps to cover. A better multi-disciplinary approach is 
needed to determine more clearly the effects of output and emissions on the environment. 
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For starters, it is necessary to deal with the toxicity of the emissions mix as very few 
studies have done. Furthermore, for the benefit of the policy makers it is necessary to 
delimit more clearly the conditions under which trade reform can be welfare improving in 
the presence of both local environmental externalities and transboundary pollution. 
Finally, in the ground of empirical evaluation more estimations are necessary beyond 
CGE analysis to creatively determine the effects of trade on the environment, 
differentiating among the competing effects brought about by trade. 
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Chapter 2: 
Trade of Renewable Resources in the  
Ricardo-Schaefer Model. 
The Small Country Case 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Natural resources approach to the trade-environment discussion has started 
recently and its contributions have been growing in the literature. We are aware of a few 
works that consider renewable resources in the trade and environment analysis. Copeland 
and Taylor (1997) develop a model of two goods, where the environment, a renewable 
resource is used as a factor of production by one sector, and deteriorated by the other 
sector. Assuming that the country is an international price taker the authors discover a 
threshold for the production externality, that when exceeded, trade can actually be 
income reducing for the country in equilibrium. This work does not include any 
intertemporal considerations, and limits itself to steady state analysis. On the other hand, 
Brander and Taylor (1997a, 1997b, 1998) have developed a model where a renewable 
resource is used as a factor of production by one sector, while a second sector only uses a 
fixed supply factor. They show how the “South” with an open access externality 
overexploits the natural resource, and in equilibrium trade could reduce welfare vis-à-vis 
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the autarky equilibrium. However, like Copeland and Taylor (1997), only equilibrium 
response is studied ignoring the dynamics of the model. Recently, both Emami and 
Johnston (2000) and Hannesson (2000) have expanded the Brander and Taylor analysis 
by studying the effects of moving from an open access to optimal resource management 
regime in a trade scenario. Emami and Johnston use the Brander and Taylor framework, 
Hannesson varies it slightly by assuming decreasing returns in the non-resource sector, 
but both show that under certain conditions “immiserizing resource management” can 
occur. This result states that after moving from open access to optimal management real 
income can be lower than before the change. 
The latter result is interesting but reflects the drawbacks and limitations of steady 
state analysis. For example, in this paper we show that technological progress in the 
resource sector causes the steady state resource stock to decrease. Then, depending on the 
original stock, after the technological change real income may be lower. Furthermore, it 
is possible for the advanced country to have a lower steady state welfare than the 
backwards country. However, this does not mean that technological progress can be 
welfare reducing. What happens is that optimal management means maximizing welfare 
over a time horizon, not maximizing the welfare achieved at steady state. That is why 
optimal management can not really be immiserizing, and why it is necessary to study the 
behavior during the whole time horizon, not only steady state. 
The work we present as the Ricardo-Schaefer model is an extension of the 
traditional analysis of renewable resource in trade in several directions. First, we let the 
North, the country that manages its resource optimally, to have a positive but finite 
discount rate, which let us study the behavior of the resource managing country under 
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more realistic assumptions, as well as make more accurate welfare comparisons for the 
whole planning horizon. Next, we focus in the dynamics of the transition periods. These 
are important to study, because as we show, the direction of trade may be completely 
determined by the transition period. Also, during the transition period, we can observe the 
extreme behavior of allocating all resources in the depletion of the resource, as apparently 
some countries do. Paradoxically, this latter behavior we show can be optimal. We also 
expand the model by allowing the South, the country which extracts resources with an 
open access externality, to have varying degrees of the open access externality. Under 
these circumstances the behavior of the South can be very different to what is expected. 
Furthermore, we study the conditions under which extinction of the resource can occur, 
and we argue that complete elimination of the resource can not occur under free trade. 
II. Discounting and Valuation of the Resource 
When one wants to determine the optimal consumption and saving across time of 
an accruing stock, one can not ignore time discounting. The following example from 
Clark (1990) will hopefully make this very clear. 
It is estimated that the Antarctic waters can hold a maximum of 150,000 Antarctic 
blue whales. Additionally, a population of whales can grow at a maximum of 2,000 
whales per year, when the stock of whales in the ocean reaches about half of the 
maximum population, around 75,000 creatures. Assuming that the market revenues of 
selling a whale amounts to $10,000 then the maximum revenue that may obtained from 
the whales, keeping its population constant is $20 million per annum. Alternatively, the 
industry may decide to liquidate the whole whale stock in one year obtaining from it 
$750 million, that invested in any other sector that yields a rather conservative 5% per 
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annum would give returns of $37.5 million per year. This example not only shows why 
whales were saved from extinction by an international ban, but also demonstrates that 
discounting is necessary to reflect alternative uses of resources. And that is what 
economics is all about, efficient allocation of limited resources over less limited 
possibilities. Also, even if, like in our model, there are no other alternative investment 
opportunities for a stock that can be accumulated, time discounting is still necessary to 
reflect preferences over the usage through time of this growing stock. 
The author loves whales, like probably the reader, and is willing to pay money 
and time some day to enjoy their gigantic beauty. Thus, this example of the whales serves 
us to dissipate another source of confusion. Sometimes renewable resources, like whales, 
have an economic value beyond their productive usage simply by their existence. For 
example, a forest has an economic value as timber, which has a competitive price and a 
market, but also the same forest has an existence value, as people value the existence of 
the species contained in the forest. This latter value could be reflected by time and money 
people are willing to pay to visit the forest, or willing to give to conservation groups. 
Thus, in the whale example there is an externality problem as the whaling industry only 
considers the productive value of the whales, but not their existence value. 
In the model we present the renewable resource only has a productive value, it 
does not have an existence value. However, it can be overexploited given an open access 
externality, which is one of the central points we explore in the model we present. 
Ignoring this existence valuation could be a more reasonable assumption for some types 
of resources than other. Nonetheless, we can a priori determine that this type of 
externality (ignored value) results in an overexploitation of the renewable resource. 
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III. The Ricardo-Schaefer Model. 
The model we present could be safely labeled the Ricardo-Schaefer model as it 
blends a standard Ricardian model of trade, with Schaefer’s pioneering work in the 
economics of the exploitation of renewable resources. The Ricardian part of the name 
recognizes that we are using linear technologies in the production of both sectors. This 
assumption has benefits and drawbacks. The main drawback is that it predicts 
specialization during transition which is a rather unrealistic prediction that may 
discomfort the reader. The linear technology assumption has, on the other hand, some 
considerable advantages. First, it allows us to solve explicitly for equilibrium, which can 
be very helpful in equilibrium analysis as we hope to show below. Also, this simple 
technology allows us to fully describe the transition paths with relative ease. 
Additionally, the linear technology, as in the original Ricardian model, allows us to 
clearly isolate the differences in technology as driving force in trade. Finally, as Gordon 
(1954) and later Scahefer (1957) suggested, the law of diminishing returns does not apply 
to an industry like fisheries (the quintessential renewable resource). The benefits 
overwhelm the drawbacks, and that is why it has been very popular in the literature of 
trade and renewable resources; see for example, Brander and Taylor (1997a, 1997b), 
Benarroch and Thille (2001), Unteroberdoerster (2001), McAusland (2005), and many 
others. 
In this section we describe the production decisions of the North, the country that 
fully accounts their natural resources, and take prices as given. Special attention is given 
to the adjustment of the economy towards steady state equilibrium. The amount of 
resources conserved by the North are described and analyzed. In the next section we 
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describe the differing behavior of the South, a small country that also takes prices as 
given but their natural resources display an open access problem. The problem of 
extinction, or termination of the natural resource is discussed in the following section. 
Finally, we study how the model behaves given changes in its different parameters, i.e. 
comparative dynamics. 
1. The Model.  
Two different products are produced by one country using two factors of 
production: one mobile, and another specific. One sector depends only on the mobile 
factor of production, labor, and for exposition purposes we will call it the Manufactures 
sector. The second sector uses the stock of renewable resources, the specific factor, and 
labor to produce its output, and therefore call it the Resource sector.  
 RR SLθ=  (1) 
 MM L=  (2) 
 R ML L L= +  (3) 
Equation (1) gives the production function for the resource sector. Note that S, the 
stock of the resource acts as a productivity shifter in the production of the resource good, 
as more available stock makes the labor employed in the sector more productive. 
Additionally, the production of the resource good depends on an exogenous technical 
parameter, θ. The second equation, (2), gives the production function for the 
manufactures sector. Note that for a particular choice of units, M will depend one-to-one 
on the amount of labor employed. Finally, equation (3) gives the labor endowment 
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constraint. If one takes the stock S as a constant, equations (1) - (3) constitute the 
standard Ricardian trade model. 
At any particular moment in time this economy behaves like the standard 
Ricardian economy. Using the labor requirements per unit produced, i.e. ( ) /Ra R L R= , 
( ) /Ma M L M= , we can define the instantaneous linear production possibilities frontier 
for this economy: 
 1( ) ( )L a R R a M M R M
Sθ= ⋅ + ⋅ = + . (4) 
However, the model differs substantially from the standard Ricardian one because 
the stock has a dynamic that depends on the natural growth of the resource and the 
production of the resource good: 
 ( ) ( )S G S R S= −  (5) 
where the dot over the variable indicates the time derivative. 
The growth of the stock G(S) in this model follows a logistic function given by: 
 ( ) (1 / )G S S S Cγ= −  (6) 
The logistic function, that can be traced to 1838, is the most commonly assumed 
for the growth of renewable resources, because it captures in the simplest fashion what 
we believe describes the growth of these kind of resources15. Equations (5) and (6) make 
up biologist M.B. Schaefer’s (1957) model of fisheries. In the Cartesian space the 
function begins at the origin increasing with the stock until it reaches a maximum at C/2 
(known in the biological literature as the Maximum Sustainable Yield), then it starts 
falling as the stock increases until it gets back to zero again when the stock reaches C.  
                                                 
15 P.F. Verhulst used the logistic equation to describe the dynamics of human population in, “Notice sur la loi que la 
population suit dans son accroissement”, in Correspondance Mathématique et Physique, N. 10, 1838  
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This hill shape is what we believe (state of our ignorance) best describes the growth of 
renewable resources. When the stock is relatively low, increases in the stock can support 
higher growth rates; however, when it is too large (greater than C/2) the growth rate will 
diminish with stock increases as the overcrowding or congestion effect affects the 
growth. In (6), γ  is the intrinsic growth rate, and C is the maximum carrying capacity.  
In steady state, when 0S =  the production of the resource good is equal to the 
growth of the stock. The dynamics of the stock are graphed in Figure 1. For example, if 
originally the production of the resource good was R(S0), the extraction of the stock 
would be higher than the natural growth rate of the stock and, therefore, the stock would 
be reduced until it reaches a steady state level at Ss, where the production of the resource 
good would be R(Ss). Alternatively, if the stock was originally at a level below its steady 
state level, the opposite would occur, while the stock grows to reach its steady state level. 
Two important features of the model may be extracted from Figure 1. First, if the 
production of the resource good through time was too high, the stock would be 
completely depleted to zero. In the graph this would happen if the line ( ) RR S SLθ= , was 
steeper than the slope of the logistic growth function at S=0, that is γ the uncongested 
growth rate. Therefore, if '( ) '(0)RR S L Gθ γ= > = , the stock would be entirely depleted 
and the economy would have to specialize in the production of manufactures. Second, 
there is one maximum level of production of the resource good. Then, if the stock 
extraction is augmented from a steady state to the right of this maximum, the production 
level of the resource good would augment, alternatively, the opposite happens to the left 
of the Maximum Sustainable Yield (C/2). 
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2. The Production Pattern in the North 
For exposition purposes, we will call South the country that does not internalize 
the effects of their production of the resource good on the dynamics of the stock (that is 
on its later availability or scarcity). By doing so, we think we are capturing the stylized 
fact that in many developing countries (South) the lack of enforcement of property rights 
causes harvesters of natural resources to consider only their private costs of extracting the 
resource, and not the costs that their extraction causes to the pool of the resource. 
Obviously, the end result of this behavior is an over exploitation of the resource. It is 
important to stress that this lack of internalization of all relevant costs may occur in a 
poorly enforced private or communal property regime. Neither regime guarantees that the 
externalities problem is solved. For example, in poor sub-Saharan African nations, the 
introduction of private property rights deteriorated communal controls over the use of 
land causing over usage of their available (and fragile) biomass16. Alternatively, the very 
known “tragedy of the commons” exemplifies how in a private property regime any 
communal resource gets over used. Therefore, one should be careful no to call this 
problem the “common property externality” as erroneously some have, but more 
accurately call it the open access externality. 
We will first solve the economic problem for the North that has a well-enforced 
property rights regime, and later study how the allocations differ in the South that has an 
open access externality. 
The economy would like to maximize a given representative agent’s utility 
function U(R,M), given the technological constraints (1) - (3) and the biological 
                                                 
16  Cf. Lopez (1998) 
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constraints (5) - (6). Usually in the trade literature homotheticity is assumed to ensure 
that income redistributions do not affect optimal consumption patterns. However, in this 
case no assumptions over U beyond quasiconcavity and monotonicity are needed, 
because the small country takes prices as given. Therefore, since the country is the sole 
owner of its revenues we can reduce the algebra of the problem to maximization of 
revenue given the aforementioned constraints. Given this optimal revenue and 
international prices, consumers can then choose optimal consumption bundles offered 
with infinite elasticity at the international prices. What is important for our welfare 
analysis is that there exists a direct relationship between welfare and real revenue, given 
monotonicity.  
The problem of the economy is to [ ]
0
Max rtpR M e dt
∞
−+ ⋅∫ , given the 
technological and biological constraints and a given initial stock level 0(0)S S= . The 
problem can be expressed as the current value Hamiltonian: 
 ( , ; ) ( ) (1 / )R R R RH L S p SL L L S S C SLλ θ λ γ θ⎡ ⎤= + − + − −⎣ ⎦  (7) 
The Hamiltonian shown is simplified by including the labor endowment 
restriction (3) into the production of manufactures (2).  The first order conditions of this 
problem are: 
 1 0p S Sθ λθ− − =  (8) 
 ( 2 / )R Rp L S C L rλ θ λ γ γ θ λ⎡ ⎤= − + − − +⎣ ⎦  (9) 
 (1 / ) RS S S C SLγ θ= − −  (10) 
 lim ( ) 0rt
t
e tλ−→∞ =  (11) 
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 0(0)S S=  (12) 
Condition (8), can be interpreted in several ways. Expressing it as ( ) 1p Sλ θ− = , it 
says that the social marginal revenue of labor in the resource sector ( )p Sλ θ− must be 
equal to the marginal revenue of labor in the manufactures sector. Here λ can be viewed 
as consumption tax. Alternatively, rewritten as 1/p Sθ λ= + , it says that the unit revenue 
of the resource good pays the labor unit cost of producing the resource good a(R)=1/θS, 
plus the marginal cost of use of the stock (marginal user cost), λ, which could be viewed 
as resource stock property rents. If there was complete open access to the resource and no 
property rent could be extracted, then λ would be zero, agents would extract the resource 
until 1/p Sθ=  or equivalently 1/S pθ=  holds, like in Brander and Taylor (1997a). This 
extreme case occurs when there is complete open access or agents are solving problem 
(7) with a discount rate r equal to infinity. The latter is an unsatisfactory explanation, and 
that is another reason why we later solve the more general problem, and model the 
externality in a different fashion. 
Note that the Hamiltonian (7) is linear in the control, and will thus have a bang-
bang solution17. Also, note that condition (8) does not depend on the control variable LR, 
and will only hold in steady state, provided that a diversified steady state equilibrium is 
achieved. If the country is unable to achieve equilibrium, for example due to insufficient 
labor supply, condition (8) will be an inequality. Away from the steady state, the 
                                                 
17 Formally, in a single control, single state problem, labeling O(s,c,t) the objective function of the state s the control c 
and time t, and labeling f(s,c,t) the function of flow of the state with the same arguments; if 
0/),,(
/),,(
=∂
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ∂∂∂∂∂
c
ctcsf
ctcsO
, then the control displays  a most rapid approach path (MRAP) or bang-
bang behavior. It is easy to see that in our problem this condition is met as the control enters linearly in both the 
objective function and the state motion equation. 
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economy chooses LR so as to arrive to equilibrium, and make condition (8) hold as fast as 
possible. We define the switching function: 
 ( ) ( ) 1t S pσ θ λ= − −  (13) 
The control variable, labor in the resource sector, will be determined by the 
switching function as follows: 
 
0 if ( ) 0
if ( ) 0
if ( ) 0
R
R
s
t
L L t
L t
σ
σ
σ
<⎧⎪= >⎨⎪ =⎩
; 
where RsL  is the steady state level of labor in the resource sector. 
We can readily make economic sense of the switching function. First note that 
this extreme, all or nothing behavior is consistent with the Ricardian nature of the 
problem. If ( ) 0tσ > , then 1/p Sθ λ> + , that is, revenues from producing the resource 
good are higher than the costs, and therefore, like in the standard Ricardian model, all 
labor resources are used to produce the resource good. Following the same reasoning, 
when ( ) 0tσ < , then 1/p Sθ λ< + and the country specializes in the production of 
manufactures. The big difference though, lies in that after specializing S, λ will change 
through time and a diversified production equilibrium may be reestablished if equality of 
marginal cost and marginal revenue is recovered.  
The mathematical explanation for this extreme or Most Rapid Approach Path 
(MRAP), is also quite intuitive. Given that the control variable appears linearly both in 
the objective function and the state flow equation, allows us to express the value function 
(i.e. the objective function accounting for the dynamic restriction (5), ( , )V S S ) after 
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appropriate transformations as a function of only the state variable, ( )V S 18. This means 
that the value function has (given linearity of the control in the objective function and 
state equation, see footnote 17) only one S that maximizes it, and the integral of the value 
function is thus maximized by attaining this maximum as quickly as possible. 
Also, it is important to note, that the MRAP is a result of trade, this economy in 
autarky approaches its steady state with a continuous change in its harvesting effort. 
When the stock is lower than the long-run, optimal labor in the resource sector is 
increasing until steady state and vice-versa (see more details in chapter 3). The economic 
explanation for this behavior is that specialization is not feasible in autarky because as the 
production of one sector decreases its demand determined relative price rises hindering 
specialization. Mathematically, under autarky we have that the Hamiltonian (7) does not 
take the price as a parameter but is instead determined by demand according to the 
consumers’ welfare maximization condition: 
( )
( )
( ), ( )
( ), ( )
R R
R
R R
M
U R L M L
p
U R L M L
= . In this latter case 
the objective function is no longer linear on the control. 
In the next section we study the motion of S and λ to see if the value function 
maximizing stock level is achievable and under what conditions.  
3. The Model Dynamics 
The first step in our study of the Ricardo-Schaefer model is to study how the 
problem is solved for any given amount of initial stock, S0. To determine if a steady state 
is reached we look at the movement of S and λ, as determined by the first order 
                                                 
18 See Spence and Starrett (1975) for the mathematical details. 
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conditions (8) - (10). It is helpful to look first at the schedules that make their time 
derivatives equal to zero: 
 
0 2 ( )
R
R
p L C
S r C L Cλ
θλ γ γ θ= = + − +  (14) 
 
0 0
( )0,
R
S S
C LS S γ θγ= =
−= =   (15) 
If condition (8) is initially not met with equality, there are profits to be extracted 
in either sector. That is, for example, if 1/p Sθ λ> + , the resource sector is more 
profitable than the manufactures, and given the (Ricardian) linear technology all the labor 
is directed to the resources sector. In that case the relevant schedules are: 
 
0 2 ( )
p LC
S r C LCλ
θλ γ γ θ= = + − +  (16);and 
 
0 0
( )0,
S S
C LS S γ θγ= =
−= =   (17) 
However, on the other hand if the inequality is reversed and 1/p Sθ λ< + , the 
profitable sector is the manufactures one, in which case the resource sector employs no 
labor, and the relevant zero time change schedules are: 
 
0
( )
2
C rS λ
γ
γ=
−=  (18); 
 
0 0
0,
S S
S S C= == =   (19) 
Solving for the first order conditions of the Hamiltonian, we can find a steady 
state stock level, we label Ss as a function of the parameters of the model. In the next 
section we describe this stock level, but for now let us assume that it exists. The 
convergence to the steady state will depend on the initial stock level S0, on whether it is 
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greater or smaller than the steady state stock level. Note that given that the logistic 
growth function is quadratic over the stock, the 
0S
S =  schedule has two solutions; one of 
them is always zero reflecting the fact that once the resource is completely depleted it can 
not recover, it becomes extinct.  
Let us study first, with the aide of  Figure 2 the case when the initial stock S0 is 
greater than the steady stock SS, that is the resource is initially underexploited. For 
descriptive purposes, we call this, the pristine environment scenario. To understand the 
dynamics of the system we need to include first order condition (8) which determines the 
extreme bang-bang behavior of labor. In Figure 2, condition (8) is graphed in the λ, S 
space as line z (z for zero profits), only combinations of λ and S that lie in the z line can 
support a diversified equilibrium, where no profits can be extracted from either sector. 
Points above the z line, where ( ) 0tσ < , represent combinations of stock and marginal 
cost of use of the stock that make the manufactures sector more profitable than the 
resource sector, and therefore, consistent with no resource extraction, and thus, resource 
stock growth. The opposite happens, below the z line where ( ) 0tσ >  and the resource 
sector is more profitable which is consistent with all labor resources being employed in 
harvesting the resource and in that way reducing its stock.  
When the initial stock S0 is greater than the steady state level, the fastest and 
optimal way to approach a lower stock level is to direct all labor resources to the 
production of the resource good. Therefore, the relevant schedules, when the initial stock 
is above the optimal are given by (16) and (17). Although in Figure 2 the 0S =  schedule 
(the vertical dotted line) is shown over the positive stock region, it may be positioned at a 
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negative stock value if there is a relative abundance of effective labor with respect to the 
resource, i.e. /L γ θ> .  
Given the initial stock level S0, the social planner, or the agents that internalize all 
social costs, will choose a λ(0) that will send the economy in a revenue maximizing 
transition path (MRAP) to the steady state stock level. The instant when the resource 
stock, after being harvested at maximum capacity, reaches its steady state level, a 
diversified equilibrium is established. Production diversification is achieved because no 
further profits are there to be extracted from the resource sector. At this moment in time, 
LR is chosen to keep both S and λ with no time change, and the remaining labor is 
employed in the manufactures sector. Note that the steady state is unique, it represents the 
only point over the z line where an LR can be chosen to maintain both S and λ in steady 
state. Figure 3 describes the steady state in the λ, S space. The diversified steady state is 
achieved even though, during transition, the stock may be harvested at an unsustainable 
rate (i.e. /L γ θ> ) that if maintained would drive the resource to extinction. Also, if the 
desired optimal stock level required a higher steady state labor employment, than the 
labor endowment (a country with vast natural resources but little labor to exploit it), then 
the optimal stock could not be achieved. In this case the country would end specialized in 
the production of the resource good, in a sub-optimal steady state with positive profits in 
the resource sector. This latter case can be represented in a phase diagram like Figure 2, 
with an optimal Ss to the left of the 0S = schedule, and the intersection of both the 0λ =  
and the 0S = schedules below the z line. Also note that in this case condition (8) is not 
met with equality.  
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During the transition the economy specializes in the production of R. Both the 
continuous decrease in the resource stock as well as the continuous increase in the 
marginal use cost guarantee that the profit gap in the resource sector closes. Current value 
national income during the transition is: 
[ ]( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( ) / ) ( )NI p S t L t S t S t C S t Lθ λ γ θ= + − − , and is falling from time zero until 
steady state is reached for two reasons: first, as the stock falls the productivity of labor is 
falling; and second, the rising marginal use cost subtracts the negatively changing stock. 
After steady state has been achieved, national income permanently 
becomes: ( )R Rs s sp S L L Lθ + − . Wages, ( )p S tθ are also falling, from time zero, but are 
higher than their steady state value 1. Labor income wL is greater than national income, 
as national income subtracts the cost of over-harvesting the resource during transition; λ 
thus, plays the role of a price that values the depreciation of the stock. Labor, during 
transition is all devoted to resource good production, and at steady state has a discrete 
jump to a lower level that sustains a diversified production equilibrium. Finally, if both 
goods are essential, a natural assumption, throughout the transition the economy exports 
the resource good and imports manufactures; while at steady state the direction of trade 
will be determined by preferences, and steady state production levels. 
When the initial stock is less than the optimal, the dynamics of the model are 
different. As no labor is employed in the extraction of the resource, the stock grows 
following its logistic growth function to its maximum level C, which is what schedule 
(18) is reflecting. On the other hand the marginal user cost is constant only when the 
stock is equal to / 2 [( ) / ]C rγ γ⋅ − , schedule (19). Since, C/2 is the stock level of 
maximum sustainable yield, we will call the stock level that maintains a constant λ, the 
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discounted maximum sustainable yield. It can be shown, that the MSY is the stock level 
that solves for G'(S)=0, while the discounted MSY is the stock level that solves for 
G'(S)=r. One expects the discount rate to be relatively low, in comparison to the 
uncongested growth rate of the resource, γ. If this were the case the discounted MSY 
would be slightly to the left of the maximum sustainable yield. Nonetheless, it is possible 
for a country to be so impatient that r>γ; in this case the discounted MSY would be 
negative. To the left of the discounted MSY, the marginal user cost is falling, as is shown 
in Figure 4, which is consistent with increasing profitability in the resource sector.  
Also note that, unless the country is extremely impatient, i.e. r>γ, to the left of the 
discounted MSY the resource growth is increasing in the stock (G'(S)>0). Thus, it is 
rather intuitive, that as increased steady state resource good output may be achieved, the 
higher relative profitability of the manufactures sectors is falling. To the right of the 
discounted MSY, the marginal user cost is increasing, causing the manufactures sector to 
be increasingly more profitable than the resource sector. This fall in the profitability of 
the resource sector may be understood by decreasing steady state resource good output 
(negative G'(S)), which happens to the left of the MSY; or the productive gains are 
positive, but less than the discounting (G'(S)<r), which happens between the discounted 
MSY and the true MSY.  
From simple inspection of the phase diagram presented in Figure 4, it can be seen 
that if the steady state stock level was to the left of the discounted MSY, there would 
exist a revenue maximizing path (MRAP) that would send the economy to steady state. 
However, as we show in the next section the steady state stock level is always to the left 
of the discounted MSY. In the case we call the depleted environment scenario, no labor is 
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employed in harvesting the resource to let it grow to the optimal level, which is higher. 
During this transition, the stock follows its logistic growth process, converging to its 
carrying capacity: ( )S G S= . Additionally, when no labor is employed in the resource 
sector, the equation of motion λ becomes, [ '( )]r G Sλ λ= − , from where the time path of 
λ may be readily obtained: [ '( )]( ) (0) r G S tt eλ λ −= . Given that the steady state stock level is 
greater than the discounted MSY, over a region where the marginal user cost is 
increasing, we should check that the path that takes the economy to the optimal stock 
level is feasible. By feasible path we mean that: the optimal path does not cross the z line 
before reaching the steady state stock level, which would avoid the convergence of the 
stock to its optimal level; and, the optimal path does not overshoot the optimal stock level 
sending the economy in a permanent path of specialization in manufactures and ever 
decreasing profitability of the resource sector, i.e. exploding marginal user cost.  
We can prove that the path is feasible. First note the slope of the optimal path is 
given by: 
 ( '( ))
( )
d r G S
dS S G S
λ λ λ −= =  (20) 
On the other hand, the slope of the zero profit line z is given by: 
 2
( ) 0
1
t
d
dS Sσ
λ
θ= =  (21) 
Solving for the stock level that makes both slopes equal we discover that the z line 
and the optimal path have the same slope exactly at the steady state optimal stock level 
which we describe in the next section. This result proves that the optimal path is feasible, 
because the planner or agents can always choose a λ(0) that will make the optimal path 
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tangent to the zero profit line exactly at the optimal stock level without ever crossing the 
zero profit line. Thus, the optimal path has the characteristics shown in Figure 4. When 
steady state is achieved, the discrete jump in labor employed in the resource sector from 0 
to its steady state level, will shift both 0λ =  and 0S =  schedules to their steady state 
levels as shown in Figure 3. 
The economics of the converging optimal path may be readily summarized. First, 
an initial marginal user cost is chosen to maximize the discounted flow of revenues until 
the unharvested resource grows to its steady state level. Throughout the transition, the 
economy remains specialized in the production of manufactures until the stock grows to 
its optimal level, when equality of profits in both sectors guarantees that a diversified 
production equilibrium is established. During the transition LR is zero, but jumps to 
/ (1 / )Rs sL S Cγ θ= −  when the stock reaches its steady state level. The stock grows 
according to its logistic function until it reaches its optimal level. The marginal user cost 
initially falls, as productivity of the resource good grows; then starts increasing after the 
stock gets larger than the discounted MSY level, as the gains in resource output G’(S) are 
less than the discount rate r. Wages are constant during the transition at 1, the marginal 
productivity of labor in manufactures sector, and remains at that level after steady state. 
Current value national income is during the transition greater than labor income, wL, as 
national income accounts for the appreciation in the natural 
stock: ( )( ( )[1 ( ) / ])NI L t S t S t Cλ γ= + − . Also, throughout the transition path current value 
national income is growing. The change in national income while there is specialization 
in manufactures can be shown to be given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )NI t S t t S t r t S t
t
λ λ λ∂ = + =∂
     (22) 
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which, although at varying levels, is always positive. Finally, if both goods are essential, 
throughout the transition the economy exports manufactures and imports the resource 
good; while at steady state the direction of trade will be determined by preferences, and 
steady state production levels. 
4. The Steady State Stock Level. 
Solving for the steady state stock level, using equations (8) - (10), we find: 
 
2
1 1 8
4s
C r r rS
p C p C p C
γ γ
θ γ γ θ θ γ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− −⎢ ⎥= − + − +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (23) 
This, solution is very similar to the steady state stock level of the generalized Schaefer 
model as studied by Clark (1979) and (1990). That model is a single sector revenue 
maximization of a fishery. The difference, thus, lies that instead of having a fixed 
marginal cost c, here the fixed marginal cost is 1, the cost of opportunity of not producing 
a unit of manufactures when a unit of labor is employed harvesting the resource.  
Following Clark (1990), we simplify the steady state stock by dividing by the 
carrying capacity, C, to normalize the maximum biomass to 1, and we call the normalized 
stock level Σ . Furthermore, as previously stated the open access stock level, when λ=0, 
is 1/S pθ∞ = , and therefore, 1/ pCθ∞Σ = . Also, we can label the ratio of discount rate, to 
uncongested growth rate of the resource as /rδ γ= , which allows us to write the 
normalized stock level as a function of two variables: 
 21/ 4 (1 ) (1 ) 8s δ δ δ∞ ∞ ∞⎡ ⎤Σ = − + Σ + − + Σ + Σ⎣ ⎦  (24) 
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Using this simplified notation, the normalized discounted maximum sustainable 
yield is (1 ) / 2δ− . By inspection, the reader should observe that the optimal normalized 
stock level is always bigger than the discounted MSY, unless 0∞Σ =  which is impossible 
for any finite price. This is one of the results presented in Table 1, where the discounted 
MSY is labeled DMSY. Given the quadratic nature of the solution, the optimal stock is 
not very sensitive to δ when the open access stock level is very high, but as the resource 
becomes scarce, the optimal level becomes very sensitive to the discount rate. Also, the 
optimal stock level is more sensitive to the open access stock level, the higher the relative 
discount rate is. 
IV. Production Decisions in the South 
Assuming a complete open access externality, as is usually done in the literature, 
is a good benchmark to start understanding the economic behavior of agents when 
property rights are not clearly defined, but it is also many times an unrealistic 
assumption. For example, it is not uncommon to observe commercial fishermen in an 
open access regime to return the small catch or pregnant samples, and even observe 
voluntary moratoriums when a particular specie is breeding. Also, it is not uncommon to 
observe loggers under an open access regime to cut only full-grown samples while 
protecting those not fully developed. This kind of behavior is not consistent with the full 
open access assumption, because under that regime future rents that may be extracted 
from the resource stock have zero value. Therefore, we try to advance from the 
benchmark case, and describe the production decisions in the South under more general 
open access assumption. 
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We assume that agents in the South consider only a fraction φ of the marginal user 
cost, where (0,1)φ ∈ , when they make their production decisions. Under such conditions, 
we may restate the problem of the Southern economy as: 
 Max  ( , ; ) ( ) (1 / )R R R RH L S p SL L L S S C SLλ θ λ φγ φθ⎡ ⎤= + − + − −⎣ ⎦  (25) 
As expected, in the South the steady state stock is lower than in the north, 
1/[ ( )]S pθ φλ= − , but the interesting questions are how smaller, and how the externality 
affects the resource level that is preserved. We can answer those inquiries by solving for 
the steady state in the South. Using the simplified notation explained in section III.4, the 
normalized steady state stock level in the south is given by: 
 21/ 4 (1 / ) (1 / ) 8 /δ φ δ φ δ φ∞ ∞ ∞⎡ ⎤Σ = − + Σ + − + Σ + Σ⎣ ⎦  (26) 
The limit of Σ  as φ goes to zero is naturally, ∞Σ . From the formula, it should 
become clear that if the discount rate is small relative to the intrinsic growth rate of the 
resource, i.e. δ is small, the externality does not have an important effect over the steady 
state stock level in the South. In Table 2 the South’s normalized stock level is presented 
for different discount to growth rate ratios and externality levels, assuming that the 
complete open access normalized resource level is 1/4. What is very striking is that if the 
δ is small, that is if the discount rate is low, or the uncongested growth rate of the 
resource is large, or both, the steady state stock level would be very different from the 
benchmark full externality scenario. Even if the externality was very large and agents 
only considered one hundredth of the shadow value of the resource, still the amount of 
biomass conserved in the South would be almost double of what the full open access 
assumption predicts!  
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Obviously, the South’s choice of steady state stock is sub-optimal, as the optimal 
choice would be to mimic the North at sΣ , but what is important is that it is over-
exploiting the resource. Although in the strict context of this model, it is equally as bad 
(in welfare terms) to over or under exploit the resource from its optimal steady state level, 
it is important to note this overexploitation as the resource could have non-use values 
either in the country or in the rests of the world. Much of the current concern with free 
trade is that it causes overexploitation of the natural resource. In the context of this model 
trade will always cause an increased exploitation of the resource for the resource rich 
country (as determined by having an autarky price lower than the international price). 
This overexploitation will be intense, as all the factor of production are directed to exploit 
the resource during the transition to steady state; however, there will be a real over 
exploitation in the South where there exists an open access externality to some degree. 
The dynamics in the South are identical to the North, only the amount of the 
resource preserved is different. Also, as a sub-optimal steady stock level is chosen in the 
South, welfare in the south is lower than in the north over the whole planning horizon. 
This remains true even if the instantaneous utility was higher in the South than in the 
North over any particular period of this horizon. 
V. Economics of Extinction 
As we saw in section II, if the labor employed in extracting the resource was 
permanently established at a very high level, i.e. /RL γ θ> , the resource would be 
harvested until extinction. Brander and Taylor (1997a) show that if the labor force L 
surpasses a certain threshold, the closed open access economy would extinguish the 
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resource. We will first show that this result holds only under certain assumptions about 
preferences, and later argue that the open economy under any resource management 
regime will never extinguish the resource. 
To study the equilibrium of the closed economy, by Walras’ law it is only 
necessary to check equilibrium in one of the markets, naturally we check the resource 
good market. Brander and Taylor assume Cobb-Douglas preferences, therefore the 
amount of resource good demanded is /DR L pα= , where α is the share of consumption 
of the resource good, and L is national income. Remember that in steady state national 
income is wL and as long as manufactures are produced, which is always the case in the 
closed economy, 1w = . Also, we know that producers in an open access property regime 
equate price to: 1/p Sθ= . Equating the producers’ condition, with the consumers’ 
inverse demand, we can solve for the equilibrium resource good: R S Lθ α= . Thus, if 
Lαθ γ> , the resource would be harvested until extinction, as shown in Figure 5 by line 
and demand X. The figure explains why the resource is harvested to extinction. Demand 
is always larger than any quantity supplied, therefore, producers try to meet demand by 
extracting more and more of the resource, as prices go up, until there is no more resource 
to harvest, and the price has exploded to infinity. Also, note that this result is a product of 
the extreme assumption of 0λ = , if producers have any sense of the value of scarcity, as 
we did in the previous section, then extinction is not possible. 
However, this result is driven by the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences, 
which imply constant elasticity of demand equal to 1. If we assume that demand elasticity 
is greater than one, the closed open access economy would always have an equilibrium 
with a positive stock, as shown by line and demand Y in Figure 5. Let us assume that 
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demand has in general price elasticity β like in: /DR L pβα= . If demand is price elastic, 
β > 1, then demand would look like Y in Figure 5b; however if demand was inelastic,  
β < 1, if it would look like demand Z.  Using the producers price condition, we can 
establish that the equilibrium amount of resource good traded is ( )R S Lβθ α= , which is 
plotted as line Y for β > 1 in Figure 5a, and as line Z for the price inelastic case, β < 1. 
When demand is inelastic there can be two equlibria, or none, when labor is too large 
relative to the resource. We have drawn the former case. Note that equilibrium 1 in the 
figure is unstable, and if perturbed could send the economy in an extinction cycle in 
which as price rises to infinity, demand always exceeds supply.  
When we are dealing with two sectors, we expect demand to be inelastic, as 
manufactures is not expected to be a good substitute of the resource good. Therefore, we 
expect extinction to be a definite possibility for the closed economy with an open access 
regime. If the small open economy opens to trade, extinction would be avoided because 
under free trade prices are exogenous, which would stop the spiral of increasing prices 
and stock reduction that leads to extinction. The small open economy harvests the 
resource until 1/S pθ=  under open access, or 1/[ ( )]S pθ λ= −  under optimal 
management, both of which are always positive. Even if the country has a large labor 
force relative to the growth of the natural resource, even if the stock during transition is 
harvested at an unsustainable rate, and even if there is a complete open-access externality 
in the resource market, opening the small economy to trade prevents extinction. 
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VI. Comparative Statics and Comparative Dynamics 
1. Price Changes, and its Effects on the Optimal Stock, Goods Supply and Welfare. 
We begin our study of the steady state by determining its stability. It will be 
useful to do so, in terms of the stock and the labor variables, which determine the real 
sector of the economy, that is both sectors' output. We know that at steady state condition 
(8) is met with equality, there are zero profits in both sectors. Using this condition into (9) 
we can express the equation of motion of the user cost as at steady state: 
 ( )( )/ 1/( ) '( ) 0RL S p S r G Sλ θ= − + − − =  (27) 
Also at steady state, the stock is not changing, therefore: 
 (1 / ) 0RS S S C SLγ θ= − − =  (28) 
The reader should be aware, that we are not using equations (27) and (28) to 
describe the dynamics of the model, which we did on the previous section, but to describe 
the steady state. Anyway, the stability of the steady state guarantees that given any 
marginal change in the parameters of the model, the steady state would be reestablished. 
To understand how the model behaves given changes in its parameters it is useful to see a 
phase diagram in the control and state space. The schedules according to (27) and (28)are 
given by: 
 
0
( 1/ )( '( ))RL S p S r G Sλ θ= = − − , and 
 
0
( ) /( )R
S
L G S Sθ= = . 
These schedules are graphed in the LR, S space in Figure 6. To understand the 
shape of the 0λ =  schedule note that it is convex in S. This schedule intercepts the stock 
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axis at S∞ , the open access stock level, when 1/p Sθ= , and at rS , the discounted MSY 
when '( )r G S= . The particular shape drawn in the figure in which the schedule, from 
above the origin, moves into negative LR is the effect of having a discount rate lower than 
the uncongested growth rate of the stock, r < γ. We believe this should be the empirical 
regularity. In the unlikely case the country is very impatient and '( )r G C> , then the 
0λ = schedule would always be positive for all S > 0. 
To describe the dynamics of the model let us assume that the country is in 
autarkic equilibrium with labor and resource stock at steady state values given by LRs and 
Ss respectively. If the country opens to trade and the international price was higher than in 
autarky, that would cause the λ  schedule to shift, to a new position like ' 0λ = . When the 
price increases, the resource sector becomes more profitable than the manufactures 
sector, 1/p Sθ λ> + , and so all of the labor resources are directed to produce the 
resource good, LR=L. As more stock is extracted, than its previous steady state growth 
rate, the stock starts declining. Also, as the stock becomes scarcer, and the price 
increases, the marginal user cost starts growing. This process will continue until the 
equilibrium is reestablished with 1/p Sθ λ= + , at which moment the labor drops to the 
new steady state value, which was higher than the first. Also, at their new steady state 
values the shadow value of the stock also increases, and the stock decreases. Figure 7 
summarizes these results graphically.   
The stock level at which the 0λ =  schedule crosses the positive horizontal axis 
is / 2 ( ) /rS C rγ γ= ⋅ − , once again the discounted MSY. This level does not depend in the 
price, thus as the price increases, the steady state stock level asymptotically reaches Sr 
(remember that the schedule is convex in S). However, this result changes dramatically if 
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the country is too impatient, r > γ. In this latter case, the stock level at which the 0λ =  
crosses the horizontal axis with a positive slope is 1/S pθ= , which is abysmally 
different from the case of the patient country (or country with fast growing resource). In 
this latter case, the steady state stock level will be much more sensitive to the price19. 
Impatient or not, the steady state stock level will never be zero, unless the price is equal 
to infinity. This case we ought to discard as it implies that the marginal utility of the 
manufactures good is zero in the country as in the rest of the world. Also, note that for a 
high enough price the country will always optimally conserve a level of the stock lower 
than the Maximum Sustainable Yield, but always higher than the discounted MSY. 
The latter result can be contrasted with Brander and Taylor (1997b) results. These 
authors show in a static context, that the country that fully internalizes the open access 
externality always chooses an optimal stock level that is greater than the maximum 
sustainable yield. We find in a positive but finite discount scenario, that the steady state 
stock level that a country would like to conserve is always greater than the discounted 
maximum sustainable yield. 
The steady state supply of manufactures is infinitely elastic, therefore it provides 
no producer surplus. The steady state supply of the resource good is positively sloped, but 
always backward bending for high enough prices.  Assuming that the steady state relative 
supply curve ( / )R M  is backward bending20, then there is a critical price that achieves 
                                                 
19 In Brander and Taylor (1997b) the author show that the country that completely ignores the open access externality, 
or equivalently has an infinite discount rate, has a steady state stock level of 1/θp.  The previous analysis shows that 
when the discount rate is just greater than γ, the country will behave optimally in a similar fashion to the full 
externality, infinite discount rate country. 
20 In Chapter 3, Section III.4, we explore in details the conditions for a backward bending relative supply ( /R M ) 
curve. However the intuition is straightforward, a backward bending supply curve requires that at some point, 
additional efforts reduce steady state output more than proportionally to the increased effort.  
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maximum steady state relative output. At higher prices, the stock would be driven to 
lower levels which can only sustain lower steady state resource good output. From the 
previous argumentation it must be clear that the price at which the resource supply 
becomes backwards bending is also the steady state welfare maximizing price. This 
special price is 2*p
r C C
γ
θ θ= + , that not surprisingly is inversely related to the discount 
rate and to the productivity of labor in the resource good, and less surprisingly inversely 
related to the carrying capacity.  
It is tempting, then, to make welfare comparisons and say that a price higher then 
p* yields a lower steady state welfare, but this is misleading, if not completely wrong. To 
understand why, let us introduce the optimal value function: 
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 (29) 
where ( ), ( ),  and ( )RL p S p pλ are all the optimal control, state and co-state variable from 
solving the economy’s problem (7). If we want to know, how this value function changes 
with p, then we calculate: 
 
0 0
'( ) ( ) ( ) 0R rt rtJ p S p L p e dt R e dtθ
∞ ∞
− −⎡ ⎤= ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ≥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫  (30) 
that is strictly positive when the resource good is produced, that is for all 1/p Cθ> . 
Therefore, the optimal present value of revenues is increasing in p. So, if the economy is 
at a p lower than p*, and prices rise to a level that is higher than p*, then, even if the 
resource output reaches a steady state that is lower than the original, and even though the 
steady state real revenue is lower than the initial, the present value of revenues would be 
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higher, and equivalently discounted welfare would also be higher. For this reason we do 
not take steady state welfare comparisons any further. 
2. Further Comparative Statics and Comparative Dynamics 
In the previous section we described the behavior of the country and the change in 
their production decisions given changes in the price. Here we review briefly how the 
model responds to changes in other parameters.  
First, the steady state stock level, as we saw above is very sensitive to increases in 
the discount rate. Additionally, increases in the discount rate will not only reduce the 
stock, but it will reduce the discounted value of revenue, and therefore present discounted 
welfare. As we did before we can define the optimal value function in terms of the 
discount rate: 
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where again ( ), ( ),  and ( )RL r S r rλ are the optimal values for the variables. From this 
function we can see that increasing the impatience, obviously diminishes the discounted 
value of revenue, and the discounted welfare achievable with that revenue flow: 
{ } [ ]{ }
0 0
'( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) 0R R rt rtJ r t p S r L r L L r e dt t pR M e dtθ
∞ ∞
− −⎡ ⎤= − ⋅ + − ⋅ = − ⋅ + ⋅ <⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ (32) 
As we saw in the previous section, the steady state stock level is very sensitive to 
increases in the discount rate. As a matter of fact an increase of the discount rate will 
unambiguously reduce the steady state stock level, sending the economy in a 
convergence path, in which all of its resources are exclusively used in the production of 
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the resource good. In the phase diagram, after the impatience rises the 0λ = schedule 
shifts up and to the left, while the 0S =  schedule does not move. That accounts to an 
unambiguous reduction of the stock after the discount rate increases, and higher steady 
state employment in the resource sector. 
On the other hand a technological improvement will also decrease the steady state 
stock level. The intuition of the result is rather straightforward. Given that labor is more 
productive in the resource sector, the cost of opportunity of having labor in the 
manufactures sector increases, and therefore there are incentives for labor to migrate 
from one sector to another. This effect is captured by the shift in the 0λ =  schedule from 
the continuous to the dashed line in Figure 8. However, at the same time, the amount of 
labor required to maintain any steady state stock level is reduced, which reduces or 
offsets the incentive to move labor from manufactures to resource. This latter effect is 
captured by the downward shift of the 0S =  schedule. The end result is an unambiguous 
reduction of the stock, but an uncertain effect over labor. During the transition, all labor 
is employed in the resource sector as the stock of the resource is being reduced. Once the 
new steady state stock level is achieved LR falls to a level that could be higher, lower or 
the same as the one prior to the technical progress. Note that for any given price the 
technically advanced country will be consuming more stock at equilibrium. At lower 
prices this means higher resource good output, but when the price leads the stock to the 
left of the MSY, the technically advanced country can have a lower resource output than 
the backward country, which is a rather counter-intuitive result. 
We now review the effects of the relaxation of the biological constraints. It is hard 
to argue that the uncongested growth rate of the resource γ could change, as we assume 
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that the natural growth rate is given by nature. However, if we think of managed 
renewable resources, for example agriculture, genetical manipulation is able to achieve 
this natural productivity enhancement.  
Regardless of the feasibility of this, an increase in γ immediately expands R 
output, and expands the Maximum Sustainable Yield of the sector. As the biological 
constraint is relaxed, more labor is necessary to maintain a constant steady state stock 
level, which attracts more labor into the resource sector, as reflected by an upward shift 
of the 0S =  schedule in Figure 9. Additionally, relaxing the biological constraint makes 
the same amount of labor employed in the resource sector more productive, which also 
attracts more labor, remember that in steady state growth of the stock equals resource 
output (equation (5)). This latter effect is captured by the shift in the 0λ =  schedule to 
the new dashed curve. As it comes clear from the picture both effects increase the steady 
state employment of labor in the resource sector. From the picture however, the effect on 
the steady state stock level is uncertain. However, we prove in Appendix 1, that when the 
natural growth rate of the stock augments, the steady state stock also increases. Finally, 
as both LR and S increase, we get the rather intuitive result that steady state resource 
output has also, unambiguously increased; regardless if the economy is to the left or to 
the right of the Maximum Sustainable Yield. The transition to the new steady state is 
given by a reduction in LR to zero while the stock grows until it reaches its new steady 
state level; at that point in time LR grows to a level larger than the original, and the 
resource output is bigger than the initial. 
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IV. Trade and Welfare. Concluding Remarks 
As stated above, the resource rich country, with autarky price lower than the 
international price will export the resource good throughout the transition period. 
However, at the new steady state the country could end up producing less or more 
resource output. Thus in the new equilibrium the same country that initially exported the 
resource good could perfectly end up importing it, or not trading at all. If the latter is the 
case this country exported the resource good only during the transitional dynamics, but 
not at equilibrium. This is a very important result of the model because it seems to 
capture an observed behavior of some developing countries. Severe deforestation in 
tropical countries seems to be more consistent with a transitional dynamics phase, than a 
behavior consistent with biological equilibrium (steady state). By definition at 
equilibrium stock levels do not change. Also the model can be consistent with a scenario 
where one small country supplies the world with the resource good, until its stocks are 
diminished to low productivity levels, at which point another country has to open to 
supply the natural good. 
As we explained above, this behavior that appears so extreme, in the limited view 
of the model could be not only optimal, but welfare improving. When property rights are 
not well enforced, however, this behavior is not optimal, and we showed that a country 
with these kinds of problems will miss the optimal equilibrium level, always, by 
overexploiting it. It is therefore, an empirical issue to determine if the behavior of the 
country rapidly consuming its natural stocks is externality free or not. We recognize, 
anyhow, that the passionate response against trade among many, and in many parts of the 
world may be reflecting that the natural stocks have economic value above and beyond 
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their productive value. If this is the case we should be thinking about expanding the 
model to include this existence values.  
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Figure 1 Resource Stock Dynamics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Convergence to Steady State from the Pristine Environment Scenario 
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Figure 3 Steady State 
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Figure 4. Depleted Environment Scenario 
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Figure 5 Equilibrium in the Resource and the Resource Good in the Closed 
Economy 
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Figure 6. Stock – Labor Dynamics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Dynamics of Labor Stock and Shadow Value Following a Price Increase 
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Figure 8 Effects of Technological Progress 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology improves with increased labor productivity from θ0 to θ1 with θ1>θo. 
 
Figure 9 Effects of Increased Natural Growth Rate of the Resource 
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Table 1 Normalized Steady State Stock Level 
 
            
 DMSY ∞Σ           
δ  1.00 0.99 0.90 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.00 
0 0.500 1.000 0.995 0.950 0.875 0.750 0.625 0.560 0.525 0.505 0.500 
0.01 0.495 1.000 0.995 0.950 0.874 0.748 0.622 0.556 0.520 0.500 0.495 
0.10 0.450 1.000 0.995 0.947 0.868 0.734 0.596 0.522 0.480 0.456 0.450 
0.25 0.375 1.000 0.994 0.944 0.859 0.713 0.556 0.467 0.415 0.383 0.375 
0.50 0.250 1.000 0.994 0.939 0.847 0.683 0.500 0.387 0.315 0.264 0.250 
1.00 0.000 1.000 0.993 0.933 0.828 0.640 0.422 0.277 0.171 0.073 0.000 
1.25 -0.125 1.000 0.993 0.930 0.821 0.625 0.395 0.243 0.134 0.039 0.000 
1.50 -0.250 1.000 0.993 0.928 0.815 0.612 0.375 0.220 0.111 0.028 0.000 
3 -1.000 1.000 0.992 0.919 0.793 0.569 0.315 0.163 0.072 0.015 0.000 
5 -2.000 1.000 0.991 0.913 0.780 0.545 0.289 0.144 0.061 0.012 0.000 
10 -4.500 1.000 0.991 0.908 0.767 0.524 0.269 0.131 0.055 0.011 0.000 
            
 
 
Table 2 Normalized Steady State Stock Level in the South when the Open Access 
Level, ∞Σ , is 1/4. 
        
δ   \   φ 0.01 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 1 
0 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 
0.01 0.422 0.596 0.613 0.619 0.621 0.622 0.622 
0.10 0.269 0.422 0.521 0.569 0.587 0.593 0.596 
0.25 0.258 0.328 0.422 0.500 0.536 0.549 0.556 
0.50 0.254 0.289 0.347 0.422 0.469 0.489 0.500 
1.00 0.252 0.269 0.299 0.347 0.388 0.409 0.422 
1.25 0.252 0.265 0.289 0.328 0.364 0.383 0.395 
1.50 0.251 0.263 0.282 0.315 0.347 0.364 0.375 
3 0.251 0.256 0.266 0.282 0.299 0.309 0.315 
5 0.250 0.254 0.259 0.269 0.279 0.285 0.289 
10 0.250 0.252 0.255 0.259 0.264 0.267 0.269 
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Appendix 1. Effects of an Increase in the Natural Growth Rate in the 
Steady State Stock Level.  
 
We want to show that there is a positive relation between the intrinsic growth rate 
of the resource and the steady state stock. We begin by differentiating the normalized 
steady state stock as defined by (24): 
(A- 1) 
( )
( )
1/ 22
1/ 22
12(1 ) (1 ) 8
21
14 8 (1 ) 8
2
s
δ δ δ δ δγ γ
δγ δ δγ
−
∞ ∞ ∞
−
∞ ∞ ∞
∂ ∂⎡ ⎤− − − + Σ − + Σ + Σ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂∂Σ ⎢ ⎥= ∂∂ ⎢ ⎥+ Σ − + Σ + Σ⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦
 
Using the definition of δ, that is r/γ, the partial derivative can be simplified to:  
(A- 2) 
2
2
(1 ) 8 (1 3 )
4 (1 ) 8
s δ δ δδ
γ γ δ δ
∞ ∞ ∞
∞ ∞
⎡ ⎤− + Σ + Σ + − − Σ∂Σ ⎢ ⎥=∂ ⎢ ⎥− + Σ + Σ⎣ ⎦
, 
First note that what is inside the square root of (A- 2) is always positive, as it can 
be equivalently written as: 2 2(1 ) 6 2δ δ ∞ ∞ ∞− + Σ + Σ + Σ . Of course this is necessary to 
guarantee that the steady state stock is a real number. Then, the numerator of (A- 2) will 
determine the sign of the derivative. We can show that it is always positive: 
2(1 ) 8 (1 3 )δ δ δ∞ ∞ ∞− + Σ + Σ > − − Σ ; 
2 2(1 ) 8 (1 3 )δ δ δ∞ ∞ ∞− + Σ + Σ > − − Σ ; 
28 8 0∞ ∞− Σ + Σ > . 
The last inequality holds by definition of (0,1)∞Σ ∈ , which proves our 
result, 0sγ
∂Σ >∂ . 
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Chapter 3: 
North-South Trade in the 
Ricardo-Schaefer Model 
 
 
I. Introduction 
When dealing with dynamic problems, economists, too often, end up choosing from two 
unsatisfactory options. The first option is to focus in the equilibrium or steady state 
behavior, and draw the conclusions from that analysis. The other option, and probably 
less desirable, is to limit the analysis to the smaller set of problems that can be portrayed 
by the reduced set of dynamic equations with solutions that are known to us (i.e. can be 
analytically integrated, or in the case of discrete dynamic programming, the value 
function can be found). 
 The allure of equilibrium / steady state analysis is quite obvious. In some cases 
only the equilibrium analysis is relevant. Growth models come immediately to mind, 
where the equilibrium behavior is what explains growth and better reflects the observed 
stylized facts like relatively fixed long run assets’ rates of returns. Furthermore, steady 
states can be solved for analytically using first order conditions. This allows the 
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economist to make unambiguous statements of the sort: if the rate of returns rises, the 
equilibrium consumption level falls.     
The problem with equilibrium analysis is that in most problems one is interested 
in the whole planning horizon. The researcher usually wants to know the behavior of the 
economic agent given initial conditions, not how to maximize equilibrium levels nor the 
behavior given equilibrium conditions. Furthermore, as we show in this chapter, not all 
problems converge to equilibrium or have equilibrium, which can make the whole 
equilibrium analysis misleading. This difference between equilibrium and the whole 
horizon is well-known to economist, but too often they ignore it; as in the example above, 
the fall in equilibrium consumption is acknowledged, but not the fact the over the whole 
horizon the agent is better off.  
Let us compare the economist with what the engineer does. The proverbial rocket 
scientist, for example, solves problems with a mathematical representation very similar to 
the economist problems. Some of the parameters of his equations are given by nature, i.e. 
gravity, and others he controls like mass and thrust. Although, like the economist, he can 
not solve his problem symbolically, he will find the trajectory of his rocket using 
numerical approximations. The rocket scientist can fine tune his calculations until he gets 
the exact trajectory. The intrinsic difference between the engineer and the economist 
problem solving is that while the first is generally interested in the solution itself, the 
economist is more ambitious, he is interested in describing the solution; that is, how the 
solution changes when we change any given parameter.  
Given that economists want to describe the solution to dynamic problems, we 
admit that numerical methods are really not very efficient for the purpose. As we do in 
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this chapter, it requires to numerically study the solution around all the relevant 
parameter space. This amounts to, as we say in Spanish, hit around with a stick like a 
blind man. However, this option is better than to be completely blind to the real problem: 
the solution to the whole planning horizon, not just the equilibrium.  
In this chapter we deal with trade in a dynamic context, as both trading partners 
manage a renewable resource. We assume both countries produce two goods, one of them 
using a renewable resource as a production factor; and that both countries are equivalent 
in every respect except for open access to the resource in one of them (the South). By 
definition, even if we assume, as we do, that countries start from autarkic equilibrium, 
when trade begins, trade encompasses off-equilibrium behavior. Even though we use 
very simple dynamic equations, the path countries follow when they open to trade can 
only be compared using numerical methods. The exercise of describing the solution 
numerically across all relevant parameter space is only possible because we posses now 
days machines that can perform, literally, millions of tedious arithmetic operations within 
the blink of an eye. It is nonetheless, a cumbersome and tedious endeavor, but we believe 
it is a small step in the right direction. 
Given that we use ‘well behaved’ concave utility and resource growth functions, 
the numerical approach should not provide results that are completely unexpected. 
Nonetheless, we present a good share of surprising results. First of all, we find that 
equilibrium analysis of these type of 2x2 trade models that uses a renewable resource as 
factor of production is not always valid, as done for example in Brander and Taylor 
(1997b), because the steady states are not attainable as we will show. Also, we find that 
this lack of equilibrium can lead the externality free country to lose with trade. This 
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unexpected result can occur because the externality free country does not plan for the 
lack of equilibrium in which it ends up; this lack of equilibrium can some times benefit or 
in others hurt this country. 
Furthermore, we discover that in this ‘externality based’ trade the reduction in the 
overall environmental stock is very small, always less than 2/3 of 1% if we assume a 
rather plausible share of consumption of resource intensive goods of less than 50%. If we 
accept that consumption share, we also find, to our surprise, that the trade induced losses 
in the country with the externality are rather small, always less than 6%, and much 
smaller for plausible parameters.  
We invite the reader to find more insightful results from our numerical exercise 
below. In the next section we present the autarky and trade behavior of both countries. 
We follow by presenting the results of the numerical exercise of simulating trade between 
the countries, as well as delving into the question of why steady states are not achievable. 
Finally we conclude, highlighting many policy implications that can be derived from the 
theoretical and numerical exercises.   
 
II. The Model 
1. Countries’ General Characteristics  
We assume that both countries have the same technology, preference and nature, i.e. 
environmental endowment. The only difference between the North and the South lies in 
their management of their natural resources, or equivalently the property regime 
prevailing over natural resources. Both countries produce two goods with constant returns 
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to scale to the competing factor, labor, as in the standard Ricardian trade model. The two 
goods are, a natural resource intensive good, R, and an alternative sector we call 
manufactures for exposition purposes: 
 
;Ri i i
M
i i
R S L
M L
θ=
=  (1), 
for i=N, S; North and South, and θ  is a productivity factor21.  Labor is in fixed supply, 
R M
i iL L L= + , which ensures that when both competing sectors are producing, i.e. there is 
no specialization, wages are equalized. For further simplification we assume that M is the 
numeraire, which ensures that wages are equal to 1 when there is diversification in these 
economies. 
 Note that in (1), iS  the stock of natural resources, behaves as a sector specific 
factor of production in the resource sector. If iS  was available in fixed supply, this would 
still be a standard Ricardian economy, however, natural resources have dynamics 
determined by the interaction of nature’s ability to regenerate, and the demands exerted 
by men exploiting these resources.   
 ( ) ( )i i i iS G S R S= −  (2) 
These interactions are captured in (2) which indicates that the change in the stock is 
determined by the difference of its own natural capacity to grow and the output of 
resource intensive good.  The natural growth function ( )iG S , possesses the 
                                                 
21 The choice of Ricardian technology, in this chapter where we use numeric methods, is not founded in the 
simplicity and the availability of solutions. Even with this simplest of technologies, the description of the 
trade dynamics requires the use of numerical approximations. We nonetheless stick to the linear technology 
assumption because: (i) it allows the formal algebraic analysis to proceed further; and (ii) as we explained 
in the previous chapter it is very popular in the renewable resources literature, and also in the trade and 
renewable resources literature (see for example Brander and Taylor (1997b) or McAusland (2005)).  
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characteristics usually attributed to renewable resources growth functions: 
(0) ( ) 0  ;  ''( ) 0iG G C G S= = < ; when the resource becomes extinct it can not grow; at its 
maximum stock capacity, C, known as the carrying capacity, it can not grow either; and it 
is concave. Concavity, reflects the nature of renewable resources as usually at low stock 
levels growth should be increasing in iS , but once the stock is large enough there is 
overcrowding and the natural growth levels become decreasing in the stock. For 
analytical and evaluation purposes we will be using indifferently the general functional 
form or the most widely used renewable resources growth function, the logistic form,  
 ( ) (1 / )i i iG S S S Cγ≡ − , (3) 
where γ , is the uncongested growth rate, and C the carrying capacity. 
 Workers are also consumers, and we define their utility function with homothetic 
Cobb-Douglas preferences, 
 1( , ) ;   (0,1)i iU r m r m
α α α−≡ ∈ , (4) 
where lower case is used for the goods to differentiate demand from production 
quantities. 
2 The Closed South Economy 
What defines the South is an open access to the natural resources, that is: either there are 
no complete property rights on natural resources, which makes producers consider only 
their private costs and not the costs that their production decision imposes on the 
renewable resources; or there are no property rights and a government fails to impose an 
optimal tax (or tax equivalent) to make producers internalize the costs of their production 
decisions on the stock of the resource. Realistic modeling should imply that the myopia 
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of producers’ current decisions on future availability of resources should not be absolute, 
but somewhere in between complete blindness and optimal dynamic management. 
However, to ease on notation and to simplify numerical computations we will assume 
that in the South the myopia is complete22. Note however that this simplifying 
assumption does not change the qualitative results presented below. 
 Thus, the workers-producers in the south, ignoring the restrictions imposed by 
nature (2), maximize revenues: 
 { }Max ( )R
S
R R
S S S
L
p S L L Lθ + − . (5) 
The first order conditions for their problem indicates that: 
 1/( )S Sp Sθ= , (6) 
the supply price should be equal to the marginal rate of transformation for this economy, 
or the per unit cost of production of the resource good. On the other hand, these same 
producers want to consume at an optimal ratio. From the consumers’ maximization 
problem we know that, 
 ( )
(1 ) (1 )
R
S S
S R
S S S
m L Lp
r S L
α α
α α θ
−= =− − , (7) 
where the right hand equality comes from the goods market clearing conditions for this 
closed economy. Equating (6) and (7) we discover that RSL Lα=  always, regardless of the 
scarcity or availability of the resource or the prevalent market price.  
 The transition in the closed economy is depicted in Figure 10 with the bold line a-
a. It shows that regardless the stock level, labor in the resource sector is fixed at αL. Also, 
                                                 
22 The intermediate case was analyzed in the previous chapter. 
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although the dynamics of the resource stock are ignored, for each effort level there is only 
one equilibrium (steady state) stock level; solving for 0SS =  in (2): 
 / (1 / )RS SL S Cγ θ= ⋅ −  (8) 
If the initial stock is above the autarky steady state level * ( ) /SS C Lγ θα γ= − , the fixed 
amount of labor employed will reduce the stock of natural resources until its steady state 
level is achieved23. Throughout this transition the price is increasing as SS  diminishes. 
 If this economy opens to trade, then the transition would be different. In autarky 
this economy is forced to produce both goods at all times because the two of them are 
essential. However, if trade is allowed and the international price is different from its 
marginal rate of transformation this economy will specialize, allocating all the labor 
resources to either one of the goods like in a standard Ricardian trade model. If the 
international price *p  is greater than producers’ unit cost 1/( )SSθ , then revenues are 
maximized by producing only R, while South’s demand for manufactures is covered by 
foreign producers. 
 The transition for an open South economy is described by the disconnect schedule 
b-b. It shows that during transition RSL  takes either extreme value 0 or L. If initially the 
international price *p  is higher than the domestic price then RSL  becomes L and the 
economy remains specialized in the production of R until the new optimal resource stock 
level is achieved 1SS , which is simply equal to 1/( *)pθ . Note that even if the rate of 
extraction was unsustainable, as drawn in Figure 10 with /L γ θ> , the stock would not 
                                                 
23 From the formula of steady state stock level, the reader can see that if Lθα γ> , the natural resource 
would be extracted unsustainably until extinction. Thus we assume here forth that Lγ θα> . 
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be driven to zero. Extinction under trade requires *p = ∞ , which is not reasonable or 
interesting.  
3 The Closed North Economy 
In the North the effects of resource extraction on future availability are accounted for, 
thus they maximize the North equivalent of revenue function (5), which adds current and 
all future revenues discounted by a constant rate, r,   
 { }
0,
Max ( )
R
N N
R R rt
N N N
L S
p S L L L e dtθ∞ −+ − ⋅∫ , (5)’ 
but also subject to the resource availability constraint, 
 ( ) NN N N SS G S S Lθ= −  (2)’. 
From the first order conditions of the revenue maximization we find that the producers’ 
price is: 
 1N
N
p
S
λθ= +  (9). 
In the North the producers price is equal to the marginal rate of transformation 1/( )NSθ  
plus a premium λ which represents the marginal user cost. This premium, which can be 
viewed as a tax, accounts for both, the relative scarcity of the resource as well as the 
effect of current extraction on future availability.  
 Equating the producers price (9), to the demand price, which is equivalent to the 
South’s demand price (7), as preferences are identical, we find that labor employed in the 
resource sector is: 
 
1 (1 )
R
N
N
LL
S
α
α θ λ= + −  (10). 
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This expression shows that during transition labor employed in the resource sector is 
changing (unlike in the South), but at no point is resource extracting effort in the North as 
high as in the South. From this latter result, R RS NL L> , it follows that the steady state level 
of the resource in the North is higher than in the South: * *N SS S> .   
 To describe the transition to steady state for the North we first note that the 
dynamics of the optimal tax λ are given by: 
 [ '( )]
R
N
N
N
L r G S
S
λ λ−= + −  . 24 (11) 
To view the transition in the multiplier-state space we draw in Figure 11 a phase diagram 
with the schedules which represent the equilibrium for λ and NS :  
 
0
0
( ) /
(1 ) ( )
4(1 )1
'( )
2(1 )
N N
S
N
N
N
L G S S
G S
L
r G S
Sλ
θαλ α θ
α θα
λ α θ
=
=
−= −
−− + −= −


  .25 (12) 
A feasible transition to steady state for the closed North economy is shown by the saddle 
path a-a schedule. If the stock of the environmental resource was initially below its 
equilibrium point, during the transition the stock of the resource would be growing 
towards equilibrium accompanied by a falling optimal tax. This implies that during 
transition the relative price of goods is falling as well. Note also, that in Figure 11 it is 
                                                 
24 Equation (11) follows from the first order condition for the multiplier of the revenue maximization 
problem after incorporating condition (9). 
25 The schedules in (12) are obtained solving for λ at 0NS = , from (5)’ and 0λ = from (11), after 
replacing labor in the resource sector as function of the state and the multiplier from (10) 
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graphically shown that * *N SS S> , as the positively sloped schedule for equilibrium in the 
resource intersects the NS  axis at 
*
SS . 
To describe the path of labor we show in Figure 12 equilibrium in the ,  RNL S  
space. In the figure, the restriction imposed by the growth of the resource, the North 
equivalent of (8) is shown as the negatively sloped schedule together with the schedule 
that describes equilibrium in the optimal tax:  
 
0
[ 1/( )][ '( )]RN N N N NL S p S r G Sλ θ= = − − . (13) 
The path of labor in the resource sector in the closed economy is describe by schedule  
a-a. The schedule, shows that while the stock is growing towards equilibrium, labor in R 
is increasing. However, schedule a-a assumes that during transition λ is falling at a higher 
rate than NS  is growing, which needs not be always the case. Thus, a negatively sloped  
a-a transition schedule is also possible.  
 If the North opens to trade it will, like the South, try to specialize, as shown by the 
trade transition schedule b-b. When the country opens to trade it will specialize in either 
good production to maximize revenue, while the demand for the good not produced is 
covered by foreign producers. If the trading price is lower than the autarky price, the 
North will specialize in the production of manufactures, allowing the stock to grow until 
its new optimum in 1NS  is achieved which is defined by 
1 1* 1/( ) ( )N Np S Sθ λ= + . The 
details of this transition have been extensively described in the previous chapter where 
we studied the case the North being a small open economy, unable to affect international 
prices. Before, we proceed to analyze this 2x2x2 model we need to recall this optimal 
response, which like in the South is specialization.  
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 The optimal level of accumulation of the natural resource, in autarky, assuming 
the logistic growth function (3), can be expressed in its simplest form by:   
 * * * 2 * 22 2 1 (2 2 1) 4[(1 )( 1) (1 )]
2(1 )N S S S
CS α δ α δ α δ αα ⎡ ⎤= ⋅ Σ + − − + Σ + − − + + − Σ + −⎣ ⎦+ (14), 
where /rδ γ≡  and SΣ  is the South steady state stock level with the carrying capacity 
(maximum stock level) normalized to 1, i.e. * / ( ) /SS C Lγ θα γ= − . Although, it is not 
immediately apparent from (14) that  * *N SS S> , exploring the limits of this expression we 
can learn something about the behavior in the north.  For example, * *lim N Sr S S→∞ =  which 
shows that South’s myopia of not accounting for their production decisions on the 
environment is only optimal when the discount rate is infinity, in other words when the 
value of future welfare is zero. Furthermore, we find that when manufactures are not 
valued, i.e. alpha tends to 1, the optimal stock tends to ½ of its maximum level: 
*
1
lim / 2NS Cα → = . This latter result suggests that the optimal stock in the North would never 
fall below this level, however this is not true. If the discount rate r is larger than nature’s 
maximum marginal ability to reproduce γ, then it is possible for the optimal stock to be 
less than C/2 (note that the growth function is maximized at C/2). What is always true 
though, as can be viewed in Figure 12, the discount rate is always greater than the 
marginal ability of the resource to regenerate ( '( )Nr G S> ). 
 
III. North-South Trade 
In the previous section we described the autarky equilibrium for the North and South 
economies. To limit the initial conditions (for the purpose of numerical simulations) 
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when countries engage in trade we will only use their autarky equilibrium starting levels, 
instead of other arbitrary positions. 
 To analyze the different welfare outcomes for both countries we propose a 
taxonomical analysis. The first division, of course is the direction of trade. Under 
“normal” or expected conditions, the over-extraction in the South is also accompanied by 
a cheaper relative resource price. Under these circumstances the South would export the 
resource good and import manufactures. If additional assumptions are made (to be 
detailed below), and the resource is extremely depleted in the South it is possible for the 
resource good to be more expensive initially in the South; in which case the direction of 
trade would be reversed, with the South importing the resource good. At a next level of 
classification we examine the trade paths during which countries specialize, and those 
where they can not. Given the linear technology of this Ricardian model, static welfare 
gains during trade can only be achieved if the country can specialize in the production of 
either good. Additionally, trade will alter the levels of accumulation of natural resources, 
imposing dynamic gains or losses which occur regardless of static effects of trade. 
Sometimes, static and dynamic effects act together and on other occasions they 
compensate each other as we will see below.  
 The prevalent price during trade must be such that there is equilibrium in both 
good markets. From, Walras’ Law, we know that in this two market model, it is enough 
to look at one of them, thus market clearing requires *( ) 0N S N Sp r r R R+ − − = , which is:  
 ( * ) ( * )* 0
* *
R R R R
R RN N N S S S
N N S S
p S L L L p S L L Lp S L S L
p p
α θ α θ θ θ⎛ ⎞+ − + −+ − − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
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The price that guarantees equality of international supply and demand in both good 
markets can be expressed as: 
 (2 )*
(1 )( )
R R
N S
R R
N N S S
L L Lp
S L S L
α
α θ θ
− −= − +  . (15) 
Assume that initially as expected, N Sp p> , and that as trade starts, the North with 
comparative advantage in manufactures, specializes in this sector, i.e. 0RNL = , then in 
such a case, the international price would simplify to:  * (2 ) /[(1 ) ]R RS S Sp L L S Lα α θ= − − .  
As can be seen from this latter expression, any increase in South’s production of the 
resource good (i.e. an increase in RSL ), would reduce the international price. The limit to 
this price reductions is the original price in the south, Sp ; profit maximizing behavior in 
the South bars producers from selling at below their cost of production. Recalling, that 
the price in the South is 1( )SSθ − , it can be shown that the maximum level of employment 
in the resource sector, which equates the international price to that prevalent in the south 
is 2RSL Lα= . Thus, if α<½ , the South can not specialize in the resource good, where it 
has comparative advantages. 
 Perhaps, a more intuitive explanation of the same result may be achieved 
examining the manufactures market. Demand for manufactures always is (1 )i im Yα= − , 
where iY  is national income of country i. For a specialized North, national income is 
simply L. While in the South, national income is * R RS S Sp S L L Lθ + − , however if the 
international price is equal to the price in the South (which would happen if the South can 
not specialize in the resource good), then income would also be L. In this case, total 
demand for manufactures would be 2(1 )Lα− . If  α<½, demand can not be satisfied by 
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one country (North) even if it is fully specialized producing L manufacture units, the 
other country (South) has to produce the remainder 2L Lα−  units. That production level 
of manufactures is achieved in the South when 2RSL Lα= .  Thus, when there is a 
preference bias for manufactures (α < ½), trade will be initially characterized by one 
country specializing in manufactures (North), and with the other (South) being unable to 
specialize in the production of the resource good.  This is the case we proceed to analyze 
first. 
1. Case 1: South Exports the Resource Good, But can not Specialize. The case of 
Manufactures Preference Bias (α ≤ ½). 
As explained above, when there is a preference bias for manufactures, and assuming as in 
most cases that initially N Sp p> , then as the countries begin trade, labor is reallocated in 
the trade partners to 0,  2R RN SL L Lα= = , and the international trading price is established 
at: * 1*(0) ( )S Sp p Sθ −= = . The increased harvesting effort in the South will start reducing 
the stock of natural resources which was at steady state before trade started, with a lower 
extractive effort level Lα , as shown in path b in Figure 13. The South, effectively blind 
to the dynamic effects of their production decision will continue this production pattern 
as the international price rises together with the fall in SS .   
  In the North, when trade starts, they observe that the trading price is Sp , a price 
for which they develop a revenue maximizing program for the harvesting premium λ. 
This program consists in setting the premium high enough, so as too make the resource 
sector not profitable, guaranteeing specialization in manufactures, but allowing this 
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premium to fall and to equal exactly *(0) 1/( )Np Sθ− , when the stock in the north has 
grown to its new optimal FNS  (optimal for the prevalent price), as shown in path a in 
Figure 13. However, as time passes by, the price of the resource will grow, and a new 
program for a smaller optimal stock level is designed. This recalculating effort is repeated 
infinitely as the international price rises, and the domestic natural asset grows, until a 
moment ( 1t ) in which the current trading price and accumulated stock makes it optimal to 
diversify production, at stock level like DNS  where harvesting is renewed with effort level 
RD
NL , as shown in Figure 13. This behavior of continually reassessing the revenue 
maximizing program is rather awkward, but the only consistent with price taking 
behavior, which is the essential assumption of perfect markets. A “non-awkward” 
behavior of internalizing the best response of the South, and its implied effects on stock 
and prices, from the beginning, is monopoly behavior. However, it is important to note, 
that although the optimal program has to change as the international price grows, the 
policy is always the same: specialize in manufactures, until a diversification stock level is 
achieved. 
 It is relevant to note that diversification will be achieved, before there is 
extinction in the South (even if 2 /Lα γ θ> ), and before the stock in the North reaches its 
maximum carrying capacity C, in fact  1*( )N Sp p t p> > . The fact that the diversification 
price is higher than the price in the south initially follows from the fact that the 
international price is always equal to the terms of trade in the South, i.e. 1( )SSθ − , which 
are increasing as the stock is depleted. On the other hand, the price at which the North 
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will diversify is falling during transition.  To show this we define the diversification price 
in the North, which is: 
 ( )
*
* ( )1 1
'( )
R
D N N
N
N N N N
L Sp
S S S r G S
λθ θ= + = + − , (16) 
where *λ  and *( )RN NL S  are the harvesting premium and labor in the resource sector 
evaluated at steady state, because diversification only occurs at steady state. The change 
in the diversification price with respect to the stock in the North is: 
 ( ) ( )( )
* * *
22
/ '( ) '( ) ''( )1 0
'( )
R R RD
N N N N N N N N NN
N N N N
L S S r G S r G S L S G S Lp
S S S r G Sθ
∂ ∂ ⋅ − − − ⋅ + ∂∂ −= + <∂ −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
, 
which is unambiguously negative because: (i) '( )Nr G S≥  always in steady state; (ii)  
* /RNL S∂ ∂  is always negative, because in steady state * 1 ( ) /Ri i iL G S Sθ −= ⋅  which has a 
negative derivative due to the concavity of the growth function; and (iii) ''( ) 0NG S < , 
again, due to the concavity of the growth function. Thus, as the stock grows in the North 
during transition, while the country remains specialized in manufactures, the price at 
which diversification becomes optimal is falling. Altogether, this shows that the price at 
which the north diversifies after trade begins, will lie between the initial North and South 
prices. So as countries trade during transition, the international price, which is equal to 
the terms of trade in the South, is rising, while the price at which the North is willing to 
diversify is falling. At a moment we label 1t , both prices are equalized and the North 
diversifies. 
 We assume, as we did when trade started, that the good markets clear 
instantaneously.  Hence, when the North diversifies, employing / (1 / )RD DN NL S Cγ θ= −   in 
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the resource sector (where 1( )
D
N NS S t≡  is the stock level in the north at the time of 
diversification), the South reduces harvesting effort to: 
 (2 ) (1 ) /RD RD RD D DS N N N SL L L L S Sα α= − − − ⋅  (17), 
which is the maximum effort that the South can employ in producing the resource good 
without decreasing the international trading price below its own terms of trade (i.e. higher 
effort would cause negative profits in the South). From the perspective of the North, 
steady state has been reached, and the country is willing to maintain stock and production 
quantities as long as the price is 1*( )p t . However, this will not be the case, and the price 
will change, because the stock of natural resources in the South has not reached a steady 
state. As can be seen in Figure 13, when the South re-adjusts its labor allocation to RDSL , 
the stock level could be in a point like A, where extraction  is greater than growth, or in 
appoint like B, where growth is greater than extraction. Let us assume for now that we 
are in case like that depicted by point A, but we will later argue that this always the case.  
 When extraction of the resource in the South is higher than natural regeneration 
after diversification in the North, stock in the South will, although at a slower pace, still 
be falling. This fall in the stock means that the terms of trade in the South have changed, 
and that the comparative advantages have been reverted and the South now can produce 
manufactures more cheaply than the North. So immediately after diversification, when 
the terms of trade in the South marginally increased to 
1 1
1( ) * *( ) ( )
D D
S D SS p p t Sθ θ− − −> ≡ = , the South will specialize in the production of 
manufactures, with the North responding, by trying to specialize in the Resource sector, 
but, like the South before, it can only produce as much R as possible without reducing its 
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current terms of trade, i.e. 
1
2 /[ (1 ) *]R DN N DtL L S pα α α θ+ = + − , which is lower than 2 Lα , 
because D DN SS S>  —the North is more productive than the South in the production of R, 
and therefore less effort is required by the North to fill the international market for R.  
 The pattern of trade just described, which we will call phase 1, is also not stable, 
and is followed by another unstable phase 2. During phase 1, the stock in the South grew 
to about DSS , because there was no extracting effort, while in the North, the attempted 
specialization in R decreased the stock of renewable resources to DNS
− . So in phase 2, 
comparative advantages have been reverted again, which will cause the South to produce 
R with maximum effort at 2 Lα , while the North specializes in manufactures. Again this 
phase is not sustainable because, NS  will grow and SS will fall reverting comparative 
advantages to a situation like in phase 1.  
 In conclusion, diversification can only last an instant, before the trading partners 
enter what we will call a bang-bang disequilibrium (as the control variable, labor, jumps 
while the state variable, the stock, remains relatively stable in both countries). This 
disequilibrium is characterized by comparative advantages and production patterns 
forever shifting, but with prices and stock levels remaining in a close neighborhood of 
their values at the time of diversification. During transition, trade follows a stable pattern, 
but once the terms of trade of both countries equalize, the current South terms of trade, 
and the North’s steady state terms of trade, there is no more room for accommodation for 
the accumulated levels of renewable resources. Obviously this bang-bang ending to 
North-South trade can not be qualified as equilibrium even under the most lax definition 
of the concept. The bang-bang disequilibrium has important consequences for the trade 
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evaluation: it invalidates the steady state analysis of trade, simply because it is 
unattainable by the market. As we will show below it may change the expected results of 
trade being always beneficial for the country that optimally manages natural resources.  
In section 5 we explain what causes the lack of an equilibrium, showing that it is not an 
artifact of the linear technology as may initially be thought.  
1.1 Welfare Analysis 
Let us start with the North. As explained before, when the trade regime is established 
welfare in the north jumps (is reduced) to the welfare level in the South.  In Figure 14, we 
depict the welfare level in both countries during autarky. We know that the level of 
natural resources is higher in the North, which means that the production possibility set is 
larger in the North than in the South, which in itself should mean higher welfare in the 
North. However, the premium λ paid on the resource good implies that the North does not 
consume at the welfare maximizing level for their production possibilities set, as depicted 
in the figure. At least in the graph there is an apparent ambiguity, the tax paid on the 
resource good can mean that the North could be initially worst off than the South in terms 
of welfare. This is not the case; in fact the North is initially always better off than the 
North. The intuitive explanation for this is that the North takes into account the 
restrictions given by nature in their maximization decision, and thus chooses a steady 
state stock level that maximizes welfare given this restriction, while South ignores the 
limits imposed by nature. 
 We can show this latter result more formally. First we note that in steady state, 
welfare is a concave function, over the accumulated stock possible set [0,C]. In steady 
 120
state, ( )i iR G S=  and 1 ( ) /i i iM L G S Sθ −= − . Using, these definitions, we can solve for 
the stock level that maximizes steady state welfare: 
 ** 22( ) 1 4 4 8 4 5
2( 1)i
CS α α αα ⎡ ⎤= Σ + − + Σ + Σ − Σ − +⎣ ⎦+  (18). 
This optimal stock is achieved exactly by the North when 0r = , that is * **
0
lim N ir S S→ = . As, 
the discount rate increases, the accumulated level of natural resources diminishes26. In the 
opposite limit is the South with a behavior which mirrors an r = ∞ . As the discount rate 
increases, less valuable is future welfare, thus the stock is accumulated to a level lower 
than the steady state maximum. Since the North accumulates natural resources to a level 
lower than the maximum, and the South accumulates natural resources to a level below 
the North, and given concavity of welfare over iS , it is always the case that initial steady 
state welfare level in the North is higher than in the South. 
So as the North engages in trade with the South it reduces its welfare to the 
present level of the South. Note that this reduction in welfare occurs in spite of an 
improvement in the terms of trade of the North. The income effect of leaving untapped a 
productive asset dominates, and welfare initially falls. This initial losing is consistent 
with the nature of the dynamic trade-off, the North is trading present losses for future 
gains; while it attains less welfare today, it is accumulating wealth by increasing its 
resource stock level, which will allow in the future better utility levels than in autarky. 
                                                 
26 The easiest way to show that * /NS r∂ ∂  is negative is to look at expression (13), or its graphical 
manifestation in Figure 12, to see that as r increases, so does the steady state effort in extraction. Higher 
extraction effort levels are always accompanied by a reduction of the steady state stock level, given 
nature’s restriction, (2). 
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Furthermore, as the natural resources are diminished in the South and the trading price 
increases, welfare in both countries is actually decreasing during transition. 
During transition, in the North, the stock of natural resources left un-harvested 
grows according to its logistic growth function: * * *( ) / / (1 / )tN N N NS t S S C e S C
γ−⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦ . 
The path of the stock in the South is also known27, and given the path of *( )p t  and DNp , 
there is only one +1  in t ℜ , however to obtain it we step from analytical solutions into 
numerical solutions28. Our numerical simulations indicate as expected, that the time 
required for diversification to be achieved is longer when the extractive capacity in the 
South is reduced: low L, low θ, and low α; as well as the growth of the resource is slow in 
the North: low γ. However, a surprising result was to discover that 
1
0S t tS = < , always, 
which means that when diversification is achieved, the stock and effort combination in 
the South is an point like A in Figure 13 and never in a point like B. This result has 
implications for the initiation of the final bang-bang phase as we discussed above. Our 
simulations show that although 
1
S t t
S =
  is always negative it tends to zero when the 
difference between *NS  and 
*
SS  is small, that is when r is high, and when the difference in 
SS  between initial steady state (0) and the beginning of transition is small. An inspection 
of Figure 10 indicates that the latter occurs when γ is large and θ, α and L are small.  
The welfare level of the North when it diversifies is higher than in transition, and 
higher than its initial autarky welfare level, so as to compensate for the transition period 
                                                 
27 * * ( 2 ) *( ) ( 2 ) / / ( 2 / )L tS S S SS t S L S C e L S C
γ θ αγ θ α γ θ α γ γ− −= − − − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
28 Please see Appendix 2 for technical details of the numerical simulations. 
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losses. But as we explained above diversification is not sustainable, and what really 
matters for our welfare analysis is the welfare attained during the bang-bang phase.  
To analyze welfare post-diversification note that we can express it as: 
(1 )( / ) (1 )i iU p Y
α αα α −= − . Given that in the bang-bang phase the price remains stable 
around the neighborhood of 1*( )p t , welfare will depend on income in the different 
phases. Income on the other hand, depends positively on the amount of labor in the 
resource sector: 
1
/ ( * 1) 0R DN N D Nt tY L p Sθ≥∂ ∂ = − > , as 1* ( )DD Sp Sθ −≈  and D DN SS S> . So 
when the North tries to specialize in the Resource good, adjusting its stock downwards, it 
is actually achieves higher current welfare than in steady state for the diversification 
stock level29. Again this behavior is consistent with the dynamic trade-off as the North 
trades current gains for future losses. During phase 2, the opposite happens, the North by 
specializing in Manufactures returns, to a lower welfare level, equivalent to the instant 
before diversification, which is even lower than the South’s initial welfare level. Given 
that the North is going to be half of the time worst-off than the diversified equilibrium 
and the other half of the time better off, it is not clear that trade is better program than 
autarky anymore. 
We have three programs to compare. Under program A, autarky, we 
have: * *
0
( , ) ( , ) /rtN NA U L S e dt U L S r
∞ −≡ ⋅ =∫ . We also have program B, which is the ideal 
                                                 
29 That welfare is higher during phase 1 than in steady state equilibrium at diversification follows from the 
fact that extractive effort is higher in the former case. To see this consider that effort has to be higher in 
phase 1, because the South is specialized in Manufactures, as opposed to the diversified equilibrium, where 
both countries produce the resource good. Therefore, it has to be the case that the labor in the resource is 
higher during phase 1, than the ephemeral diversified equilibrium.   
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trade plan for the North, that represents welfare that would have been attained if the 
diversified trade equilibrium was stable:  
 1 1 1
10 0
( , *( )) ( , ) ( , *( )) ( , ) /
t t rtrt D rt rt D
N Nt
B U L p t e dt U L S e dt U L p t e dt U L S e r
∞ −− − −≡ ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ +∫ ∫ ∫ . 
We know from theory that program B is better than program A. Finally, there is the real 
result of trade with a bang-bang final disequilibrium: 
 { }1
1 1
1 20
( , *( )) 1/ 2
t rt rt rt
D Dt t
C U L p t e dt U e dt U e dt
∞ ∞− − −≡ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∫ ∫ ∫  
 
1
1 1 2
0
( )( , *( ))
2
rtt rt D DU U eU L p t e dt
r
−
− += ⋅ +∫ , 
where 1DU  and 2DU  refer to the welfare levels during phase 1 and 2 respectively. Given 
that we can rank utility levels: 1 2( )
D
D N DU U S U> > , it is not immediately clear that path 
C, is better than B, and for that matter better than A. We will answer this question after 
discussing the welfare implications of trade for the South.  
 For the South, trade is always a losing proposition under case 1, 1/ 2α ≤ . The 
South never earns static gains from trade, as it is unable to specialize in the Resource 
good, where its comparative advantages lie; and on the other hand, while it trades it is 
incurring in dynamic losses, as the depletion of its renewable resource stock diminishes 
its production possibilities set (i.e. real income).  After diversification, utility levels in the 
South remain stable, as nominal income remains independent of RSL , given   
1* ( )DD Sp Sθ −≈ , and real income does not change, with price stable around *Dp . 
 To compare the South different programs, trade and autarky over the whole 
planning horizon, we assume that the South’s over-harvesting behavior is due to an open 
access externality, and not due to optimal behavior of a country with an infinite time 
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discount rate. We assume that the relevant time discounting factor, as well as in all other 
aspects, is identical to the North’s time preferences.  
 In Table 1 we present some results of the numerical simulations, which help us 
compare the difference between programs and the magnitude of the gains and losses that 
trade causes on the trading partners. In the first row of the table we present an arbitrary 
benchmark case that can be used to compare other results. This benchmark case is 
characterized by equality of the relative labor, to growth to natural resources, equal 
productivity of labor in both sectors (θ =1), a small discount rate, and an arbitrary 
preference factor for the resource good of ⅓. In this benchmark case, the South losses of 
about 3% vis-à-vis the autarky plan, are much higher than the potential gains from trade 
of only 0.8% for the North, but roughly equivalent to the real gains of the North 
accounting for the post-diversification bang-bang disequilibrium.  
The losses of the trade regime in the South approach a maximum of about 5.9%; 
we present in rows 2 and 3 two cases representative of the greatest losses for the South. 
We observe three common characteristics in the cases when the South losses are greatest: 
(i) slow rate of depletion of the stock in the South, (ii) low discount rate, and (iii) highest 
preferences for resource good without allowing for static trade gains in the South. As 
rows 2 and 3 show, it is not important the nominal level of labor or growth rate of 
resources, but what actually matters is a slow reduction of the stock in the south, which 
rate is determined by: 2 Lγ θ α−  (see footnote 6). Also, a low discount rate will penalize 
more severely the losses which start accumulating for the South as soon as trade starts. A 
lower discount rate also means that the fall in level of welfare between autarky and the 
final diversification level will be lower (because the difference in initial stock levels 
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between countries is smaller), but the effect of accounting those smaller losses for a 
longer time dominates. On the other hand the losses in the South, and at the same time 
gains in the North approach zero, when preference for the resource good is very low, and 
either discounting of gains/losses is very high relative to growth of the resource (row 5), 
or extractive capacity (α,θ,L) is very low relative to available resources (γ) (row 4).  
In all the rows of Table 3, as well as all the iterations performed, we found that 
the gains from trade in the bang-bang disequilibrium are higher or equal to the gains from 
trade obtained if diversification was a steady state equilibrium. Furthermore, while the 
hypothetical gains of the latter case approach 1.7%, the gains of the former case approach 
7.2%. The potential gains approach 1.7% under similar conditions to that that make 
South’s losses greatest: preferences for the resource good as high as possible without 
allowing static trade gains for the South, low time discount  and low rate of depletion in 
the South. However as opposed to rows 2,3; in rows 6,7 where the potential gains in the 
North are highest, the rate of depletion is a bit higher, and the level of L and γ appears 
relevant: when L and γ are highest, the actual bang-bang gains reach a maximum (rows 
8,9), while when  L and γ are at intermediate values the potential gains reach a maximum 
rows 6,7. We finally note that although the examples in our table show that the actual 
gains in the North are larger than the losses in the South, this is not always the case, as 
the opposite case is perfectly possible and observed. So from the perspective of the 
World welfare (aggregate South and North welfare) trade can be good or bad. 
An important question usually raised against trade in the trade and environment 
debate is that trade destroys the environment. This is possible in a world were the 
environment itself is valuable, but its level is not considered in society’s objective 
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function, like in our model. We find that the changes in the stock level of natural 
resources can be large, losses reaching up to 11.5% for the South, and gains of up to 
8.8% for the North. However, we observe that the net effect over the global environment 
( N SS S+ ) is of a much lower range: between -0.6% and 0.4%, and can be actually 
positive. In rows 10 and 11 we show cases were the negative net effect on the 
environment is greatest. These scenarios have in common, low preference for the 
environmental good, low time discount, and high /Lθ γ  ratio. In rows 12 and 13 we 
show that the net effect of trade on global environment is positive and largest when there 
is high preference for the environmental good, α =½, together with a low natural growth 
rate of the resource and low /Lθ γ  ratio. These are the cases when SS  is lowest, so it is 
encouraging to observe that there can be a positive net effect of trade on the environment 
when the depletion of resources is highest in the South.  
 
2. Cases 2 and 3: South Exports the Resource Good and Specializes in It. The cases 
when the Resource Good is Preferred (α>½). 
We continue the taxonomical analysis of the North-South trade with the case when α>½ 
and N Sp p> , which as we explained in the previous section allows for specialization and 
static gains from trade in the South. Under these circumstances, it is possible that the 
North can also initially specialize, a possibility we label case 2; or only the South initially 
specializes, in what we label case 3. Of course the welfare implications are that in both 
cases the South earns static gains from trade, while the North is constrained in its 
dynamic trade-off in case 3. 
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Case 2 occurs if the international price (see (15))  when both countries specialize, 
lies between the initial autarky prices:  
 
*
* * * *
( )1 *
(1 ) (1 )
R
N
S N R
S S N N
L Lp p p
S S S L
αα
θ α θ α θ
−= < = < =− − . (19) 
One can show that case 2 occurs when: (i) α>½, from *Sp p< ; and (ii) 
* *
* *
( )RN N
R
S N
S L L
S L
−< ,  
from * Np p< . Case 3, on the other hand, occurs when α>½, and 
( )* **
* * *
( ) /( )
( ) /( )
N NN
S N N
L G S SS
S G S S
θ
θ
−> .  
We examine the dynamics of case 3 first. When trade begins, the North observes a 
cheaper price of the resource good in the South, so the country tries to specialize in 
manufactures, while the South has specialized in the Resource good. However, given the 
low preferences for manufactures, the North covers the market for manufactures without 
being able to specialize in the sector, finding that before allocating all labor to 
manufactures, the new international price has reached its initial terms of trade. Initially, 
labor in the resource good is derived from: 
 ( )
*
*
* * * ** 2 *
( ) ( )1 1 *
(1 ) ( )'( )
R
N N
N R
N N S N NN N
G S L Lp p
S S S L S LS r G S
αλθ θ α θθ
−= + = + = =− +− , (20) 
that is, initially North’s labor in the resource sector equalizes the initial price in the 
North, with the international price (15) when the South has specialized in the resource 
sector, i.e., RSL L= . Although the North could not specialize, the harvesting effort as trade 
starts is lower, and therefore the country begins accumulating environmental resources. 
Thus, although the country is not obtaining any static gains from trade, it is accumulating 
wealth, and obtaining dynamic benefits. As the North stock grows, its diversification 
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price, in other words, its steady state terms of trade are falling; and at the same time the 
stock in the South is falling which pressures the international price upwards. Altogether, 
this means that during transition harvesting effort is increasing in the North, when the 
optimal is to bring it down to zero, but at all time from (20),  
 
( ) ( )( )
( )
2 '( ) (1 ) ( ) '( ) ( )
( )
(1 ) ( ) '( )
N N S N N NR
N
N N N N
L S r G S S t r G S S G S
L t
S G S r G S S
α α
α
− − − − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 (21), 
where the environment in the South is depleted at maximum rate so that:  
 * * ( ) *( ) ( ) / / ( / )L tS S S SS t S L S C e L S C
γ θγ θ γ θ γ γ− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
Finally, the path of the resource in the North is determined by (2), 
( ) ( )RN N N NS G S S L tθ= − , where harvesting effort ( )RNL  is as determined by (21), the 
minimum possible without driving the international price above its own steady state 
price. There is really no hope of analytically integrating this differential equation (solving 
for ( )NS t ), which usually stops the dynamic analysis from happening. However, there 
are very well known numerical methods to describe the path of this differential equation, 
most notably the Runge-Kutta method, developed at the end of the XIX century, 
variations of which we apply subsequently to analyze the complete dynamics of this 
North-South trade model30. 
 Eventually, as the North’s diversification price, which is equivalent to the 
international price falls, while the South’s terms of trade rises, the two countries will 
equalize their terms of trade: 
                                                 
30 For technical details on the Runge-Kutta method please see Stengel (1994), pp. 77-79. 
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 ( )2
( )1 1
( ) '( )
D
N
D D D D
S N N N
G S
S S S r G Sθ θ θ= + −  (22). 
At this point, like explained with more details above for case 1, the countries will enter in 
a bang-bang final dis-equilibrium unable to maintain both stocks at steady state. In the 
first stage, as soon as the South (specialized in the resource good), reduces its stock of 
natural resources below DSS , the relative comparative advantages revert and the South 
tries to specialize in manufactures. The difference when comparative advantages revert is 
that now, the South, unlike the North, may be able to specialize in manufactures. This 
could happen because the North is more productive in the resource sector than the South, 
and could fill the market for the resource good at the final trading price without 
specializing. Looking at the market for manufactures we have that S N Sm m M+ ≥ , or: 
 (1 ) (1 ) * (1 ) (1 )( / )D D D MN N S SL p S L L S S L Lα α θ α α− + − = − + − ≥ . 
Which means that South specializes in manufactures, i.e. MSL L≥ , when 
/(1 ) /D DN SS Sα α− ≤ . The left hand side of this inequality lies in the range (1, )∞ , while 
the right hand side of the inequality is greater than one.  As expected, when the bias for 
the resource good is not large enough, it is possible for the South to specialize in 
manufactures during this phase. Thus, if  /(1 ) /D DN SS Sα α− ≥ , then the North is 
specialized in the resource good during the first stage of this bang-bang disequilibrium, 
while if the inequality  is reversed the North does not specialize during this stage, 
allocating only: 
 2
(1 )( / )
R
N D D
N S
LL
S S
α
α α= − + , 
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to the production of the resource good. This result is important, because as we noted in 
the previous section, given that 2*( ) 1/( ) 1/( )
D D
S Np t S Sθ θ= > , welfare (real income) in the 
North is positively correlated to the amount of labor in the resource sector; unlike the 
South were welfare is independent of the labor allocation. 
 Again, like in case one, this brief phase is unsustainable. The accumulation of 
stock in the South and the depletion of the stock in the North will revert comparative 
advantages to a situation equivalent to the trade and production patterns prevalent when 
the countries’ terms of trade equalized: South specialized in the resource good, with the 
North filling the demand gap, producing some resource good too.   
 Under case 2, both countries initially specialize, and trade at a price which lies  
between both of their initial terms of trade. Initially the trading price is 
[ ]* / (1 ) Sp Sα α θ= − , which is growing as the South specialized in the resource good 
depletes its environmental resources. Also, the North’s diversification price is falling, as 
the country specialized in manufactures accumulates renewable resources. Eventually, 
the North’s diversification price, which is falling, will intersect the rising international 
price, at this point, case 2 becomes the same as case 3, and the North is unable to 
specialize in manufactures, and produces, increasingly, some resource good as well. Also, 
the international price as dictated by the North, starts falling. As we show in Figure 15, in 
case 2, the international price has two discontinuous changes, when the international 
price equalizes the price in the North, and when both countries equalize terms of trade. 
When the latter happen, the countries enter a final bang-bang disequilibrium, which is 
equivalent to the one explained above for case 3. 
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2.1 Welfare Analysis   
In the North, the more manufactures the North produces, the worst off the country will be 
once trade is initiated. Income in the North, assuming non-specialization (Case 3) is: 
(1 )R RN N NL S L Lθ λ+ + − , and adding that without specialization the original autarky price 
does not change, proves that the higher the manufactures output in the North, the worst 
the country will initially be. In the limit when it specializes in manufactures, case 2, the 
country is even worse off, consuming at a budgetary restriction which is effectively lower 
than their autarky income (remember that in the North, the marginal rate of 
transformation, and the terms of trade of the country are different). However, the inability 
to specialize in manufactures makes the North overall (the planning horizon) worse off, 
because what is best for the North is to achieve their new steady state as soon as possible, 
trading deeper, but lesser in duration, welfare losses for future gains. That is the nature of 
the dynamic trade-off. Again, the North is getting dynamic gains, increasing its wealth by 
accumulating more natural resources.  
In case 3, when the North does not specialize, the country trades even when the 
initial autarky price does not change. The country does so, because it allows it to 
accumulate wealth through accumulation of natural resources. One could propose that the 
North allocates labor as to leave the international price infinitesimally below its initial 
autarky price, which would not affect the welfare levels but perhaps help understand the 
optimality of the North’s behavior. Even though the price may not change initially trade 
is still optimal for the North because it allows accumulation of resources which increases 
the productivity of labor in the resource good, without affecting the overall supply of the 
resource good. So in a new steady-state the gains from the North are unambiguous, 
 132
however, again we face the question if in a bang-bang final disequilibrium, jumping from 
higher and lower welfare than in steady state: is trade still a better proposition than 
autarky? 
 In the South, both under case 2 and case 3, the country specializes in the resource 
sector and receives a higher price for it than in autarky. Thus, the country earns standard 
Ricardian gains from trade, which will be higher the higher the price received, i.e. gains 
are larger in case 3 when the international price is limited by the North’s autarky price. 
As trade continues this gains from trade are diminished and completely eliminated when 
the final bang-bang is achieved, at which point the terms of trade in the South and the 
international price equalize. At some point in between, however, the South reaches a 
welfare level lower than autarky, because as time passes by, the reduction in the stock of 
natural resources reduces the South’s real income, as well as the reduction in the 
international price reduces profits in the South to zero when both international price and 
South’s terms of trade equalize. All other characteristic being equal, there will always be 
a high enough discount rate that makes trade a preferable plan over autarky in the South. 
Thus, the numerical exercise for the South is more interesting for a given time discount 
rate: how do other characteristics determine if trade is preferable to autarky or not? 
 Our numerical simulations indicate that gains from trade in the South are always 
negative. This losses approach zero when there are not many differences between South 
and the North; e.g. when the discount rate is high, low extractive capacity Lθ , and high 
preference for the resource good, as shown in the second row of Table 4. However, these 
negative gains from trade are negligible for even lower levels of preference for the 
resource good as shown in row 3. Both cases have in common high discount rates, which 
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lowers the intrinsic difference between the South and the North, and a low extractive 
capacity which implies very little difference between steady state initial extraction, and 
full extraction during trade transition. On the other hand, trade losses in the South reach 
an astounding maximum of almost 63% (compare to the maximum of 6% in case 1) when 
the discount rate is at its lowest, there is a high preference for the resource good and the 
ratio of extractive capacity to growth of the resource ( /Lθ γ ) approaches 1 from below, 
as can be seen in rows 3 and 4 of Table 431. Note, that the fall is dramatic precisely 
because the starting level of utility and resource level is very low. In these cases, the low 
discount rate penalizes the final losses in which the South incurs by trading, while the 
small difference between Lθ  and γ  makes transition last longer, and the high 
preferences for the resource penalize more heavily the losses in the stock of the resource 
which can be greater than 63%.  
 The fact that the South does not attain gains from trade over the time horizon 
comes as a surprise because the country does obtain static gains from trade always in 
cases 2 and 3. These gains from trade can represent a jump in welfare of up to more than 
20% versus the autarky steady state level, when the preference for the resource is around 
2/3, and the discount rate is very low. What our numerical simulations indicate is that the 
final losses always dominate the initial gains. When the initial gains are highest, the 
accompanying low discount rate penalizes over a longer horizon the final losses. When 
the discount rate is high and does not penalize heavily the final losses, the initial gains are 
not large enough. Note that this does not mean that trading initial gains for future losses 
                                                 
31 As we show in the next section, when the /Lθ γ  is greater than 1, and the demand for the resource good 
is high enough, the initial comparative advantages are reverted, that is why the greatest losses in the south 
are achieved when this ratio approaches1. 
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is not optimal, as a matter of fact, as we will see in the next section this dynamic trade-off 
can be done optimally. On the other hand, we could discount welfare differently in both 
countries, in which case a low discount rate in the North together with a high enough 
discount rate in the South would make trade beneficial for both parties. However, this 
would be trade based on the environmental externality and differences in preferences. 
What our numerical simulations tell us is that trade resulting from the environmental 
externality alone is never beneficial for the country with the externality, even when there 
are standard gains from trade.  
 The potential gains from trade for the North, i.e. the gains from trade that would 
be attained if a steady state was feasible when the terms of trade equalize, reach a 
maximum of about 3.8%, which pales in comparison to the South’s actual losses which 
approach 64%. This maximum is achieved when preferences for the resource good are 
around 3/4, when the discount rate is minimum, and the /Lθ γ  ratio is also around ¾, see 
rows 6 and 7 of Table 4. The actual gains, which account an average of the bang-bang 
final equilibrium, where the country jumps between welfare levels above and below that 
of steady state equilibrium, is always positive, and approaches 50%, which is more 
similar to the South losses. The actual gains are maximized when /Lθ γ  is close to 1 
from below and Lθ  is high, as when South losses are maximized, see row 4; but close to 
their highest for much lower levels of extractive capacity, as in row 8. 
 The stock of natural resources suffers its greatest losses mirroring the greatest 
welfare loss in the South, see rows 4 and 5 of Table 4. The maximum gains of stock in 
the North is achieved when the discount ratio is above the intrinsic rate of growth of the 
environmental resources, the extractive capacity is low, and the bias in preference for the 
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resource good is highest, as shown in rows 9 and 10 where the stock in the North is 
shown as growing almost by 20%.  Global environment, i.e. N SS S+ as shown in case 1, 
can increase or decrease with trade, as Table 4 shows, the changes can be more 
pronounced in cases 2 and 3. When the discount rate is low, together with a /Lθ γ  ratio 
around 9/10, and high preference bias for the resource good, as shown in rows 11 and 12, 
the fall in global environment can be as much as 12%. Obviously this case is 
characterized by a fast reduction in the stock in the South, and slow accumulation in the 
North. On the opposite spectrum, rows 13 and 14 show that the global environment can 
improve in as much as 6% when the /Lθ γ  ratio approaches to 1 from below, the 
extractive capacity is low, the /r γ  ratio is grater than 1, and there is high demand for the 
resource good.   
 
3. When the South Exports Manufactures 
The South will initially export manufactures when in spite of the environmental 
externality, it is cheaper to produce manufactures in the South, i.e. S Np p> . As Brander 
and Taylor (1997) noted when they analyzed the steady state of a similar model, a 
backward bending steady state relative supply ( /S SR M ) is a necessary condition for 
S Np p> . The sufficient condition is that the relative demand is high enough, for there to 
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be an equilibrium in the North and in the South markets, with manufactures cheaper in 
the latter country32.   
 Two conditions are required for the South’s steady state relative supply curve to 
be backward bending. First, the natural growth function of the resource must have the 
concave, inverted “U” shape, which is usually assumed for renewable resources. This 
condition assures that for high enough levels of extraction effort, additional expansions in 
the extraction of the renewable resource will actually render lower steady state output 
levels of the resource good, rather than more.  The second condition is that the fall in the 
production of the resource good that follows from the reallocation of one unit of labor 
from the manufactures to the resource sector has to be greater than the fall in the 
production of manufactures. We define South’s relative supply:  
 
* ( )
( )
R R R
S S S S S
R R
S S S
R S L C L L
M L L L L
θ θ γ
γ
−= =− −  (23), 
where in the second equality we have used the definition of the steady state stock level. 
Thus, this relative supply will have a negative slope, ( / ) / 0RS S SR M L∂ ∂ < , when: 
 (2 )
R R
S SL L L
L
θγ −<  (24). 
The right hand side of (24) has a maximum at Lθ , therefore the steady state relative 
supply can have a negative slope only if Lθ γ> . If this condition is not met the relative 
supply in the South is always positively sloped, and for any price, the country offers 
relatively more resource good than the North. 
                                                 
32 Note that in Brander and Taylor the North is an extreme version of what we call the North. In their study 
they implicitly assume that the North has a discount rate of zero, while we study a more general case where 
the discount rate is less than infinity.  
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 This second condition was completely missed by Brander and Taylor (1997b); so 
much so that they specifically assume Lθ γ< , to avoid extinction, which denies the 
possibility of the negative sloped supply curve they work with. As we have shown this 
condition to avoid extinction is too stringent, what is required to avoid extinction is 
Lθα γ< . Hence, the possibility of the relative scarcity of the resource overwhelming the 
environmental externality and reverting apparent comparative advantages ( S Np p> ) 
opens the possibility of extinction, and may occur within a rather small window: 
 L Lθ γ θα> >  (25). 
The window is rather small because the left hand inequality of  (25), opens the possibility 
of a backward bending supply curve, while demand α  needs to be large enough, 
( 1 (1 /( )Lα γ θ> − − ), to ensure initial equilibrium in the backward bending section of 
the supply curve33.  
 As in the case when the South exports the resource good, when the South exports 
manufactures there are three initial possibilities. Either country can specialize in the good 
it exports, or both countries specialize. We will briefly characterize when each of the 
three possibilities occurs.  
We examine first the case when the South specializes in manufactures, while the 
North can not specialize in the production of the resource good.  First, for the relative 
price of the resource good to be higher in the South, condition (25) has to be met and,  
                                                 
33 Note that the steady state relative supply curve in the North can also be backward bending. When r is 
high enough, particularly greater than γ, then NS  can fall well below the maximum growth level, C/2 
(remember that '( )Nr G S>  always).  If additionally if  Lθ γ>  then the relative supply curve will be 
backward bending, for the same reasons than in the South, but the bending will always start at a higher 
price than in the South.  
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 * * *
1
1 ( / )( / 1)RS N NS S L L
α > + − , 
which ensures initial equilibriums above the point where the North and the South’s 
relative supply curves intersect. When the South specializes in manufactures the 
international price becomes: ** [ (2 )] /[(1 ) ]R RN N Np L L S Lα α θ= − − . Comparing this price, to 
the North’s steady state price, we can show that the North will not be able to specialize in 
the production of the resource good if: 
 
* *
* * * * *
( '( )) 12 2
( '( )) (1 ) ( ) 1 (1 )
N N
N N N N
S r G SL L L
S r G S G S S
α αα α λ θ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤−> =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− + − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (26). 
As expected, when the demand for the resource good is low, α is small, then the North 
will not be able to specialize in the production of the resource good. In this case, the 
international price is constrained by the price in the North, which will rise through 
transition as the stock of environmental resources becomes scarcer in the North. At the 
same time, the accumulation of stock in the South will lower the terms of trade in the 
South until both equalize, and after this a bang-bang final equilibrium follows as 
described in the previous section. 
 On the other extreme, the North will be able to specialize in the production of the 
resource, and the South will produce both goods, when the international price that would 
prevail if both parties specialize, i.e. ** /[(1 ) ]Np Sα α θ= − ,  lies below the initial price in 
the South. Thus, when  
 
*
*(1 )
N
S
S
S
α
α >−  (27), 
the South will be unable to specialize in manufactures. Note that, since the stock in the 
North is always initially higher than in the South, condition (27) implies that 1/ 2α > , 
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which is expected, higher demand for the resource good inhibits the South from 
specializing in manufactures. In this case, the international price throughout transition 
will be constrained by the price in the South, which is falling as the country accumulates 
environmental stock. At the same time the diversification price in the North is rising, and 
eventually when both prices equalize the countries enter a final disequilibrium phase.  
 The third case, when both countries initially specialize occurs when both 
conditions (26) and (27) are met with reversed sign. In this case, the international price 
will rise, as the stock in the North is diminished, but after the international price 
eventually intersects the terms of trade in the South, the international price starts falling, 
constrained by the South’s terms of trade that fall as the country accumulates 
environmental stock. As time goes by, the terms of trade of both countries will intersect, 
at which point the countries enter a final bang-bang disequilibrium.   
3.1 Welfare Analysis 
In the case of the South the welfare consequences of initially exporting manufactures are 
unambiguous. The country may gain static gains from trade if it initially specializes in 
manufactures, but will always gain dynamic benefits from accumulating natural stock, 
which increases its real income. Therefore in the end, the South will always gain from 
trading when it exports manufactures. Our numerical exercise can provide the magnitude 
of these gains. 
 The North will always trade present gains for future losses, but optimally as long 
as it can hold a future steady state. As we saw in the previous section, the South was 
unable to make this same dynamic trade (present gains for future losses) in an 
advantageous manner, even when it earned initial profits, it ended up worse off over the 
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whole planning horizon. However, the North accounts for the dynamics of the stock and 
its own time preferences so it can make this dynamic trade and earn from it. It is not 
clear, nonetheless, that the country would still be better off considering that it is not able 
to maintain a steady state when the international price and its own diversification price 
equalize.  
 In Table 5 we take an arbitrary benchmark case in row 1, and present the main 
consequences of trade. The result that immediately strikes is the negative gains in the 
North in the Actual Gains column. The potential gains, if a steady state was attainable are 
positive (2.3%), as expected, as the North is behaving optimally. However, the actual 
gains which is a simple average of two states, one of them higher and the other lower 
than in steady state, needs not be actually higher, as in this case, -2.8%. When the North 
initially exported manufactures, the country accumulated natural stock and increased real 
income, with a lower minimum income (that occurs when the country specializes in 
manufactures) of  / *L p  that is higher than the initial minimum. However, when the 
North initially exports the resource good, the opposite happens, real income falls, and the 
new minimum real income is lower than in autarky, which opens the possibility for the 
actual gains for trade to be negative. 
 The effects of trade are minimal and almost null as shown in row 2 when both the 
/Lθ γ  and the /r γ  ratios are highest and α  is lowest. A low demand for the resource 
good ensures that the welfare effect of the changes in stock will have little effect on 
welfare. When α  is low, a high extractive capacity /Lθ γ  is required to be in the 
backward bending section of the relative supply. Also, a high /r γ  will ensure that the 
initial differences between north and South are very small. As long as r is extremely high 
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the differences between countries will be small enough and dynamic gains and losses are 
not accounted heavily and thus trade will have almost no effect for higher levels of α   
and lower /Lθ γ  ratios, as shown in row 3.  
 In rows 4 and 5 we show when the actual losses in the North are maximum. These 
cases are characterized by a /Lθ γ  ratio approaching 2 from below, a very low time 
discount rate and α  equal to ½. We can make sense of these figures. First, the North 
lowest welfare level during the bang-bang phase is achieved when the country exports 
and specializes in manufactures. ½ is the highest level of α , that weighs the losses in the 
resource stock, at which the North remains specialized in manufactures. Furthermore, if 
1/ 2α = , the /Lθ γ  has to be lower than 2, higher extractive levels would extinguish the 
resource stock in the South (in autarky). Finally, the lower discount rate penalizes more 
heavily the real income losses incurred by the country. These trade induced losses can 
amount to 24% compared to an autarky program, and represent an unexpected result of 
the inability to achieve equilibrium: the country that optimally manages the resource 
looses with trade.   
 It is fair to ask: how is it possible that the externality free country looses with 
trade? The answer is that the North is free from the environmental externality, but it 
suffers, in a sense, from an information failure. This information failure is twofold; the 
country does not know its trading partner optimal behavior but more importantly, does 
not know that it will be unable to sustain a new equilibrium.  
 On the other hand, the North can have actual gains positive and very high, 
approaching 27% , as shown in rows 6 and 7.  These cases are characterized by a /Lθ γ  
ratio slightly above 1, lowest time discount and high demand for the resource good. As 
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shown by the very low potential gains, the extreme actual gains therefore are due to gains 
during the bang-bang phase. Note, that stocks changes very little, less than .5% although 
initially countries are very different, with the North having initial stock level above 50% 
of maximum C, while the South only 7%. In spite of these differences in stock level, 
terms of trade equate very fast without much change in stocks/real income. Also, in the 
North during the bang-bang phase, the minimum level of production of the resource good 
(when the country exports manufactures), given the high demand, is not too low below 
the steady state level, which allows an average for the bang-bang phase which is actually 
above the steady state optimal.  
 The gains for the South compared to autarky can be limitless. This happens, 
because the autarky benchmark in terms of stock and welfare can be very low, just above 
zero as the resource stock approaches the point of extinction. In row 8 of the table we 
display the largest welfare gains for the South in our round of iterations, 276%. However, 
in row 9 we show that adjusting demand around that maximum we see that welfare gains 
can amount to more than 4,000%, and if we continued fine tuning we would approach 
infinity, as we reduce the initial stock in the South to ε  above zero. Nonetheless, row 8 
gives hints of when the South is likely to earn more from trade. This happens, when α  
approaches ½ from above, when r γ> , which means that the initial positions of both 
countries are not too far apart,  and the /Lθ γ  ratio approaches 2 from below. 
 What happens with the environmental stock is very interesting. When the South 
initially exports the resource good, stocks diverge, but in this case stock converge. 
However they never intersect, when terms of trade equalize, still D DN SS S> . The change in 
the stock in the South, as we have shown, can vary from almost zero to almost infinity. 
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The change of the resource stock in the North can be very high approaching -90% and 
higher as shown in row 9. The latter happens precisely when the stock in the South is 
very low, which gives as an end result that the total world environmental stock drops 
dramatically more than 86%, when the physical limit is 100%. In this case row 9 is very 
revealing, because both countries gain from trade even after accounting for the bang-bang 
final state, but there is an environmental catastrophe. Note that the problem here is not 
that the environment is not included in the welfare function explicitly. The problem is the 
externality. If instead of modeling the environmental externality in the production side, 
we would have included it in the demand side we would still get the same result, welfare 
improvement accompanied with environmental destruction. The North would manage 
optimally their valued environment, but not the world environment and we would end 
with a similar result both countries can gain from their perspective, while serious 
environmental destruction (from the point of view of the world is brewed). Of course, 
trade can be beneficial for the world’s environmental stock, but these gains go as high as 
10% as shown in rows 10 and 11 (when demand for the environmental good is extremely 
low), versus lows that can go to almost total destruction of the environment.  
 
4. Global Steady States and the Inability to Achieve Them 
4.1 Global Steady States 
The reader will have noticed that while we have argued that a trade steady state is not 
feasible starting from autarkic equilibrium, we have really not shown or explained why 
this happens. In this section we first show that a trade equilibrium is not possible, and in 
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doing so we describe and discuss the available equilibriums. Then we explain why the 
market is unable to achieve them, and discuss the implications for real world trade in 
goods intensive in renewable resources.  
We will have to accept the inability to formally prove that an equilibrium is 
unattainable by the market, given that we are unable to solve symbolically for key 
variables of the trade outcome. Nonetheless, we can show that trade steady states are not 
possible: using numerical methods as shown in the previous section; and we can explain 
why this type of equilibrium is not possible, as we later do. First, we discuss different 
type of trade equilibriums, and we discuss their stability, and if they can be achieved by 
market behavior.  
 We begin by defining a global steady state, which is simply a production pattern 
that can sustain a natural equilibrium in both countries at the same time; i.e. 0SS =  and 
0NS = . Clearly, any production arrangement with (0, / )RiL γ θ∈  can provide a global 
steady state. However, not any of these feasible global steady states will satisfy the 
market conditions. We define a global steady state consistent with free-market trade 
(GSCM), as an equilibrium that is a global steady state in the sense that provides natural 
equilibrium in both partners, but additionally complies with the market conditions, which 
can be collapsed to three requirements: (i) the trading price has to be equal to the rate of 
transformation in the South (6), to eliminate any incentive in that country to deviate from 
production patterns; (ii) equivalently, the international price has to be equal to the North’s 
optimal price for its own steady state stock level (16); and (iii) the labor allocation, and 
the global steady state stock levels of both countries must be such that they provide a 
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trade balancing international price (15), equivalent to that of the South (i) and the North 
(ii).   
 We can thus mathematically define the GSCM as a set { }, , ,R RN S N SL L S S  which 
simultaneously satisfies: 
 ( ) RN N NG S S Lθ=  (28); 
 ( ) RS S SG S S Lθ=  (29); 
 * 1/( )Sp Sθ=  (6); 
 * *1 1
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N
N N N N
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S S S r G S
λθ θ= + = + −  (16); and 
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− −= − +  (15). 
If we equate (6) and (16) we get:  
 [ '( )]( ) /( )RGN N N S SL r G S S S Sθ= − −  (30), 
which is the minimum harvesting effort that the North can employ in harvesting natural 
resources without raising the international trading price. Similarly, equating  (6) and (15) 
we obtain:  
 2 [(1 ) / ][ '( )]( ) /( )RGS N S N N S SL L S S r G S S S Sα α α θ= − − + − −  (31); 
which is exactly equivalent to (17) (evaluated at RGNL ): the maximum effort that the South 
can employ in producing the resource good without decreasing the international trading 
price below its own terms of trade. Thus we can reduce the GSCM, to two dynamic 
equations, valid only at steady state: 
 ( ) [ '( )]( ) 0NN N N N S
S
SS G S r G S S S
S
= − − − =  (32); and 
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 ( ) 2 [ '( )]( )[ (1 ) ] / 0S S S N N S S N SS G S S L r G S S S S S Sαθ α α= − + − − + − =  (33). 
We have to stress that these equations are only valid at steady state, because any 
deviation from equilibrium will cause both partner to adopt their extreme transition 
production patterns.  In Appendix 3, however, we show that this equilibrium will always 
be stable (around a very narrow neighborhood of the steady state) when it occurs at stock 
levels for both countries higher than / 2C , and could be unstable when stock levels are 
very low, and / or the intrinsic environmental growth rate is very high.  
 Equations (32) and (33) also can help us graphically represent the GSCM. We can 
solve for NS  in (32) to obtain:  
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  (34). 
We can also solve for NS  in (33), however, please note that the answer involves the 
solution of a cubic function, and therefore the solution is an extensive formula which we 
do not show explicitly; nonetheless, it is graphically represented together with (34) in 
Figure 16.  
 The figure shows that, given the cubic nature of (33), there can be up to 3 
different equilibriums. However, given the constraint imposed by nature, only 
equilibriums that occur within { } { }, (0, ), (0, )S NS S C C∈  are feasible. Thus, the number of 
feasible equilibriums may range between 0 and 3. This raises many interesting questions. 
Will a feasible GSCM always exist when trade is possible? Does a feasible GSCM exist 
that is contained between the initial autarky * *( , )N SS S and diversification stock levels 
( , )D DN SS S  always, or at all? Clearly if a GSCM is going to be feasible, there must exist a 
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solution that is a GSCM and contained within the range within which the stocks move 
during trade; that is: * G DN N NS S S> >  and *D GS S SS S S> >  (in the case South exports the 
resource good).   
We proceed to try to give an answer to these questions with numerical methods 
again. With the help of a symbolical algebra engine (Maple 9 or Mathematica 5) we can 
solve explicitly for the 3 possible GSCM solutions, however the answers require several 
pages of algebraic expressions (quite an achievement for a deceptively simple problem!), 
so they are not shown here. The feasibility of a GSCM solution has two parts. On one 
hand both stocks must be contained within nature’s bounds (0,C) (naturally feasible). 
Also, as explained above, it must be feasibly attained by the market, thus both stocks 
must be contained within the autarky and diversification levels (economically feasible). 
Finally, a GSCM would only be possible if in addition to being economically feasible, 
both equilibrium stock levels where attained at the same time, by the market determined 
extraction rates (as shown in previous sections). The exercise done in previous sections, 
which traced market behavior, showed that this last requirement is never met. We 
proceed to explore the issue one step back, by analyzing if economically feasible GSCM 
exist or not. 
The numerical exercise consists of iterating across all the parameters space, and 
finding all the feasible GSCM, together with testing the stability of these types of 
equilibriums. To limit the calculations, we limit the iterations to the case when the South 
exports the resource good. We can readily summarize our most important findings. There 
always exists at least one naturally feasible GSCM, and a maximum of three. However, 
on the other side, we did not find one single economically feasible GSCM. In most cases, 
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there is at least one GSCM that consists of one country stock level contained within the 
autarky and diversification boundary, while the other one was outside. While in other 
fewer cases we found that none of the individual country stocks of the naturally feasible 
GSCM where contained within the range the stocks move during trade (more details 
below).  These last two results are very compelling in demonstrating, beyond a doubt, 
that trade starting from autarkic equilibrium, can occur without conducting countries to a 
global equilibrium. 
The GSCM appears to approach economical feasibility, without ever reaching it 
in our iterations, but only when the difference between autarky prices among countries is 
very small, or equivalently, the change between autarky and diversification stock levels is 
very low.  
In Table 4 we illustrate with some examples the results of our numerical exercise. 
The most common result is for there to be 1 naturally feasible GSCM, but 2 and 3 
naturally feasible GSCM are possible. The least expected result is to have 3 naturally 
feasible GSCM. One such example is given in the first row of the table. Note that in the 
table the individual country stock levels that are contained between the autarky and 
diversification boundary are highlighted in bold. If an economically feasible GSCM 
existed, both columns of the GSCM would be in bold. Three GSCM exist within a 
narrow parameter window, when the discount to natural growth rate ratio /r γ  lies 
between 0.4 and 2.5, and the effective labor to natural growth rate /Lθ γ  is not too large.  
Rows 2 and 3 provide further examples of trade scenarios where only 2 and 1 naturally 
feasible GSCM exist.  
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In row 4 we present a less likely but interesting case, where none of the naturally 
feasible GSCM stock levels are contained between the autarky and diversification levels. 
This latter type of cases only occurs when the discount to natural growth rate ratio /r γ  is 
extremely high, and it is therefore more of an interesting theoretical curiosity than an 
expected observable empirical regularity. However, it demonstrates quite strongly how 
trade can happen, without achieving a global steady state.  
On the other hand, our simulations showed that all the naturally feasible 
equilibriums are stable. In the last column of Table 4, we indicate the amount of  negative 
roots of the system (28) - (29) evaluated at each equilibrium point. All the examples in 
the table have at least one negative root, and indeed, that is also the case with all 
equilibriums found in our simulations. This result complements the analysis done in 
Appendix 3, where we showed that all equilibriums with stock levels above one half of 
the carrying capacity behaved at least as a saddle path. So with the caveat, that due to the 
non-linear response of trade partners, within a very narrow neighborhood of steady state 
the GSCM is always stable.  
Of course the possibility of multiple equilibriums provides theoretical foundations 
for the environmentalists concerns. We discussed multiple equilibriums in chapter 1, and 
showed how it serves as a theoretical support for the claim that trade can cause 
environmental collapse.  Here the multiple equilibriums are a result of the externality in 
the South. As shown, for example by case 1 in Table 6, one of the equilibriums represents 
an environmental collapse in the South and a near environmental collapse in the North. 
Additionally, these “extremely low” equilibriums can occur when the diversification 
level can lie at almost no extraction. From the perspective of the analysis carried out here, 
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where we only consider autarky equilibrium as starting points, these environmental 
collapses are not relevant, because these collapse equilibriums are not achievable. 
However, these equilibriums could be attainable if the countries were off their own 
autarky equilibriums, and in the vicinity of these environmental collapse equilibriums.  
Of course, free trade is not the only possibility. If both countries knew each 
other’s best response, then they would play a game in which each tries to behave as a 
monopolist, à la Cournot. However, a more relevant possibility is that the North, due to 
better information or political power behaves as a monopolist, while the South remains as 
a price taker.  In this case, only the North knows the South’s best response, and the 
South’s environmental restrictions, in addition to the trading price, and can create a trade 
and production plan that accounts for this information, which may potentially lead to an 
equilibrium.  
Thus, when the North behaves like a monopolist, the country knows the South’s 
best response, which can be obtained from the South’s rate of transformation:  
 1/( )S Sp Sθ=  (6); 
and the trading price: 
 * (2 )
(1 )( )
R R
N S
R R
N N S S
L L Lp
S L S L
α
α θ θ
− −= − +  (15). 
By equating these conditions we can obtain (17) which is South’s best response. Given 
that the monopolist knows the South’s best response, the environmental restrictions in the 
South as seen by the monopolist are: 
 ( ) 2 [(1 ) / ]RS S N N SS G S L L S Sαθ α α= − + − +  (35) 
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The objective function for the monopolist is different, given that he knows that the price 
is limited by the South’s rate of transformation (6), the objective function is now: 
 
0,
Max ( )
R
N N
R R rtN
N N
L S S
S L L L e dt
S
∞ −⎧ ⎫+ − ⋅⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∫  (5’’) 
Therefore, the North monopolist program can be obtained by solving the current value 
Hamiltonian: 
 ( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) 2 [(1 ) / ]R R R RN N N N N N S N N S
S
SH L L L G S S L G S L L S S
S
λ θ μ αθ α α⎡ ⎤= + − + − + − + − +⎣ ⎦ (36). 
 The objective function (5’’) is quite revealing. The North obviously wants to 
maximize its stock and minimize stock in the South. Therefore, the value of the stock in 
the South is zero; and the equilibrium if it exists will be defined with the shadow value of 
the South’s stock, μ , is equal to zero. Such an equilibrium, let us call it the monopolist 
global steady state (GSM), could not be found symbolically using computer aided 
algebraic engines, but we can find it numerically. This means, we collapse all the first 
order conditions derived from (36) into 1 equation, assuming that multipliers and stock 
levels are at equilibrium, and with the computer aid we find the floating point number(s) 
that makes the equality hold, within the feasible range (i.e. (0,1)iS ∈ ).  
Again to investigate the GSM, we iterated across all parameter space to see how 
this equilibrium behaves, and to check its stability properties.  We are not presenting the 
results of this last exercise; however, we refer to the main findings. Again, three 
equilibriums are possible, but in contrast to GSCM the possibility of no feasible GSM 
exists. No feasible solutions tend to occur when the effective labor to natural growth ratio 
( /Lθ γ ) is low. However, given the monopolist controls its own extraction rates, as well 
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as its trading partner extraction rates (indirectly), the feasible revenue maximizing 
equilibriums are most likely attainable, when they exist.  
4.2 Why Are Global Steady States Consistent with the Market Not Attainable? 
We now explain why equilibrium can not occur in this model in the context of price 
taking, market behavior.  First we note that, this result is not the product of the 
assumptions made about the beginning of the process, nor it is a result about the 
assumptions about production (linear) technology. In brief, economic and biological 
equilibrium (Global Steady State Consistent with the Market) can not be attained at the 
same time, because when the terms of trade of both partners equalize (thus exhausting the 
economic incentives for trade) it is impossible for both partners to change the production 
decisions from their transition levels to respect their own biological equilibrium, and at 
the same time respect the international price which must remain equivalent to their 
equalized terms of trade, to negate economic incentives to deviate from equilibrium. To 
illustrate this, let us focus in Case 1. 
 We assumed, because it seemed plausible and most reasonable, that once the 
terms of trade equalize, the North observes that the international price equals its own 
long-term terms of trade and decides to diversify as if in a steady state. Further, we 
showed that the South to maintain market equilibrium has to choose a production level 
that further reduces its stock and reverses its comparative advantage, initiating the bang-
bang disequilibrium. Assume that our numeric simulations were wrong and that after the 
North diversifies, the South to respect market equilibrium is in a point like B in Figure 
13, where the extraction is less than natural regeneration.  In this case, the stock in the 
South would grow, which means that again the South can produce the resource good 
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cheaper than in the North. Thus, the South specializes in the resource intensive good, the 
North produces more manufactures, which reduces the environmental stock in the South 
and increases it in the North; which reverts comparative advantages, the North now has 
the comparative advantage in the Resource good and we have entered a bang-bang final 
disequilibrium again. Hence, the observed result that the South after the North diversifies 
is at position where extraction exceeds regeneration does not determine the final bang-
bang disequilibrium. 
 On the other hand, the assumption that it is the North that diversifies and 
establishes its own biological equilibrium when the terms of trade of both countries 
equalizes, also does not drive the lack of equilibrium result. One could alternatively argue 
that it is the South that observes North’s long-term terms of trade and decides to stop 
maximum extraction and establish its biological equilibrium. Alternatively, one can argue 
that production patterns remain at transition levels until the South has over-extracted the 
resource and essentially has higher costs of producing the resource good than the North. 
These different assumptions will change how the bang-bang disequilibrium begins, but 
does not alter the fact that it will happen.  
The bang-bang disequilibrium happens because once the terms of trade equalize 
(the South’s short term, and the North’s long term marginal rate of substitution), 
condition (22), it is impossible for both countries to establish their steady state 
(environmental equilibrium) production levels, i.e. ( ) ( )1 1( ) / ( )Ri i iL G S t S tθ= , and at the 
same time maintain the international price at the diversification level, i.e. 1*( )p t . 
Needless to say, the international price (which depends on both extraction and stock 
levels) can not change, otherwise there are economic incentives to deviate from those 
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equilibrium production levels. During transition countries maintain levels of extractions 
that are not consistent with biological equilibrium. Once the terms of trade equalize, to 
achieve environmental equilibrium extraction levels must change. This would affect the 
international price, which is not consistent with equilibrium. Only by chance can the 
international price be the same, holding stock levels fixed, at the transition extraction 
levels, and at the environmental equilibrium levels34; which is what a GSCM requires.  
Essentially, when the terms of trade equalize it is required that 3 equilibriums hold (both 
biological equilibriums, and the international price which must stay constant), but there 
are only two degrees of freedom, the extraction rates.  
 Note how this result is not caused by the linearity in the production functions, a 
prime suspect of bang-bang behavior. If technology was not linear, then during the bang-
bang disequilibrium there would not be any specialization, but it would not avoid the 
problem that to achieve market equilibrium only one country can produce at biological 
equilibrium level. After that, the stock in the other country changes and causes a change 
in comparative advantages, which triggers the bang-bang disequilibrium. Thus if 
technology exhibited decreasing returns to labor, the jumps would be more moderated, 
but would still occur as comparative advantages are reverted back and forth.  
 Also note that the lack of equilibrium is also not dependant in the starting points 
we assumed (i.e. autarky) in our numerical simulations.  
 Thus, two characteristics determine the bang-bang disequilibrium. First, there is 
the market price taking behavior which means that countries do not know each other’s 
response and can therefore not plan anticipating the response of their trading partner. And 
                                                 
34 Although it is theoretically possible, because when terms of trade equalize extraction levels in both 
countries must move in opposite directions to re-establish the environmental equilibrium 
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the second characteristic is that the trading partners represent a large share of the world 
market and their production decisions affect the international price. On the extreme of no 
market share, we have basically what we described in Chapter 2 where North and South 
had no problem achieving steady state market equilibrium. In the model we study in this 
chapter, for the sake of understanding, assume that once the terms of trade equalize 
between North and South, the international price remains constant regardless of the 
production patterns. In this case after the North establishes its equilibrium production 
level, the South would see its production level decrease whilst its extraction exceeds 
regeneration, however, eventually both equalize and a global steady state is achieved. 
This impossible example highlights the fact that it is the ability to affect market price 
what is partially responsible for the bang-bang disequilibrium.  
 As surprising as the lack of equilibrium may seem, this is not a new result in the 
renewable resources literature. In the case of one agent managing one renewable 
resource, it takes just a fixed cost (which de facto eliminates the convexity of the 
production possibilities) to create the possibility of non-equilibriums. Lewis and 
Schmalensee (1977) showed this result; in the presence of a fixed cost it may be optimal 
to perpetually abandon the resource, let it grow and then re-exploit it; what has later been 
called a “chattering” equilibrium.  Also in the context of one agent exploiting one 
renewable resource, Hommes and Rosser (2001) showed that when price expectations 
follow an AR(1) process, both convergence to equilibrium and chaos are possible for 
differing parameter values. “Chaos” in these authors work is comparable to our lack of 
equilibrium, a perpetual jump between low and high extraction levels. Note however, that 
in our analysis the source of the lack of equilibrium (or “chaos”) is much simpler than a 
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complex expectation structure; simply, in the trade model it is impossible to achieve 
economic equilibrium (in this case maintain their production structure) after terms of 
trade equalize, and at the same time achieve biological equilibrium in both resources at 
the same time. 
  So this lack of equilibrium is just a mathematical curiosity? Does it have 
implications for the real world? Let us start by noting, that economist as early as Malthus 
have been worrying about potential disequilibrium in the resource extraction and 
potential environmental collapses. In the modern analysis these potential environmental 
collapses are described as convexities within the natural growth function, or by multiple 
equilibriums. In our model, there is no environmental collapse during the final 
disequilibrium, as the stock levels remain stable (around a neighborhood; i.e. there is a 
pseudo biological equilibrium) during the final bang-bang phase. However, there are 
welfare jumps in the case of the North. Thus, the model does seem to reflect periods of 
welfare with periods of misery as Malthus feared long ago, but surprisingly for the case 
of the country that optimally manages the resource, not the country with the externality. 
The disequilibrium phase should pose a concern: Even if there was the smallest of 
transition / friction costs associated with moving from one stage of production to another, 
the permanent disequilibrium could amount to catastrophic losses in the long term. It is 
always assumed in trade models that transition costs are null (i.e. no unemployment 
occurs when migrating from primary rural industries to urban manufacturing industries). 
While this assumption may not be crucial when only one change in production structure 
occurs, it may not be a good assumption when there is permanent change in asset 
allocation. We recognize however, that if this transition costs were large enough, 
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probably there would be economic incentives, for both countries not to change 
production structure after the terms of trade equalize. 
  
IV. Conclusions 
 The results of the numerical simulations provide very important implications for 
the policy maker. Perhaps the most important one is that an excessive worry over 
externality based trade causing excessive losses in the South and causing excessive 
environmental damage is probably misplaced. First, externality based trade is likely to 
cause a very minor reduction in the environmental quality (if at all) because there is a 
transfer of environmental quality from the South to the North. The possibility of a global 
environmental collapse exists, but is really a theoretical curiosity that can happen, 
surprisingly, when trade patterns reverse (when the North exports the environmental 
intensive good), which we are yet to observe and can only occur under limited parameter 
combinations. 
 Of course externality based trade harms the South. However, it is important to get 
an idea of how large this damage is. Our simulations showed that the a key parameter in 
determining the size of this damage is (α) the share of resource intensive goods in total 
consumption. For middle income countries, where the share of consumption of 
environmentally intensive goods, like food, and high polluting industries, lies around 1/3, 
the trade induced welfare losses reach only a maximum of 3.3% for plausible discount 
rates in the range of 5-10%. This damage is larger, the greater the relative size of the 
resource intensive sector; thus, assuming that for a middle income country the share 
environmentally intensive output lies between 15 and 60% the trade induced losses range 
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between 0.5 and 3.3% for the same plausible discount rates (compare these losses with 
the externality losses of the South with respect to the North without trade, which can be 
as high as 33% for the same 1/ 3α = ) . Thus for countries like Malaysia, Philippines and 
Brazil, that although have a relative large “environmental” sector, the trade induced 
losses are very small. Thus, development funds may be better spent dealing with other 
more urgent needs in these type of countries than tackling the trade induced 
environmental losses. This conclusion is also supported by Anríquez, Lopez and Gulati 
(2001) who show that in the presence of three productive assets (the environment, plus 
human and physical capital), growth is possible when there is an open access externality 
in the environmental asset, but it is not possible when there is an externality in either 
accruable asset. 
 However this conclusion is totally different for the poorest countries, where the 
share of consumption of mainly primary goods rises over 50%. For an archetypical 
country with a share of consumption of primary goods in the range of 66%, and assuming 
plausible discount rates of around 10%, losses in terms of welfare amount to 9% as 
compared to an autarky basis. Even in these cases the global environmental losses are 
rather small, less than 0.5%. However, given the welfare losses in the case of very poor 
countries like Congo, Albania and Laos, where the share of the primary sector in total 
GDP climbs above 50%, aid and development institutions should be focusing in 
environmental externalities as a serious burden to development. 
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Figure 10. Transition in the South. 
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Figure 11. Transition in the North. Closed Economy Case. 
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Figure 12. Transition in the North 
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Figure 13. Transition During Trade. Case 1  (No Specialization in the South) 
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Figure 14 Initial Welfare During Autarky 
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Figure 15 The Path of the International Price 
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Figure 16 Global Steady States Consistent with Market Behavior 
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Table 3. Gains from Trade: Case 1 
 θ L γ r α South 
Gains 
% 
North 
Gains % 
(potential)
(B-A)/A 
North 
Gains % 
(actual) 
(C-A)/A 
Change 
in SS  
% 
Change 
in NS  
% 
Change 
in 
S NS S+  
% 
 Benchmark          
1 1 1 1 0.05 ⅓ -2.9578 0.8163 2.9863 -8.6739 7.0336 -0.3791 
 Some Extremes          
2 0.99 1000 1000 0.001 ½ -5.8997 1.6055 7.1087 -11.4514 8.2651 -0.2208 
3 1.1 0.9 1 0.001 ½ -5.8960 1.6030 7.0948 -11.4459 8.2652 -0.2195 
4 0.001 0.25 1000 50 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0.001 0.01 0.01 1000 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 1.05 20 25 0.001 ½ -5.7584 1.6705 6.5627 -11.1852 8.7214 -0.3215 
7 1.1 20 25 0.001 ½ -5.8397 1.6700 6.7479 -11.3384 8.6666 -0.3059 
8 1.05 1000 1000 0.001 ½ -5.8219 1.5290 7.1941 -11.3049 7.8970 -0.1487 
9 1.05 500 500 0.001 ½ -5.8219 1.5290 7.1940 -11.3049 7.8970 -0.1487 
10 1.1 500 1.5 0.001 0.001 -0.0078 0.0017 0.0079 -7.4642 5.2688 -0.5471 
11 0.9 1000 2.5 0.001 0.001 -0.0077 0.0018 0.0079 -7.4537 5.2995 -0.5471 
12 1.05 1 0.75 0.1 ½ -2.9427 0.3330 3.4659 -5.8316 3.5816 0.3897 
13 1.05 ⅓ 0.25 0.05 ½ -2.7126 0.2672 2.8613 -5.3936 3.4211 0.3833 
Note: 0 is used for values smaller than 055 10−× . 
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Table 4. Gains from Trade: Cases 2 and 3 
 θ L γ r α South 
Gains 
% 
North 
Gains % 
(potential)
(B-A)/A 
North 
Gains % 
(actual) 
(C-A)/A 
Change 
in SS  
% 
Change 
in NS  
% 
Change 
in 
S NS S+  
% 
 Benchmark          
1 1 3/4 1 0.05 ⅔ -8.3467 2.8265 15.3624 -12.7545 11.3223 0.7293 
 Some Extremes          
2 0.001 0.01 3/4 1000 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0.01 0.01 100 1000 ⅔ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0.99 1000 1000 0.001 0.98 -63.2263 0.0017 47.9812 -63.9724 0.0429 -3.5232 
5 1.1 0.9 1 0.001 0.98 -60.4139 0.0021 38.2198 -63.9350 0.0431 -3.5241 
6 0.75 1000 1000 0.001 0.75 -13.4026 3.8886 22.4986 -17.4584 11.5491 -0.5651 
7 1 .75 1 0.001 0.75 -13.3731 3.8789 22.4328 -17.4400 11.5588 -0.5544 
8 1.25 1.25 1.5 0.001 0.9 -4.0560 0.1960 47.3107 -4.4973 1.0232 0.4351 
9 0.99 0.75 0.75 1 0.99 -0.2929 0.0002 0.0002 -21.5305 19.0150 5.9603 
10 1.1 0.9 1 1.5 0.99 -0.2682 0.0001 0.0001 -17.9827 18.9414 5.8282 
11 1.1 1.25 1.5 0.1 0.9 -30.6186 0.5381 2.1186 -51.8056 2.0354 -11.8402 
12 1 20 25 0.001 0.8333 -34.6591 1.5781 26.9247 -39.9972 5.8367 -11.1343 
13 0.99 0.75 0.75 1 0.99 -0.2929 0.0002 0.0002 -21.5305 19.0150 5.9603 
14 1.1 0.9 1 1.5 0.99 -0.2682 0.0001 0.0001 -17.9827 18.9414 5.8282 
Note: 0 is used for values smaller than 055 10−× . 
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Table 5 When the South Initially Exports Manufactures 
 θ L γ r α South 
Gains % 
North 
Gains % 
(potential)
(B-A)/A 
North 
Gains % 
(actual) 
(C-A)/A 
Change 
in SS  
% 
Change 
in NS  
% 
Change 
in 
S NS S+
% 
 Benchmark          
1 1 1 3/4 0.05 0.7 10.5773 2.3199 -2.8762 15.1628 -4.7729 -2.5663 
 Some Extremes          
2 1.05 1/2 0.001 1000 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0.01 1.1 0.01 1000 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0.99 1000 500 0.001 0.5000 166.7529 8.4206 -24.3699 611.5711 -7.3800 3.1419 
5 0.99 100 50 0.001 0.5000 166.7540 8.4206 -24.3686 611.5742 -7.3803 3.1417 
6 1/3 5 1.5 0.001 5/6 0.3485 0.0063 27.0397 0.4183 -0.2046 -0.1292 
7 1/3 2.5 3/4 0.001 5/6 0.3542 0.0064 27.0133 0.4251 -0.2080 -0.1313 
8 1.05 0.9 0.5 0.75 0.525 276.96 2.1314 1.6939 500.52 -59.7461 -43.6054 
9 1.05 0.9 0.5 0.75 0.5291 42597.8 2.2695 2.2695 920028 -90.0759 -86.4917 
10 0.99 1000 1 0.001 0.001 0.2523 0.0292 -0.0485 1142.44 -9.2163 9.1000 
11 0.99 500 1/2 0.001 0.001 0.2523 0.0292 -0.0482 1142.67 -9.2370 9.0913 
Note: 0 is used for values smaller than 055 10−× . 
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Table 6 Global Steady States Consistent with Free Market 
 θ L γ r α North 
Trade Range 
South 
Trade Range 
GSCM Roots 
<0 
      *
NS  
D
NS  
*
SS  
D
SS  
G
SS  
G
NS   
1 1 1 3/2 3/2 8/10 0.5129 0.5720 0.4667 0.4162 0.4049 0.5624 1 
          0.9787 0.9857 1 
          0.0348 0.1409 2 
2 1 1/2 ¾ 5/2 5/6 0.4594 0.4859 0.4444 0.4205 0.4185 0.4839 1 
          0.3736 0.4389 1 
3 10 1.1 10 10 3/5 0.4639 0.4883 0.34 0.3204 0.3119 0.4805 1 
4 1 5/4 1.5 500 4/5 0.3336 0.3338 0.3333 0.3331 0.3378 0.3385 1 
Note: 0 is used for values smaller than 055 10−× . GSCM stock levels contained within the autarky and diversification levels are 
highlighted in bold. 
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Appendix 2. Notes on the Numerical Simulations 
All numerical calculations where implemented in Mathematica 5. Code is available upon 
request. Maple V was also used, but proved to be much slower in its numerical 
integration routines, so it was not used for the iterations phase. As we were interested in  
uncovering the behavior of the model in a five parameter space, we iterated over the 
following parameter set:  
γ(17)={1/1000, 1/100, 1/20, 1/10, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 1, 3/2, 5/2, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100, 500, 1000}; 
r(17)={1/1000, 1/100, 1/20, 1/10, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 1, 3/2, 5/2, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100, 500, 1000}; 
θ(17)={1/1000, 1/100, 1/10, 1/3, 1/2, 3/4, 9/10, 99/100, 1, 21/20, 11/10, 5/4, 3/2, 5/2, 5, 
10, 100}; 
L(21)={1/100, 1/10, 1/4, 1/3, 1/2 , 3/4 , 9/10, 1, 11/10, 5/4, 3/2, 5/2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 
100, 500, 1000}; and 
α(26)={1/1000, 15/1000, 1/100, 1/40, 1/20, 1/10, 2/10, 3/10, 1/3, 2/5, 9/20, 49/100, 1/2, 
501/1000, 515/1000,  51/100,  21/40,  11/20, 3/5, 2/3, 7/10, 4/5, 5/6, 9/10, 19/20, 
99/100}.  
 
This parameter set amount to 2,682,498 iterations, for each exercise. Of course not all 
parameter combinations are possible, for example in Case 1, only 1/ 2α ≤  is considered, 
and other parameter combinations, results in S Np p> . However, for each exercise all 
parameter combinations are checked.  
  Notice that step size differ for each parameter set. We deliberately chose smaller 
step sizes for parameter levels that our previous analysis determined to be relevant, for 
example around 1/ 2α = , or 1θ = . Also, step size was much larger toward the parameter 
extremes: 0,∞ . We used maximums of 1,000 and 1/1,000, which allows for ratios of 6 
significant digits to both sides of the decimal point.  
 Most calculations where performed at 16 digits of precision, but some numerical 
integrations where performed at a minimum precision of 12 significant digits to manage 
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the trade-off between speed and precision in Mathematica.  Since these variables (stock, 
time) calculated at 16 or 12 digits of precision are used to calculate other indicators, like 
change in welfare, the final precision would be less than 12 digits; however, there is 
ample headroom in the 4 significant digits we are reporting in our tables. That is, the 
reader can rest assured that if symbolical integration was possible, and other variables 
like time where also solved for symbolically, we would achieve the exact same numbers 
presented in the tables.   
 The raw data (roughly 2 giga-bytes) obtained from Mathematica was transferred 
to MS ACCESS a database management engine to sort and explore the results. At this 
stage further manual iterations around some interesting or surprising results where 
performed to better understand the behavior of the model. The numerical computations 
required several weeks of CPU usage. Several 2 GHz processors where joined into the 
computation effort.   
How to implement the numerical simulations: An example with Case 1.   
In this section we provide a brief roadmap to reproduce the results presented, using as an 
example Case 1.  What is necessary to describe the whole model is to first find the path 
(integrate the differential equations) of both stocks. Next we use those stock paths to 
solve for the time 1t  at which the both the North long term and South’s instantaneous 
terms of trade equate (i.e. time of diversification). With this information we proceed to 
integrate welfare during transition (function of the stocks and 1t ). Finally, we calculate 
labor efforts in the two states of the bang-bang final disequilibrium to calculate welfare in 
the North during both states.  
 172
We provide more details with case 1 as an example.  This case is characterized by 
constant extraction effort in the South, 2RSL Lα= , which allows us to analytically 
integrate the South’s stock differential equation: 
 
*
* ( 2 ) *
( 2 )
( )
/ ( 2 / )
S
S L t
S S
S L
S t
S C e L S Cγ θ α
γ θ α
γ θ α γ γ− −=
−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
− − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
, 
where * ( ) /SS C Lγ θα γ= −  of course is the starting stock level in the South, steady state 
under autarky.  With a known path for the stock in the South we also know the 
international price, *( ) 1/( ( ))Sp t S tθ= , throughout transition. 
 In Case 1, the North specializes in Manufactures during transition, therefore the 
path of the stock in the North can also be obtained analytically, it is simply the logistic 
growth rate: 
 
*
* *( ) / e (1 / )
N
N t
N N
SS t
S C S Cγ−
= + − , 
that depends on the starting point *NS , the autarkic stock equilibrium level described in 
(14). At this point we note that it is not always possible to obtain analytical expression for 
the stock levels, and that in the other cases it is necessary to numerically integrate the 
stock dynamic equations.  Thus, we also know the long term terms of trade of the North, 
(16), as a function of time only.  The next step is to obtain a numerical representation of 
1t , the time of diversification when *p  and 
D
Np  equalize. We can obtain this time, 
because we have expressions for the stock levels as a function of time, and thus we can 
express both prices as a function of time only. 
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 With a known finishing time for transition, we can calculate welfare accrued 
during transition (we use the indirect utility function), which in case 1 is equal for both 
countries: 
 
1
(1 )
0
(1 ) ( / *( ))
t
rtp t Le dtα αα α− −− ⋅∫  
which we integrate using numerical approximations. 
 We conclude by calculating welfare accumulated during the disequilibrium phase. 
In the case of the South, that has a constant welfare this is simply:  
 1(1 ) 1(1 ) ( / *( )) /
rtp t Le rα αα α −−− . 
In the case of the North it is a little bit more complicated. Welfare accumulated during 
the disequilibrium is an average of the two states that define disequilibrium: 
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
1 1 1 1
(1 ) ( / *( )) *( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( / *( ))
2 2
R R
N N N rt rt
p t p t S t L L L p t Le e
r r
α α α αα α θ α α− + + −− −⎡ ⎤− + − −⎣ ⎦ +
 
where 
1 1
2
[ (1 ) ( ) *( )]
R
N
N
LL
S t p t
α
α α θ
+ = + − , is the extraction level when the North tries to 
specialize in the Resource good. 
 
 174
Appendix 3. Stability of a Market Global Steady State 
In this appendix we review if convergence is possible around a global steady state 
consistent with market behavior. We begin with the two equations that describe a GSCM, 
equations (32) and (33).  
 ( ) [ '( )]( )NN N N N S
S
SS G S r G S S S
S
= − − −  
 ( ) 2 [ '( )]( )[ (1 ) ] /S S S N N S S N SS G S S L r G S S S S S Sαθ α α= − + − − + −  
First we make a first degree Taylor-Series approximation to the stock dynamics 
equations:  
 
( ) ( ) . . .
( ) ( ) . . .
G G
N N N S S
G G
S N N S S
S a S S b S S h o t
S c S S d S S h o t
≈ ⋅ − + ⋅ − +
≈ ⋅ − + ⋅ − +

  (A1) 
Where we use the subscript G to identify the stock levels at a GSCM, and the coefficients 
a, b, c, d to identify the following constants:  
2'( ) [ '( )] ''( ) ( )
G G G
G G G G GN S N
N N N N SG G
S S
S S Sa G S r G S G S S S
S S
⎛ ⎞−≡ − − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
; 
2
2
( ) [ '( )]
( )
G
GN
NG
S
Sb r G S
S
≡ − ; 
2(1 ) (1 2 ) (1 )[ '( )] ''( )( )
G G G G
G G G GN S S N
N N N NG G
S S
S S S Sc r G S G S S S
S S
α α α α⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤− − − + −≡ − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦ ; and 
2
(1 )'( ) 2 [ '( )] [ '( )]( )(1 )
( )
G G G
G G G G GS N N
S N N N SG G
S S
S S Sd G S L r G S r G S S S
S S
α ααθ α⎡ ⎤+ −≡ − − − − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
 In order to sign these coefficients, let us assume we are analyzing the case where 
the South initially exports the resource good, the most natural case. In this instance we 
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have that the stock grows in the North and decreases in the South, so we have that 
G G
N SS S> ; also '( )GNr G S> , because we know that in autarky *Nr S> , so after trade this 
latter inequality is enlarged. Also, recall that given the concavity of the growth function, 
''( ) 0NG S < . Thus, the second and third term in a are negative, while the first term does 
not have a determined sign. Similar is the case of d, the second and third term are 
negative, while the first term does not have a determined sign. Coefficient b is clearly 
positive, while coefficient c is also positive. 
 The signs of the roots of system (A1), can be determined by the sign of the trace 
and the determinant of the matrix of coefficients of the system. The trace of the matrix of 
coefficients will be unambiguously negative if the GSCM is achieved at stock levels in 
both countries higher than / 2C . In this case, both coefficients a and d would be 
unambiguously negative, and the system would have at least one negative root. That is as 
far as we can go with unambiguous statements. The second root will be negative if 
bc ad> , which for any GSS  and GNS  will depend on the model parameters. Also, by 
looking at the coefficients, we can say that higher intrinsic growth rates combine with 
low stock levels makes convergence less likely. 
 So we know for sure that the system converges to steady state around a 
neighborhood at least with a saddle-path when both GSS  and 
G
NS  are greater than / 2C , 
although a stable node is also possible. When either GSS  and 
G
NS  are less than / 2C , the 
system may or may not be convergent. The numerical analysis provided in section 4 
provides more insight. 
 Finally, it is important to stress that this is a very narrow analysis only valid in the 
close neighborhood of the GSCM.  Given the linearity of production functions, any 
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departure from equilibrium forces each country to zero and maximum labor in the 
resource sector, which of course substantially changes the stock dynamics equations (32) 
and (33). 
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